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This dissertation focuses on a phenomenon called appraisal bias in the residential 
mortgage market that stemmed from information asymmetry. It is composed of two 
essays, one theoretical and one empirical. The theoretical essay analyzes the existence of 
appraisal bias in a dynamic game of incomplete information framework and solves for 
the perfect Bayesian equilibria. It establishes how adding semi-verifiability condition to a 
cheap-talk game helps construct non-babbling equilibria in an asymmetric information 
environment. The empirical essay quantifies appraisal bias at individual loan level and 
measures its effect on mortgage terminations. It tests the extent to which option theory 
explains default and prepayment behavior in residential mortgage market. It treats default 
and prepayment hazards as dependent competing risks and jointly estimates mortgage 
terminations in a competing risk proportional hazard model framework and controls for 
unobserved heterogeneity using Heckman-Singer nonparametric method. It replaces the 
inaccurate approximated likelihood function that has been applied so far on competing 
risks analysis with an exact likelihood function. Armed with repeat sale transaction data, 
this paper is the first to analyze the effect of appraisal bias on mortgage terminations. It 
concludes that appraisal bias is important in determining mortgage terminations and 
needs to be controlled for to correctly estimate termination hazards.  
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 Chapter 1: Introduction to Dissertation 
My dissertation focuses on a phenomenon called appraisal bias in the residential 
mortgage market that stemmed from information asymmetry. It refers to practices 
conducted by real estate appraisers and mortgage lenders who intentionally inflate 
collateral values in order to maximize their profit at the expense of mortgage investors.  
 
My dissertation is composed of two essays, one theoretical and one empirical. The 
theoretical essay analyzes the existence of appraisal bias in a dynamic game of 
incomplete information framework and solves for the perfect Bayesian equilibria of this 
game. It establishes how adding semi-verifiability to a cheap-talk framework helps 
construct non-babbling equilibria in an asymmetric information environment.  
 
The empirical essay quantifies appraisal bias at individual loan level and measures its 
effect on mortgage terminations. It jointly estimates mortgage terminations in a 
competing risk proportional hazard model framework and controls for unobserved 
heterogeneity in a nonparametric approach. It concludes that appraisal bias is important 
in determining mortgage terminations and needs to be controlled for to correctly estimate 
termination hazards. 
 
Essay I: How Mortgage Appraisers Produce Biased Appraisals by Inflating Property 
Value – A Theoretical Illustration 
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 The U.S. residential mortgage market consists of two markets: a primary market and a 
secondary market. The primary market is one where new mortgages are created through 
credit extension from mortgage lenders to borrowers. The secondary market is one where 
investors and mortgage lenders buy and sell existing and prospective loans. In order to 
reduce mortgage default risks faced to investors, most mortgages sold to the secondary 
mortgage market are guaranteed against default risks by government-sponsored 
enterprises (GSEs) such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.  
 
The structure of the secondary market limits the roles of GSEs by prohibiting them to 
participate in the primary market. They need to rely on information provided by mortgage 
lenders to evaluate the credit risks of mortgages and charge guarantee fees accordingly.  
 
The structure of the U.S. secondary mortgage market creates an asymmetric information 
environment between GSEs and mortgage lenders. Information asymmetry provides 
incentive for one party to maximize his own utility at the expense of the other. In the 
secondary mortgage market, this incentive is realized through the practice of appraisal 
bias where lenders report inflated collateral values to GSEs in order to reduce the 
guarantee fees.  
 
This paper sets up a dynamic signaling game with incomplete information structure to 
analyze the existence of appraisal bias. The game is played between mortgage lender and 
GSEs. In this game, mortgage lenders send out signals in the form of appraisal prices to 
GSEs about the credit quality of their loans and GSEs react to these signals in 
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 conjunction with the termination outcomes of mortgages. In contrast to Spence (1976)’s 
signaling game, where the sender’s signal is exogenously costly, the signals sent by 
mortgage lenders are costless and do not depend on lenders’ types. In addition, they are 
nonbinding and non-verifiable. Hence, these messages are not informative to separate the 
types. These types of games are referred to as “Cheap Talk” games.  
 
This paper modifies the “Cheap Talk” structure by adding an extra condition, namely 
semi-verifiability to make the signals informative. It establishes how adding semi-
verifiability to a “Cheap Talk” game structure helps construct a non-babbling Bayesian 
equilibrium in an asymmetric information environment. It proves that appraisal bias can 
exist in the secondary mortgage market and provides equilibrium conditions for the 
hybrid and pure strategy equilibria that bring it into play.  
 
It proves that there exists a hybrid equilibrium where it is optimal for mortgage lenders to 
randomize between truthfully reporting the property value and defrauding given GSEs’ 
action. The existence of the hybrid equilibrium confirms empirical evidence that 
appraisal bias exists in some but not all mortgage cases. It also provides a scope of 
parameter conditions such that a pooling equilibrium where all lenders choose to behave 
honestly/dishonestly exists, as well as conditions for a separating equilibrium to exist 
where lenders behave differently according to the types of mortgages they receive.  
 
This paper contributes to the literature by providing semi-verifiability conditions to 
reverse the uninformative signals in the “Cheap Talk” game specification. It is the first to 
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 theoretically prove the existence of appraisal bias in the residential mortgage market and 
solves for the equilibrium strategies between secondary market participants.   
 
Essay II: An Empirical Analysis of Mortgage Termination With Appraisal Bias - 
Maximum likelihood Estimation of a Proportional Hazard Competing Risks Model with 
Grouped Duration Data  
 
Following the theoretical establishment on the existence of appraisal bias, this paper 
empirically tests the effect of appraisal bias on mortgage terminations in a competing-risk 
proportional hazard duration framework with controls for unobserved heterogeneity. 
Armed with repeat sales transaction data, this paper is the first to measure appraisal bias 
at individual loan level and quantifies its effect in mortgage termination studies.  
 
Following literature on mortgage terminations, this paper tests the extent to which 
financial option theory explains default and prepayment behaviors. By running different 
model specifications, this paper concludes that a non-ruthless model specification where 
mortgage terminations depend on borrower, property, and macroeconomic characteristics 
in addition to financial option related variables outperforms the ruthless model where 
only financial option related variables are deemed relevant. It also demonstrates that a 
non-ruthless model where appraisal bias is controlled for outperforms one that does not. 
Throughout model specifications, default and prepayment hazards are treated as 
dependent competing risks and are estimated jointly using maximum likelihood 
estimation method. In addition, this paper accounts for unobserved heterogeneity by 
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 Heckman-Singer’s nonparametric method and estimates it simultaneously with the 
parameters and baseline hazards for default and prepayment.  
 
The findings suggest that high probability of negative equity increases the default hazard 
and reduces the prepayment hazard; large gap between the market value and the face 
value of the mortgage increases the prepayment hazard. In addition, default hazard is 
significantly influenced by appraisal bias. A high appraisal bias leads to a high likelihood 
of default and the effect increases in a decreasing fashion. Borrower’s willingness to 
exercise financial options is also triggered or hindered by trigger events and asymmetric 
information. For example, default hazard monotonically increases as borrower credit 
score deteriorates; it increases with borrowers’ debt-to-income ratio, origination loan-to-
value ratio and state level quarterly unemployment rate; and decreases with mortgage 
loan amount. Mortgage loan amount is also found to be positively influencing 
prepayment default.    
 
The model also suggests that there exist unobserved heterogeneity in mortgage 
terminations. The heterogeneity can be attributed to difference in borrowers’ attitude 
toward prepayment and default, it can also be attributed to unmeasured house-specific 
factors such as unexpected depreciation or appreciation of property values, as well as 
borrower tastes or abilities. Among all plausible interpretations, I assume that unobserved 
heterogeneity is picking up differences in borrowers’ financial awareness toward 
prepayment and default throughout this paper. Under the assumption that the 
heterogeneity is picking up the difference in borrowers’ attitude, the results suggest that 
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 80 percent of people have a high tendency toward prepayment risk, whereas 20 percent 
have low tendency toward prepayment; there does not seem to be any difference toward 
default.   
 
This paper concludes that origination appraisal bias is significant in predicting default 
probabilities and must be controlled in order to achieve optimal model performance. The 
higher the appraisal bias, the bigger the default hazard is. Unobserved heterogeneity 
exists in both default and prepayment before appraisal bias is controlled, indicating 
existence of omitted variables. The heterogeneity disappears in the default space after 
controlling for appraisal bias, suggesting once again the importance of accounting for 
appraisal bias in mortgage termination studies. 
 
The paper is the first to measure origination appraisal bias on loan level and examine its 
effect on mortgage terminations; it demonstrates the importance of appraisal bias in 
default hazard and establishes the necessity to control for it in mortgage termination 
studies; it is the first to replace the widely used yet inappropriate approximation 
likelihood function by an exact likelihood function to freely estimate the weights for the 
two hazards; it applies the Heckman-Singer semiparametric heterogeneity distribution to 
allow for independence between default and prepayment heterogeneity. 
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 Chapter 2: How Mortgage Appraisers Produce Biased Appraisals by 
Inflating Property Value – A Theoretical Illustration 
 
2.1 Introduction 
It is well recognized that information asymmetry between sellers and buyers can lead to 
market inefficiency, thanks to the seminal work lead by Akerlof (1970). Ever since then, 
information economics gradually stepped out of the shadow and became a research area 
that draws great attentions from economists. In addition to recognizing this problem, 
researchers who work on information economics attempt to develop mechanisms to 
achieve efficient outcomes by reducing information asymmetry in the market (Akerlof 
1970; Spence 1974; Stiglitz 1976, 1977). 
 
Although information asymmetry exists extensively in the market, economic parties are 
always able to develop instruments to mitigate it. For example, product warranties, 
certified mechanical inspections, skills certifications are all instruments that can reduce 
information asymmetry, to name a few. This paper analyzes a phenomenon that stems 
from information asymmetry structure in the residential mortgage market that had been 
well maintained historically but not any more, thanks to drastic changes in the market 
environment. This phenomenon is referred to as appraisal bias, it refers to actions taken 
by mortgage lenders who intentionally inflate collateral property values to under report 
default risks in order to maximize their profit at the expense of mortgage investors.  
 
This paper is organized as follows: section 2 introduces residential mortgage market, its 
composition and participants. It also explains in detail the incentive and existence of 
appraisal bias under the current market environment. Section 3 reviews literatures on 
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 market efficiency, information asymmetry and various mechanisms that market 
participants introduced to mitigate the problem. It follows with a review on a particular 
game introduced by Crawford and Sobel (1982) as cheap talk. Cheap talk has the unique 
property that it is costless to declare players’ types, and consequently a babbling 
Bayesian equilibrium shall be reached. This game structure can be applied to mortgage 
market and helps explain the existence of appraisal bias. In section 4, I shall prove how 
the introduction of semi-verifiability into the appraisal bias cheap talk game structure can 
help construct a non-babbling Bayesian equilibrium in an asymmetric information 
environment. Section 5 concludes the paper and provides suggestions for future 
improvements.   
 
2.2 Residential Mortgage Market 
What is residential mortgage market? Residential mortgage market is the origination, 
sale, and servicing of mortgage loans secured by residential real estate (MBA of 
America). The residential real estate industry is one of the largest sectors of the economy, 
constituting 14 percent of U.S. total GDP in 2003 (Bureau of Economic Analysis: 2003 
NIPA Table for GDP). It is also a significant contributor to the U.S. economy, providing 
millions of job opportunities and generating hundreds of billions of dollars of economic 
output each year. Real estate is also an important source of wealth building for 
homeowners, with home equity serving as the largest share of household wealth. This is a 
market that has enjoyed a strong growth in the past years, with an average growth rate 
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 twice as much as that of the GDP1. In dollar terms, U.S. residential single-family 
mortgage originations totaled $2.6 trillion in 2002, 29 percent higher than that in 2001. 
U.S. residential MDO in 2003 reached a stunning $7.8 trillion. This is one of the markets 
that keep the U.S. economy moving forward.  
 
The U.S mortgage market consists of primary and secondary markets. The primary 
mortgage market is where new loans are created. Borrowers who seek mortgage credit to 
finance real estate apply for mortgages from mortgage lenders who provide long-term 
funds with fixed and variable rates of interest. This process includes origination, 
processing, underwriting, and closing of the loan. The secondary mortgage market is 
where investors and mortgage lenders buy and sell existing and prospective loans as 
investment tools. The secondary mortgage market provides liquidity to allow mortgage 
originators to meet immediate needs for capital and enables investors to invest in 
mortgages easily. It assists the flow of capital from cash surplus areas where available 
capital exceeds credit demands to areas with cash shortage. By balancing capital 
distribution, geographical differences in interest rates disappear, making rates 
competitive nationally. To summarize, the primary market involves an extension of credit 
to borrower, and the secondary market markets a sale of that credit instrument.  
 
                                                 
1 During the last decade when U.S. GDP sustained an average 3.5 percent growth rate, the U.S. mortgage 
debt outstanding (MDO) yielded a seven percent annual growth rate.  Between 2001 and 2002, MDO’s 
growth rate further escalated to11.3 percent and 12.0 percent, making 2001 –2002 the first two consecutive 
years of double-digit residential mortgage debt outstanding growth since 1988-1989 (Fannie Mae 2002 
Annual Report, U.S. Census Bureau 2002). 
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 There are many participants in the mortgage market.  They include borrowers, lenders, 
government agencies, government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), private agencies and 
investors.  
 
Mortgage market participants and the relationship among them can be depicted by the 
following flow chart.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mortgage
Lenders (Primary mortgage 
market):  
• Mortgage Bankers 
• Commercial Banks  
• Savings and Loan 
Associations 
• Credit Unions 
 
Purchasers (Secondary mortgage 
market): 
• Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, 
Ginnie Mae 
• Private Conduits 
• Other Lenders 
• Security Dealers 
• Mortgage Brokers 
Cash MBS 
Cash/MBS
Investors: 
• Primary Mortgage Market 
Lenders 
• Pension Funds 
• Life Insurance Companies 
• International Market 
 
Figure 1. Market Participants and Their Relationship in the Primary and Secondary 
Mortgage Market 
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 Among the above participants, the relationship between mortgage lenders and GSEs is of 
particular interest to this paper. Mortgage lenders include mortgage bankers, commercial 
banks, mutual savings banks, savings and loan associations, credit unions and others that 
are capable of lending money to borrowers to finance mortgages. These institutions may 
hold the mortgages they originated in their portfolio for investment purposes, they may 
also sell those mortgages into the secondary mortgage market for liquidity concerns. In 
order to reduce mortgage default risks faced to investors, most mortgages sold to the 
secondary mortgage market are guaranteed against default risks by GSEs.  
 
There are two GSEs in the secondary market: Federal National Mortgage Association 
(Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac). Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac are identified as GSEs because the U.S. federal government was 
involved in the creation of them. In 1938 and 1970, the U.S. Congress established Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac respectively to expand the flow of mortgage money by creating a 
secondary market. Currently, both of them are private corporations, although they still 
obtain a credit line at the U.S. Treasury. The importance of the GSE classification is that 
the debts of the GSEs are perceived in the marketplace as “United States Agency” 
securities and thus are sold at lower rates, even though neither is a part of the U. S. 
federal government. 
 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac purchase mortgages from mortgage lenders and issue 
mortgage-backed securities (MBS) to sell to the investors. In principle, a lender delivers a 
package of mortgages to either of the two GSEs. Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac issues 
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 MBSs to the lender, guarantees timely payment of principal and interest to the investors, 
and assumes the credit risk on the loans. In return for the credit guarantee, the lender is 
charged a guaranty fee. He then sells the guaranteed MBS to investors through Wall 
Street dealers. 
 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac issue the biggest volumes of mortgage-backed securities in 
the secondary mortgage market. Jointly they hold on their balance sheet nearly $300 
billion home mortgages, plus an additional $1.2 trillion of MBS’s, compared with a total 
$6.6 trillion of home mortgages outstanding in the United States (FM Watch, 2003). 
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the government owned agency Ginnie Mae together 
account for 58 percent of residential MBS as of September 2004 in the U.S. market (ETF 
Connect). These MBSs are popular among lenders because standardization has made loan 
sales efficient and effective. Investors also favor these MBS products because repayment 
of the securities is backed by the full faith and credit of government-sponsored 
enterprises. As a result, mortgage money needed to finance residential and commercial 
properties is available in every geographic region of the United States.  
 
There are several steps in a typical mortgage transaction involving selling loans to GSEs. 
It starts with a mortgage borrower who applies for a loan from a mortgage lender. The 
lender then underwrites the loan upon receiving the application and makes an offer to the 
borrower. The offer is often in the form of a combination of an interest rate, loan term 
and monthly payment. It is determined based on pricing schedules set up by GSEs in their 
automated underwriting tools. The borrower can then reject or accept the offer. The 
 12
 underwriting process needs to comply with Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac’s standard for 
delivery. Once accepted by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac, the loan package is sold and 
delivered to its intended purchaser. The lender generates revenue by enjoying an 
origination fee from the borrower and a servicing fee from the investor for future loan 
administration. In addition, the lender will be free of repayment obligations should the 
loan defaults in the future. Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac charges guarantee fee and enjoys 
net interest income from the interest spread. They assume default risk and guarantee 
timely payment of the mortgage principal and interest even if the borrower fails to fulfill 
his mortgage obligations. In essence, the lender passes the mortgage and associated 
default risk to Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac, depending on who agrees to guarantee the 
mortgage.  
 
This paper focuses on the unique relationship between mortgage lenders and GSEs, the 
information asymmetry structure between them and the consequence of information 
asymmetry.  
 
The structure of the secondary mortgage market makes information asymmetric between 
mortgage lenders and GSEs, and consequently provides existence for an incentive 
problem. According to charter rules, GSEs are not allowed to participate in the primary 
mortgage market; they need to rely on solely the information provided by mortgage 
lenders at loan origination to evaluate the risks associated with each application and 
determine its pricing schedules and purchasing decisions2. Mortgage lenders, on the other 
                                                 
2 However, GSEs can conduct costly post foreclosure reviews after default has occurred, but successful 
fraud detection is not guaranteed.  
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 hand, know more about the borrower and property characteristics than GSEs do. They 
have incentive to behave in ways to maximize their profit at the expense of the GSEs 
provided that their actions are not detectable. 
 
For example, a profit maximizing lender would manipulate the mortgage application 
information in order to achieve favorable outcome if there is no consequences of their 
actions. Two types of application information that affect pricing decisions are required to 
submit to GSE’s in addition to mortgage parameters. One is borrower specific 
information; the other is property specific information. Borrower information includes a 
borrower’s financial conditions, his credit ratings, his debts and other financial 
obligations, etc. Property information includes current property value. Between the two 
types of information, borrower specific information is provided and verified 
independently by third parties such as credit bureaus, the borrower’s employer, bank and 
IRS. On the other hand, the mortgage lender is the only source that provides information 
regarding the collateral property value when property purchase price does not exist, for 
example, in refinance transactions3. Since current property value at mortgage origination 
significantly influences the price being offered, mortgage lenders have incentive to 
manipulate property values in order to maximize their profit. The fact that fraud on loans 
delivered to Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac cannot be costlessly detected further strengthens 
that incentive.  
 
                                                 
3 In purchase transactions where both purchase price and the appraisal value of the property exist, the 
current property value is determined by the minimum of the property purchase transaction price and the 
appraisal price. In refinance transactions where no purchase price exists, the current property value is 
determined solely based on the lender-provided appraisal price.  
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 Real estate mortgage market has realized long ago the information asymmetry and 
incentives embedded in this market. In order to reduce the asymmetric information and 
incentives, it requires an objective third party to verify the truthfulness of the collateral 
value information. This job is done entirely by the real estate appraisal industry. Real 
estate appraisers are the channels chosen by mortgage lenders and borrowers to deliver 
information from one party to the other. Their purposes are to protect real estate sellers 
and buyers from frauds as well as mortgage lenders from credit loss.  
 
The real estate appraisal industry certifies the value of properties that are about to be sold 
or refinanced into the mortgage market. They provide an estimate of the property value 
by researching comparable sales in the same area and by inspecting the property 
condition. Their estimate helps mortgage lenders determine if the property they are about 
to lend money for are worth the mortgage amount. In refinance transactions where no 
purchase price is available on the property, their estimate is the one and only information 
that lenders and GSEs rely on for pricing decisions. In theory, real estate appraisers 
should maintain independence of mortgage borrowers and mortgage lenders in order to 
present objective and unbiased opinion on the value of the property. However, recent 
changes in mortgage market structures and intensive competition among appraisers 
provide incentives to real estate appraisers not to fulfill their duties objectively.  
 
The residential mortgage market experienced significant changes during the past decades. 
During 1970s and 1980s when home ownership was low, the residential mortgage market 
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 was dominated with low loan-to-value (LTV) 4 ratio purchase money mortgages. 
Purchase money mortgages, or purchase transactions are ones whose purpose is to 
purchase a house, either new or existing. It involves an ownership change of hand. In 
purchase money mortgages, there exist purchase transaction prices that are jointly 
determined by the property sellers and the property buyers. In purchase money mortgage 
transactions, both lenders and secondary market mortgage buyers observe the purchase 
transaction prices coupled with the appraisal prices. Secondary market participants such 
as GSEs rely on the combination of the two sources of information on property value to 
determine appropriate pricing schedules. The existence of an actual purchase transaction 
price deters the appraisers to deviate much from it.    
 
Apart from a large concentration of purchase money mortgages, the mortgage market in 
early period also enjoyed a pool of high quality borrowers with low credit risks. In those 
days, mortgage loans were offered exclusively to high quality borrowers who could 
afford to put down large down payments, resulting in a small credit risk for the mortgage 
lenders. In addition, the incentive to defraud did not exist because mortgage lenders 
typically held the mortgages they originated in their portfolio instead of selling them to 
GSEs; it was in their best interest to report the accurate collateral value to fully 
understand the credit risks. As a result, those market characteristics significantly relaxed 
the market dependence from real estate appraisers. Appraisers simply were asked to 
verify the reasonability of the purchase price on the property. Rarely were appraisers 
asked to determine if the borrower would have enough equity in the transaction so that 
                                                 
4 Loan-to-value ratio (LTV) measures the ratio of loan amount to equity; the higher the LTV is, the higher 
the credit risk is.  
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 the lender would be protected in case of default or should mortgage insurance be 
required. Most lenders simply counted on rising housing prices, making such decisions 
irrelevant.  
 
Today, every aspect of the old environment is gone. For example with the significant 
reduction in long term interest rates in the 1990s, refinancing and home equity loans have 
come to dominate the residential mortgage market, making purchase money mortgage 
less than one quarter of total mortgage transactions. Refinance mortgages are loans 
whose purpose is to payoff an existing mortgage and refinance into a new mortgage; it 
does not involve a change of ownership. Unlike in purchase money transaction where an 
actual sale price is available, there does not exist transaction price on the refinance 
property. Hence appraisal values are the sole source for GSEs to determine pricings, 
making appraisers’ role unprecedented important in the mortgage market.  
 
Changes in the market also encompass an increasing share of high LTV loans with less 
than 20 percent down payments in the market. Those loans are relatively riskier in terms 
of credit loss than their safe counterparts of the old days. However, due to their 
affordability feature, they continue to be on the rise and account for more than a quarter 
of total mortgage products since 1995. In addition, more than half of all loans are 
originated with the intension to be sold as MBSs (Fannie Mae Annual Report 2003). 
Lastly, with the rising home ownership and increasing demand for housing, mortgage 
lenders began to expand to borrowers with sub-prime credit history and financial 
conditions, resulting in a higher consumer delinquency rates on mortgage products. All 
 17
 these new market trends call for stringent evaluations and pricing decisions in order to 
reduce credit loss. As a result, real estate appraiser’s estimates on collateral values are 
more and more heavily replied upon.  
 
However, the mortgage market fails to adjust the market structure to prevent inefficient 
outcomes under the new environment.  
 
Previously, real estate appraisers worked closely with mortgage lenders in order to reduce 
the search cost for appraisers and to increase efficiency. Consequently, mortgage lenders 
rely on their in-house or designated appraisers to conduct collateral evaluations. Although 
harmless in the old environment, this relationship reduces the independent role of real 
estate appraisers and causes them to share the same objectives as mortgage lenders. As a 
result, appraisers behave in ways that maximize mortgage lenders’ profit at the expense 
of maintaining independence. Pressure from mortgage lenders becomes an important 
reason for appraisers to compromise their principle. According to an article on the 
Denver Post, “The people who certify what homes are worth when they are sold or 
refinanced say they are being pressured to inflate their numbers to ensure that the lending 
deals go through” (The Denver Post, July 20, 2003). Appraisers acknowledge they are 
under pervasive client pressure and have a tendency to give in when exerted by important 
clients (Kinnard, Lenk and Worzala 1997). Pressures from lenders are often in the forms 
of threat of withholding fee payments or reduction in future assignments (Levy and 
Schuck 1999). 
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 Apart from pressures exerted by mortgage lenders, competition in the appraisal industry 
accelerates the trend of unethical practices. On average, an appraiser charges $300 to 
$600 per case; it is an unstable source of income for real estate appraisers. Even in the 
refinance boom year of 1994, there were only 100 transactions per appraiser on average, 
generating an average income of $25,000 to $30,000 for appraisers. Their average 
incomes declined by more than one-third over the next two years after the refinance 
slowed down. Consequently, real estate appraisers have tendency to succumb to the 
market trends.  
 
The common fraudulent practice is to arbitrarily inflate the property value in the absence 
of purchase price in refinance transactions. Instead of conducting comparable research 
and in-house research, the appraiser finds out the size of the underlying mortgage that the 
homeowner wants to refinance or how big a credit line he wants to establish. Often 
appraisers are given this information by the mortgage borrower or the mortgage lender. 
Or the appraiser finds out what interest rate the homeowner wants to qualify for. In other 
cases, appraisers inflate property value to help borrower avoid mortgage insurance, which 
could be as high as half of the mortgage payment. This systematic fraudulent action is 
referred to as appraisal bias. 
 
Below is an example of how appraisal bias works in favor of mortgage borrowers in a 
refinance transaction. Suppose a homeowner chose an 80 percent LTV loan for a property 
worth $100,000 in 1990. Let’s assume his property appreciated to $110,000 in 2000 and 
he chose to refinance and cash in some of his home equity appreciation in a declining 
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 interest rate environment. Suppose further that he had paid down $10,000 of the 
mortgage payment and was left with $70,000 as outstanding unpaid principal balance in 
2000. Thanks to his equity appreciation, this borrower could apply for up to $88,000 in 
mortgage amount and still keep his LTV equal to 20 percent. This allowed him to have 
$18,000 in cash after paying off his current mortgage balance of $70,000. Appraisal bias 
could escalate this borrower’s ability to take more cash out of his mortgage yet keep the 
LTV intact.  
 
Mortgage lenders have strong incentive to maintain the existence of appraisal bias 
because it brings substantial monetary values to them. From a revenue perspective, 
holding everything else constant a higher property value lowers the interest rate for 
mortgage borrowers, making it easy for the mortgage deal to go through and hence 
increase the revenue. From a cost perspective, a high property value mortgage lowers the 
credit risk and in turn lowers the guarantee fee charged by GSEs. Therefore, mortgage 
lenders have strong motivation to maintain a system of appraisal incentives.  
   
Appraisal bias can lead to significant loss to the GSEs and the society as a whole, 
although it is a favorite to mortgage lenders. Because equity influence default and 
appraisals are used to estimate borrower’s equity in the absence of a transaction price, 
over-valuation of collaterals results in underestimation of the default risk. The 
underreported default risk is passed to secondary mortgage market agents and can cause 
significant consequences. Many times these fraudulent loans end up in foreclosure, 
resulting in financial losses to mortgage buyers. The total price of mortgage fraud could 
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 be as high as $120 billion, with the Mortgage Banker Association (MBA) estimating over 
$60 billion from its reporting membership (The Denver Post July 20, 2003). For example, 
among others, fraud appraisals had lead to failures of many thrifts and saving banks, 
which had to be bailed out by the federal government in the saving and loan crisis in the 
1980s. Thousands of foreclosed properties were significantly overvalued and the revues 
from sales of them were far enough to recoup the losses. A report by the U. S. House of 
Representatives Committee on Government Operations5 concluded that 10 to 15 percent 
of the $1.3 billion in losses suffered by private mortgage insurers in 1984-1985 could be 
attributed to inaccurate and fraudulent appraisals, and that 10 to 40 percent of the $420 
million in loan losses at the Veterans Administration in 1987 was caused by inaccurate or 
dishonest appraisals or other appraisal-related deficiencies. The FBI recently reported 
that 10 to 15 percent of all loan applications contains material misrepresentations, such as 
inflated property valuations (The Denver Post July 20, 2003). “Appraisal bias, spreading 
like a cancer, is eating away at the industry’s moral foundation” (NAIFA – AppraiserE-
Gram, 2001). 
 
Empirical research also documented the evidence of appraisal bias. Using a sample of 
mortgages purchased by Fannie Mae, Cho and Megbolugbe find that in more than 80 
percent of the cases, the appraisal is between 0 and 5 percent above the transaction 
purchase price, in only 5 percent of the cases is the appraisal lower (Cho and Megbolugbe 
1996). Chinloy, Cho and Megbolugbe show that appraisals are systematically higher than 
purchase data using 3.7 million repeat transactions on mortgages bought by Fannie Mae 
                                                 
5 “Impact of Appraisal Problems on Real Estate Lending, Mortgage Insurance, and Investment in the 
Secondary Market,” a.k.a. “1986 Barnard Report”. 
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 and Freddie Mac by using monthly data from January 1975 to December 1993 (Chinloy, 
Cho and Megbolugbe 1996). 
 
The alternative world where property appraisers are commissioned by GSEs, instead of 
mortgage lenders cannot solve the problem either. In this case, the situation is reversed 
with appraisers share the same incentive with GSEs. GSEs would like to increase the 
guarantee fee even when the default risk is not high, making appraisers likely to under 
report the property value. Therefore, reversing the roles does not solve the incentive 
problem. 
  
In summary, the existence of information asymmetry between mortgage lenders and 
GSEs creates an environment for a problem to exist. This problem is realized through a 
phenomenon in refinance transactions referred to as appraisal bias. Because the 
truthfulness of the property value is costly for GSEs to verify independently, mortgage 
lenders with their in-house appraisers have incentive to inflate the property value in order 
to maximize their profit at the expense of GSEs. Complementing the anecdotal evidence 
and empirical research on the existence of appraisal bias, the remaining parts of this 
paper attempt to analyze the existence of appraisal bias from a theoretical point of view.      
 
2.3 Literature Review 
Information has proven to be very valuable to individuals and entities in the economy 
because shortage of it can impair the economy. One form of information shortage is 
reflected by the existence of asymmetric information among economic agents. 
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 Asymmetries of information are pervasive in economic relationships: customers know 
more about their tastes than firms, firms know more about their costs than the 
government, and all agents take actions that are at least partly unobservable. Such 
information asymmetry can have a profound impact on market efficiency and 
organizational structure (Akerlof 1970, Hart 1989). For example, in Akerlof (1970)’s 
seminal work on lemons, he shows that a market may function very badly if the informed 
party cannot communicate effectively the quality of the good it is selling to the 
uninformed party. His result shows that information asymmetry about product quality can 
hinder the function of the market from where all quality products are trade to the point 
where only the worst quality goods are traded, and ultimately the market unravels. The 
disappearance of markets for high quality commodities caused by information asymmetry 
reduces market efficiency, whereas such markets, under competitive structure with 
complete information, could reach Pareto efficiency (Vikers 1995).  
 
The asymmetric information between an informed party and an uninformed party in 
general takes on two forms: hidden action where the private information is regarding to 
what an agent does, and hidden information where the private information bears on who 
the agent is (Salanie 1997). Economists who study the economics of information also 
take on different path to attenuate the problem of asymmetric information based on the 
two types of private information. They include adverse selection models, signaling 
models and moral hazard models. Adverse selection models, also named as self-selection 
or screening models, apply to cases where the uninformed party is imperfectly informed 
of who the informed party is, i.e. the characteristics of him, and initiate the first move 
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 (Stiglitz 1976). Signaling models share the same information availability with the adverse 
selection model, but differ in that the informed party moves first to signal who they are to 
the uninformed party (Spence 1971, 1974). Lastly, in moral hazard, also called agency 
problem cases, the uninformed party is imperfectly informed of the action of the 
informed party and acts first (Holmstrm and Milgrom 1987).  
 
In adverse selection cases, the uninformed agent designs a menu of contracts for the 
informed agents to choose such that the informed agents shall reveal themselves through 
their choices. Examples of such include life insurance where the insurer offers several 
insurance packages to tailor for specific risk class, credit extensions where banks use 
different interest rates to assess borrowers’ default risks, firm regulations where 
regulators set up contracts such that firms accurately reveal their cost in choosing the 
contracts, and optimal taxations where tax on production help government to maximize 
social welfare by implementing an allocation of consumption and labor (Maskin and 
Riley 1984; Stiglitz and Weiss 1981; Laffont 1994; Mirrlees 1986).  
 
Extensions are made on adverse selection models including competition within the 
informed parties as well as the uninformed parties, risk-averse agents, and asymmetric 
information on both sides (Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976, Salop and Salop, 1976; 
Champsaur and Rochet 1989; Salanie 1990). For example, Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) 
studied a competitive insurance market and showed that a pooling equilibrium where all 
people buy the same insurance contract despite accident probability cannot hold. Such a 
market may end up either with a separating equilibrium where people buy different 
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 insurance contacts in accordance to their accident probability, or there exists no 
equilibrium at all. As a result, equilibrium strategies can be drastically different from 
standard adverse selection models in some of those extensions.  
 
Different from screening models, signaling refers to games that the informed party moves 
first by sending a signal that may reveal information relating to his type. And the 
uninformed party then tries to decrypt these signals by using interpretative scheme. 
Spence classified the signaling into contingent contract and exogenous costly signals 
(Spence 1976).  Contingent contract is defined as contracts where “there involve a menu 
of options for the seller that are created by virtue of the buyer’s subsequent ability to 
observe the product quality directly, and, to transact with the seller at that point – hence 
the terms contingent contract” (Spence 1976). One good example of contingent contract 
is warranties offered by product manufactures. Heal (1977) stated that existence of a 
warranty provided incentives for producers to improve quality, at least to the extent to 
reduce the chances of falling below the product warranty. Spence (1977) perceived 
warranty as a signal where high quality producers could afford to offer more complete 
warranty while low quality producers choose not to. However, the actual effect and 
design of warranty can be more complicated than just a signal (Cooper and Ross 1988).  
 
Exogenous costly signals are defined as “activities engaged in by the seller, which have 
costs that vary with product quality, independent of the buyer’s response to the activity” 
(Spence 1976). Education is a good example of an exogenous costly signal. Spence 
(1974) explored the effect of education as a signal for productivity of employees in the 
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 labor market. By assuming a disutility suffered only by low productivity labors, Spence 
derived that the successful completion of a higher degree signals the employee’s 
productivity type to prospective employers. Note that the costly education expenditures 
are initiated before the labor is supplied, which is independent of possible responses of 
employers; hence the name exogenous costly signal applies. Other signaling and 
screening devices studied include price (Wolinsky 1983) and reputation (Shapiro 1982, 
1983, Rogerson 1983, and Allen 1984) etc6. 
 
The reason why exogenous costly signals enable the uninformed party to separate the 
agents is due to the existence of a signal whose cost varies with the types of the informed 
party. Spence (1976) suggested that verbal declaration could also function as a potential 
source of information. However, words are cheap and free of costs, which hardly provide 
convincing information. Signals where there exists no cost for the agents who send them 
are referred to as costless signals.  
 
Crawford and Sobel (1982) are the first to analyze cheap-talk games where all signals are 
costless. Cheap-talk game is a special case of signaling game where the signal sender’s 
messages are costless, nonbinding and non-verifiable. For that reason, such talks cannot 
be informative in Spence’s signaling games because the signal senders have the same 
preference over the receiver’s actions. Hence there always exists a non-informative 
babbling equilibrium in cheap-talk games where all signals shall be ignored. 
                                                 
6 Wolinsky (1983) argued that high price is associated with high quality product because high cost level is 
required to consistently deliver the quality; hence a markup needs to be earned to support the quality. 
Shapiro (1983) argued that reputation can also serve as an effective instrument to differentiate product 
quality given ample returns. 
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 Nevertheless, Crawford and Sobel (1982) show that there also exist equilibria that reveal 
some information. Their research suggests that more communication can occur through 
cheap talk when the player’s preferences are more closely aligned, but perfect 
communication cannot occur unless the players’ references are perfectly aligned. 
Examples of cheap talk include policy announcement by the Federal Reserve, veto threats 
by the president, information transmission in debate and union voice to the management 
(Stein 1989; Mathews 1989; Austen and Smith 1990; Farrell and Gibbons 1991). I will 
model the appraisal bias phenomenon based on the cheap-talk game. 
 
The last family of games that reflect information asymmetry is moral hazard, or 
principal-agent models. In moral hazard settings, an agent takes an action that affects his 
utility as well as that of the principal; the principal only observes the outcome, which is 
an imperfect signal of the action taken. As a result, the action the agent would choose 
spontaneously is not Pareto optimal. Examples of moral hazard appear almost 
everywhere in the economy. For example, it can be found in the employer-employee 
relationship, property insurer and the insured relationship, car owner and his mechanic’s 
relationship, patient and doctor relationship. Grossman and Hart (1983) suggest an 
optimal contract offered to the agent that maximizes the principal’s utility. The optimal 
contract should trade off risk sharing and incentives, which are the basis of moral hazard. 
    
In summary, information asymmetry prevails in economic relationships, which lead to 
market inefficiency and sub-optimal results for the economy. Researchers who work on 
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 contract theory and information economics develop families of economic models to study 
those relationships using perfect Bayesian equilibrium concepts and game theory.  
 
2.4 Model  
In this section, I will set up a dynamic game with incomplete information to illustrate the 
relationship between mortgage lenders and GSEs. By solving the perfect Bayesian 
equilibria of this game, I shall prove that there exists a hybrid equilibrium where it is 
optimal for mortgage lenders to randomize between maintaining honesty and defrauding 
given GSEs’ actions. This confirms the empirical evidence that appraisal bias exists in 
some but not all mortgage cases. I shall also provide a scope of parameter conditions such 
that a pooling equilibrium where all lenders choose to behave honestly/dishonestly exists, 
as well as conditions for a separating equilibrium to exist where lenders behave 
differently according to the types of mortgages they receive. 
 
The following section will start with a revisit of the mortgage market structure, an 
introduction to the game structure, and payoff functions of each player. Throughout the 
text, I shall introduce assumptions and notations that are necessary for solving the 
equilibrium conditions. After I solve for each equilibrium condition, I shall present a 
comparative statistics analysis to measure the effect of parameters on each equilibrium 
outcome.  
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 2.4.1 Market Structure Revisit 
As mentioned in previous section, there are numerous mortgage lenders in the market 
competing for borrowers. They seek GSEs’ guarantee service to ensure timely payment 
of principal and interests to mortgage investors. In exchange, mortgage lenders pay a 
guarantee fee to GSEs for the credit risks insurance. GSEs, who serve as credit risk 
insurers, rely on lenders to provide estimated values of the collaterals to evaluate 
borrowers’ credit risks. Once the risk is known, GSEs will charge a risk based guarantee 
fee specified for different levels of default risks. I will interchange “GSEs” with “credit 
risk insurers” in the subsequent texts since their role is to insure the credit risk on 
mortgages sold to mortgage investors. 
 
2.4.2 Setup 
Following Stiglitz (1976), I assume that the types of borrowers are uniformly distributed 
along a line. I also assume that the primary mortgage market is a Hotelling market where 
there exists a search cost  that is greater than zero for mortgage borrowers. s
   
Assume there are two types of borrowers in the market; their only difference is that one is 
endowed with a high value house H , and the other is endowed with a low value house 
. The proportion of borrowers who are endowed with high value houses is L η , and the 
proportion of those who are endowed with low value houses is η−1 . Both types of 
borrowers want to apply for a mortgage at the same amount V , with the house being the 
collateral. They search for the lowest interest rate offered in the market at a positive 
search cost .  The interest rate is exogenously determined such that loans with low s
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 value collaterals and high value collateral are charged differently. Because holding 
everything else equal a high value property has a low probability of default and a low 
value property has a high probability of default, interest rate charged on mortgages with 
high value collaterals is lower than that charged on mortgages with low value collaterals 
to compensate the credit risks.   
 
The lifetime of a mortgage is assumed to be two periods. In the first period, the lender 
originates the mortgage and seeks guarantees from credit risk insurers. In the second 
period, the outcome of the mortgage is realized; a loan either defaults, or pays off. I 
assume the discount factor between the two periods is one7.  
 
Lenders are assumed to know the true property value after the appraisal process. They 
then report an appraisal value to the mortgage insurer and transfer the mortgage risk at 
the guarantee price determined based on the reported appraisal value. Everything held 
equal, high value property has low probability of default and low value property has high 
probability of default. Therefore, lenders with high value collaterals mortgage will be 
charged a low guarantee fee whereas lenders with low value collateral mortgage will be 
charged a high guarantee fee. Assume at the moment that the guarantee fees are 
exogenously determined.  
 
If no verifiability is available, then this game falls under the classic cheap talk game 
scenario where all lenders’ preference is to claim high value regardless of the true value 
                                                 
7 One can assume the discount factor is less than one and still obtain similar result with one more parameter 
condition on the discount factor.  
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 of the property. Hence a babbling equilibrium is the only outcome.  However, market can 
be restored by letting credit risk insurers costlessly verify fraud and pass the cost of 
default back to lenders. This cost depends on the realization of the state of nature and the 
credit risk insurers’ actions. This semi-verifiability helps construct non-babbling 
equilibria in this game.  
 
Credit risk insurers, knowing that lenders have incentive to cheat, will randomly choose 
to conduct a costly quality review on defaulted loans at a positive cost . Assume that 
once reviewed fraudulent loans will be discovered with probability one8. Consequently, 
lenders who originated those loans will be forced to incur the default loss and the 
fraudulent loans shall be returned to them. In this sense, the signal sent by a mortgage 
lender on whether the collateral is high value or low value is costless a priori, but can be 
costly posteriori depending on the outcome of the loan and the credit insurer’s action.   
C
 
Another potential time to review is when the loan is delivered, as opposed to when 
default occurs. However, just like insurance verification is conducted when the claim is 
made, not at the time the insurance is purchased, GSEs should also verify the truthfulness 
of the information when it matters. Verification after default has occurs makes sense 
because the cost of verification is high and default is a rare event.  
 
Under complete and symmetric information scenario, mortgage insurers can observe the 
true value of the collaterals, correctly infer the probability of default and hence charge 
                                                 
8 In reality, the success rate of fraud discovering is less than one. However, one can assume that the review 
cost encompasses the cost of unsuccessful reviews.    
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 guarantee fees correspondingly. Mortgage lenders, under information symmetry, do not 
have incentive to deviate from reporting the property value truthfully. The role of 
mortgage lenders is simply to transfer information in a complete and perfect fashion. 
Information asymmetry, where mortgage insurers cannot observe the true default 
probability of the properties, creates incentives for lenders to over appraise the property 
to reduce the guarantee fees.  
 
2.4.3 Game Structure 
I assume the game played between a mortgage insurer and a mortgage lender is a 
dynamic game with incomplete information. The mortgage lender is the agent who has 
private information on a loan’s default risk. He sends out a signal regarding the quality of 
his “product” to the mortgage insurer. The mortgage insurer receives the signal and 
chooses his action accordingly without the ability to verify the truthfulness of the signal. 
This game differs from Spence’s famous job market signaling game in that the sender’s 
signal is exogenously costly in Spence’s model, whereas it is costless and does not 
depend on lender’s type in this model. Therefore, it can be viewed as a “Cheap Talk” 
game.  
 
Cheap talk game is a special case of signaling games, where the sender’s messages are 
costless, nonbinding, and not verifiable. Such talk cannot be informative in signaling 
games that require costly messages to separate the types. Thus, for cheap talk to be 
informative, one necessary condition is that different types of senders have different 
preferences over the receiver’s actions (Gibbons 1992). The model analyzed here, 
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 however, does not satisfy this condition because all lenders prefer a low guarantee fee to 
a high guarantee fee regardless what types of loans they are dealt with. Hence a babbling 
equilibrium where all signals are uninformative arises. However, adding a condition that 
the signals are costly posterior can guarantee a non-babbling equilibrium. This condition 
is reflected by the fact that the receiver chooses his action after observing the sender’s 
signal as well as the outcome of the loan. The loan outcome conditional on sender’s 
signal helps update the receiver’s belief on the lender’s type. Therefore, the semi-
verifiability of the costless signal can be proven to affect signals sent by different types 
and hence makes this model different from other games in the “Cheap Talk” family.    
 
The timing of the game is as follows: 
1. Nature determines the type of the borrower, which is reflected by the type of 
property that he is endowed with. The proportion of borrowers who are endowed 
with high value houses is η , and the proportion of those who are endowed with 
low value houses is η−1 . A high value property, denoted by H  has a default 
probability , and a low value property, denoted by  has a default probability 
. Note that the subscripts  correspond to the value of the property, not the 
value of the probability. I shall use the subscripts in the same fashion in the 
subsequent notations. It is assumed that 
Hp L
Lp LH ,
LH pp <  because a high value property 
has a lower default probability than a low value property.   
2. A borrower searches for the lowest possible interest rate offered with a positive 
search cost . A high value borrower is offered with an interest rate , and a 
low value borrower is offered . Note that 
0>s Hr
Lr LH rr <  because high value borrowers 
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 are offered with a market determined low interest rate; low value borrowers are 
offered with a market determined high interest rate due to credit risk differences. 
Some low value borrowers may be offered an interest rate as low as a high value 
borrower receives if the lender chooses to lie about the property value. Because of 
the positive search cost, I assume not every low value borrower can find a 
compromising lender within his search cost constraint. 
3. The lender, after appraising the property, obtains the true property value H  or 
, default probability  or , and chooses an appraisal value L Hp Lp
∧
H  or  to 
report to the credit risk insurer. 
∧
L
4. Borrowers are willing to accept any offer that yields utilities greater than or 
equal to their reservation utilities. Since the interest rate offered to a high value 
borrower is lower than that offered to a low value borrower, borrowers with low 
collateral value prefer to receive the offer designed for the high value borrowers.    
5. The mortgage insurer observes the appraisal value and the interest rate offered, 
but not the property’s true value or its true probability of default. It offers a 
guarantee price  or  to the lender according to the claimed property value ∧
H
g ∧
L
g
∧
H  or . The guarantee fee is assumed to be determined exogenously.  
∧
L
6. Nature moves again and reveals the outcome of the loans. A loan either defaults 
or pays off in its lifetime. The mortgage insurer takes no action toward loans that 
are safely paid off because he does not incur any credit loss on a paid-off loan 
regardless of fraud. When a loan defaults, the mortgage insurer will choose 
whether or not to order a quality review with a probability at a positive cost q
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 0>C . Once the review is conducted, fraud discovery is guaranteed and the 
fraudulent lender will be forced to incur the default loss. The review has no effect 
on honest lenders.  
7. Game is over. 
 
The above notations can be summarized as follows: 
H  denotes a high value property,  
L  denotes a low value property, 
Hˆ  denotes a property with a reported high value, regardless of its true value, 
Lˆ  denotes a property with a reported low value, regardless of its true value, 
D  denotes event of default, 
ND  denotes event of pay off, 
R  denotes event of quality review by credit insurer, 
NR  denotes no quality review.  
 
The probability of certain event is as follows:  
The probability of a high value property on the market is: 
η=)(HP         (a) 
The probability of a low value property on the market is: 
η−= 1)(LP         (b)   
The default probability of a high value property is: 
HpHDP =)|(       (c) 
 The default probability of a low value property is: 
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 LpLDP =)|(        (d)  
The probability of a quality review on a defaulted loan by the credit insurer is: 
qDRP =)|(        (e)  
The probability of a quality review on a paid off loan by the credit insurer is: 
0)|( =NDRP        (f) 
 
The action space for the lender comprises of two parts: one which he reports the 
collateral value truthfully, the other where he lies about the collateral value. The action 
space for the insurer has three components: one that he reviews the defaulted loan, the 
other he does not, the third one is where he takes no action if default does not occur. This 
is because a paid off loan, regardless if there exists appraisal fraud, does not impact the 
profitability for the insurer as long as the loan pays off as scheduled. 
 
To simplify the notion, it is fair to assume that the payoff structure on a given mortgage is 
one where a fixed pass through rate of return is allocated to the investors in the capital 
market, a fixed administration and servicing fee is allocated to mortgage servicers, and 
the left over is up for negotiation between lenders and mortgage insurers. Specifically, 
the pricing structure for a mortgage can be expressed as:  
goT
Tfir
+=
++=
 
where r  is the coupon/note rate that the borrower pays,  is the pass through rate to the 
investors,  is servicing and administration fee and 
i
f T  is residual rent. The residual rent 
is divided between the lender as an origination fee o , and the credit risk insurer as a 
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 guarantee fee g . Given the note rate, pass through rate and servicing fees, the higher the 
guarantee fee is, the lower the lender’s return is. 
 
The payoff structures for each player is as follows: 
The combined payoff for the two players in the event of no default is , where V  and TV ⋅
T , as previously introduced denote the loan amount and the left over rent for the 
mortgage lender and credit risk insurer to share respectively. The mortgage lender 
receives  and the insurer receives )( •− gTV •⋅ gV  as revenue. The guarantee fee  is 
 for reported high value property or  for reported low value property. In the event 
of a default, the combined payoff is reduced to 
•g
∧
H
g ∧
L
g
VTV −⋅ , where the defaulted loan 
amount V  needs to be taken off from the combined revenue as a loss. This loss shall be 
absorbed by the mortgage lender and the credit risk insurer. When the mortgage insurer 
does not review the defaulted loan, the payoff for the lender is  and the payoff 
for the insurer is . If the insurer reviews the loan, the two players’ payoffs are 
 for the lender and 
)( •− gTV
VgV −⋅ •
Vg• )TV −−( CgV −⋅ •  for the insurer if fraud is detected; they are 
 for the lender and )( •− gTV VCgV −−⋅ •  for the insurer if fraud is not detected. Once 
again, the guarantee fee  here is either  or  for reported high value property and 
reported low value property respectively. 
•g ∧
H
g ∧
L
g
 
The game can also be depicted in a normal-form representation. In the normal game 
representation, I define cheating as inaccurately report the property value. It includes 
cases that a lender with  value collateral reporting the property value as L
∧
H , and a 
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 lender with H  value collateral reporting the property value as  to the credit risk 
insurer.  
∧
L
 
If a mortgage lender is dealt with a low value collateral  and the loan pays off, the total 
payoff between the mortgage lender and the credit insurer becomes . The mortgage 
lender’s payoff as well as the payoff for the credit risk insurer is as follows depending on 
if he lies about the property value. Since the credit risk insurer does not review loans that 
paid off, there is only one action space on his side. 
L
TV ⋅
  
Credit Risk Insurer 
 
Cheat 
No Quality Review 
No Cheat ),( ∧−
L
gTV   ∧⋅
L
gV  
),( ∧−
H
gTV   ∧⋅
H
gV  
Mortgage Lender 
 
 
 
 
 
If a mortgage lender is dealt with a low value collateral  and the loan defaults, the total 
payoff between the mortgage lender and the credit insurer becomes . His payoff 
as well as the payoff for the credit risk insurer is as follows depending on if he lies about 
the property value and if the credit insurer reviews the loan. Note that now the credit 
insurer has two actions, review and not review, because the loan has defaulted.   
L
VTV −⋅
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Credit Risk Insurer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cheat 
),( ∧−
L
gTV    
VgV
L
−⋅ ∧  
No Quality Review 
),( ∧−
L
gTV         
CVgV
L
−−⋅ ∧  
,)( VgTV
H
−− ∧    
CgV
H
−⋅ ∧  
Quality Review 
),( ∧−
H
gTV    
VgV
H
−⋅ ∧  
No 
Cheat 
 
Mortgage 
Lender 
If a mortgage lender is dealt with a high value collateral H  and the loan pays off, the 
total payoff between the mortgage lender and the credit insurer becomes . His 
payoff as well as the payoff for the credit risk insurer is as follows.  
TV ⋅
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If the high value property H  defaults, the total payoff between the mortgage lender and 
the credit insurer becomes VTV −⋅ . His payoff as well as the payoff for the credit risk 
insurer is as follows. Note that a high value lender will not be penalized if the review 
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 discovers that the loan is actually a high value loan even though it is reported as low 
value. 
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As the payoff function shows, the payoff for a high value H  lender when he behaves 
honestly is always higher than when he cheats. This is because he will be charged a high 
guarantee fee with no compensation if he does so. Therefore, a high value lender does not 
have the incentive to “cheat” or underreport the collateral value regardless the outcome of 
the loan. It is always in a high value lender’s best interest to honestly report the property 
value.  
 
A dishonest lender with a low value collateral will be penalized only under two 
conditions, 1) the loan must default, 2) the credit risk insurer must choose to review this 
defaulted loan. Since credit risk insurers will only choose to review defaulted loans, loans 
that are paid off would not be subject to review regardless if the lender cheated or not.  
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No lenders have incentive to over appraise the property value higher than 
∧
H  since it is 
common knowledge that 
∧
H  is the highest property value in the market. If a credit risk 
insurer sees a property value higher than 
∧
H , he would automatically infer that fraudulent 
behavior has occurred and hence reject the transaction.   
 
Lenders who receive a low value property have incentive to bias the appraisal value 
upward and report the property as 
∧
H  to receive a low guarantee fee. Let’s denote a credit 
risk insurer’s prior belief on cheating by low value lenders as . Because the signal sent 
by the lender is costless and property type independent, mortgage insurer does not update 
his belief on cheating after receiving the reported value. The update process takes place 
only when the outcome of the loan is realized.     
e
 
The above sections set up the game structure, payoff functions and the action space of 
mortgage lenders and credit risk insurers. In the following section, I shall solve for the 
perfect Bayesian hybrid and pure strategy equilibria and provide comparative static 
analyses of the impact of parameters on each equilibrium outcome.  
                
2.4.4 Hybrid Equilibrium  
There exist hybrid and pure strategy equilibria in this game. In this section I shall focus 
on the hybrid equilibrium where one type of lender chooses to send a signal with 
certainty and the other type of lender randomizes between mimicking the first type by 
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 choosing the first type’s signal and separating from the first type by choosing a different 
signal. By model setup, only lenders with low value properties have incentive to mimic 
the ones with high value properties. We hence analyze the case in which the low value 
lender randomizes. 
 
Suppose the high value lender chooses to honestly report the property value, but the low 
value lender randomizes between being honest with probability e−1  and dishonest with 
probability .  e
 
The probabilities for certain events according to Bayes’s rules are as follows. 
Using equations (a)-(f), the probability of observing default outcome on a reported high 
value property is: 
ηη HL pepHPHDHPLPLDHPDHP +−=⋅+⋅= )1()()|,ˆ()()|,ˆ(),ˆ(  (1) 
The probability of observing default outcome on a reported low value property is: 
  (2) )1)(1()()|,ˆ()()|,ˆ(),ˆ( η−−=⋅+⋅= epHPHDLPLPLDLPDLP L
The probability of observing payoff outcome on a reported high value property is: 
 (3) ηη )1()1()1()()|,ˆ()()|,ˆ(),ˆ( HL pepHPHNDHPLPLNDHPNDHP −+−−=⋅+⋅=
The probability of observing payoff outcome on a reported low value property is: 
)1)(1)(1()()|,ˆ()()|,ˆ(),ˆ( η−−−=⋅+⋅= epHPHNDLPLPLNDLPNDLP L  (4) 
 
The probability of observing default outcome on a reported high, but in fact low value 
property is: 
)1()()|,ˆ(),,ˆ( η−== epLPLDHPLDHP L      (5) 
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 The probability of observing default outcome on a reported high and indeed high value 
property is: 
ηHpHPHDHPHDHP == )()|,ˆ(),,ˆ(      (6) 
The probability of observing default outcome on a reported low, but in fact high value 
property is: 
0)()|,ˆ(),,ˆ( == HPHDLPHDLP       (7) 
The probability of observing default outcome on a reported low and indeed low value 
property is: 
)1)(1()()|,ˆ(),,ˆ( η−−== epLPLDLPLDLP L     (8) 
The probability of observing payoff outcome on a reported high, but in fact low value 
property is: 
)1()1()()|,ˆ(),,ˆ( η−−== epLPLNDHPLNDHP L     (9) 
The probability of observing payoff outcome on a reported high and indeed high value 
property is: 
η)1()()|,ˆ(),,ˆ( HpHPHNDHPHNDHP −==     (10) 
The probability of observing payoff outcome on a reported low, but in fact high value 
property is: 
0)()|,ˆ(),,ˆ( == HPHNDLPHNDLP      (11) 
Lastly, the probability of observing payoff outcome on a reported low and indeed low 
value property is: 
)1)(1)(1()()|,ˆ(),,ˆ( η−−−== epLPLNDLPLNDLP L    (12) 
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 Derived based on the above probabilities, the followings are the beliefs credit risk 
insurers have on the true value of the property upon observing the signal sent by the 
lender, i.e., the appraisal value , as well as the outcome of the loans . A 
credit risk insurer will choose the probability of review based on his belief, a best 
response function with respect to lender’s strategy. 
)ˆ,ˆ( LH ),( NDD
 
A credit risk insurer’s belief that a property has low value given that it is reported as high 
value and has defaulted is: 
)1(
)1(
),ˆ(
),,ˆ(),ˆ|( ηη
η
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−==
epp
ep
DHP
LDHPDHLP
LH
L     (13) 
His belief that a property has high value given that it is reported as high value and has 
defaulted is: 
)1(),ˆ(
),,ˆ(),ˆ|( ηη
η
−+== epp
p
DHP
HDHPDHHP
LH
H     (14) 
His belief that a property has low value given that it is reported as low value and has 
defaulted is: 
1
)1)(1(
)1)(1(
),ˆ(
),,ˆ(),ˆ|( =−−
−−== η
η
ep
ep
DLP
LDLPDLLP
L
L     (15) 
His belief that a property has high value given that it is reported as low value and has 
defaulted is: 
0
),ˆ(
),,ˆ(),ˆ|( ==
DLP
HDLPDLHP       (16) 
His belief that a property has low value given that it is reported as high value and has 
paid off is: 
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His belief that a property has high value given that it is reported as high value and has 
paid off is: 
)1()1()1(
)1(
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epp
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HNDHPNDHHP
LH
H   (18) 
His belief that a property has low value given that it is reported as low value and has paid 
off is: 
1
)1)(1)(1(
)1)(1)(1(
),ˆ(
),,ˆ(),ˆ|( =−−−
−−−== η
η
ep
ep
NDLP
LNDLPNDLLP
L
L    (19) 
Lastly, his belief that a property has high value given that it is reported as low value and 
has paid off is: 
0
),ˆ(
),,ˆ(),ˆ|( ==
NDLP
HNDLPNDLHP       (20) 
 
Before we solve for the hybrid equilibrium solution, we first look at how the beliefs 
change with respect to changes on the parameters.  
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The above comparative static shows the directions of change on beliefs with respect to 
changes on four parameters. First of all, a credit risk insurer’s belief that a property is 
high value given that its stated value is high and the loan has defaulted decreases if 
lenders are more likely to cheat. Cetera paribus the higher the probability of cheating by 
lenders, the lower the probability that a loan is truly a high value loan conditional on 
event of default. Secondly, the belief that a property is high value given that its stated 
value is high and the loan has defaulted increases if the high value loan’s default 
probability rises or the low value loan’s default probability falls or if there are more high 
value loans in the market. The higher default probability of high value loans, or the lower 
default probability of low value loans, the more likely that a defaulted yet claimed to be 
high value loan is truly a high value loan. If the proportion of high value loans in the 
market increases, the likelihood of a defaulted yet claimed to be high value loan is indeed 
a high value loan also increases. 
 
Now I shall solve for the hybrid equilibrium solution. In order for a hybrid equilibrium to 
exist, it must be the case that the two players are indifferent between strategies. I.e., the 
payoffs from cheating have to equal the payoffs from being honest for a low value lender. 
Similarly, the payoffs from review have to equal the payoffs from not review for a credit 
risk insurer.  
 
The expected payoffs for a low value lender when he cheats is:  
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 )()1()()1(])([|)( ∧∧∧ −−+−−+−−=
H
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L gTVpgTVqpVgTVqpcheatingE π   (25) 
Three outcomes could happen when a low value lender chooses to cheat. The loan could 
pay off safely with probability Lp−1 ; or it could default but not chosen for reviews with 
probability ; or it could default and be chosen for reviews with probability 
. The expected payoff from cheating thus equals the probability of cheating, default 
and reviewed multiples the payoffs from being caught (depicted in the 1st part), plus the 
probability of cheating, default, not reviewed multiplies the payoffs from not being 
caught (depicted in the 2nd part), plus the probability of cheating, not default multiplies 
the payoff from not being caught (depicted in the 3rd part). 
)1( qpL −
qpL
 
The expected payoff for a low value lender when he does not cheat is simply his payoff 
from being honest 
)(|)( ∧−=
L
gTVhonestE π        (26) 
 
Equate the above two expected payoffs allows us to solve for the equilibrium probability 
of review that makes a low value lender indifferent between cheating and being honest.  
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 Now let’s turn to the insurer’s payoff. Given the insurer’s belief that high value lenders 
will not misreport loan values, all reported low value loans must be true low values loans. 
Therefore, the insurer only needs to review defaulted loans with high reported values Hˆ .  
 
Two outcomes arise when review is conducted on a defaulted Hˆ  loan. The loan is either 
a true high value loan H  or a true low value loan . The credit risk insurer either 
transfers the default loss to the lender if the loan is found to be low value, or incurs the 
default loss if it is found to be high value. Hence, the expected payoff for an insurer when 
he reviews a defaulted loan with high reported value is the probability of discovering the 
true type of the property (
L
H  or ), given observing a defaulted L Hˆ  multiplies the 
payoffs from discovering the true type. His expected payoff is as follows when he 
reviews a defaulted Hˆ  loan: 
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The 1st probability is simply the probability that a loan has low value given that a high 
reported value and event of default are observed on that loan, i.e. . The 
second term is the probability that a loan has high value given that a high reported value 
and default occurred on that loan, i.e. . 
),ˆ|( DHLP
),ˆ|( DHHP
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 The credit risk insurer’s expected payoff if he does not review a defaulted high reported 
value loan is simply the revenue from insuring a Hˆ minus the cost from default.  
VgVreviewE
H
−⋅= ∧|^)(π        (29) 
 
Equate the two expected payoffs solves for the equilibrium probability of cheating that 
makes credit risk insurers indifferent between reviewing and not reviewing a defaulted 
loan with a high reported value. 
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L
HL
p
gg
q
∧∧ −=*  and 
))(1(
*
CVp
Cpe
L
H
−−
⋅= η
η  establish the equilibrium probability of review 
and cheating that make the mortgage lender and the credit risk insurer indifferent 
between cheating and not cheating and review and not review. 
 
If  then a mortgage lender will always remain honest and report the true property 
value with probability one. 
*qq >
If then a mortgage lender will randomizes between being honest and dishonest. *qq =
If then a mortgage lender will always cheat and misreport low value property as 
high value with probability one. 
*qq <
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 If then a credit risk insurer will always review defaulted loans with probability one. *ee >
If then a credit risk insurer will randomize between reviewing a defaulted loan and 
not reviewing it. 
*ee =
If then a credit risk insurer will always choose not to review any defaulted loans 
with high reported values with probability one. 
*ee <
 
Above result shows the hybrid equilibrium conditions. The following comparative static 
shows the relationship between the equilibrium probability of review, equilibrium 
probability of cheating and the parameters.   
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The comparative static result shows how the equilibrium condition on the cheating 
probability changes with regard to changes on parameters. First of all, as the high value 
loan’s default probability increases, the equilibrium probability of cheating that makes a 
credit insurer indifferent between review and not review also increases. This means that 
as more and more high value loans default, reviews will discover less and less frauds 
 50
 given the previous equilibrium cheating probability. Hence a higher cheating probability 
by lender is needed in order for an insurer to randomize between reviewing and not to 
review. Secondly, as probability of default increases for low value loans, cheatings are 
more likely to be detected given the same probability of review. Hence, a lower 
probability of cheating by lender is required to sustain indifference between review and 
not for an insurer. Thirdly, the equilibrium cheating probability also increases with cost 
of review and proportion of high value loans in the market. As cost of review for insurers 
rises or proportion of high value loans increases, reviews become more costly or less 
likely to generate fraud detections. As a result, the probability of cheating by lenders 
must rise in order for insurers to randomize between review and not review.  
 
Similarly, the following comparative static shows the relationship between the 
equilibrium probability of review with each parameter.   
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The result shows that the equilibrium probability of review that makes a lender 
indifferent between cheating and not cheating decreases if default probability of low 
value loans rises. It increases with guarantee fees for low value loans and decreases with 
guarantee fees for high value loans. It is not a direct function of default probability of 
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 high value loans. The intuition is the following: as the default probability of low value 
loans rises, it becomes easier for credit risk insurers to detect fraud given the same level 
of cheating. Therefore, a lower probability of review is required to induce randomization 
between cheating and not cheating by lenders. An increased guarantee fee for low value 
loans or a decreased guarantee fee for high value loans generate higher incentive to cheat 
by lenders and hence calls for a higher probability of review to sustain the hybrid 
equilibrium.  
 
2.4.5 Pure Strategy Equilibria 
The above section completes the analysis on the hybrid equilibrium condition of the 
game. In this section, I shall take a look at the other four possible pure-strategy perfect 
Bayesian equilibria in this game. They are: pooling on reporting high value Hˆ ; pooling 
on reporting low value ; separation with high value lender reporting high value Lˆ Hˆ  and 
low value lender reporting low value ; and separation with high value lender reporting 
low value  and low value lender reporting high value 
Lˆ
Lˆ Hˆ . 
 
Because guarantee fee is exogenously determined, a reported Hˆ  is always charged less 
than an  is. Furthermore, review outcome does not influence true Lˆ H value loans. 
Therefore, a true H value lender will never have the incentive to report the property 
value as . Hence pooling equilibrium on  or separating equilibrium with Lˆ Lˆ H reporting 
as  and  reporting as Lˆ L Hˆ  does not exist. 
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 2.4.5.1 Pooling Equilibrium on 
∧
H  
Now let’s investigate the other pooling equilibrium where both types of lenders report the 
property value as 
∧
H  regardless of its true value. Suppose there exists such equilibrium 
where the lender’s strategy is to report the property value as high regardless of its true 
value, i.e., . The insurer’s information set corresponding to the lender’s strategy 
should be on the equilibrium path and his belief shall be determined by Bayes’ rule and 
the lender’s strategy.  
1=e
 
The insurer’s belief that a property is truly high value given that it is reported to be high 
is:  
ηηη
η =−⋅+⋅
⋅=+= )1(11
1
)()|ˆ()()|ˆ(
)()|ˆ()ˆ|(
LPLHPHPHHP
HPHHPHHP   (38) 
 
Similarly, his belief that a property has a low value given that its value is reported to be 
high is just η−1 . 
 
After the loan’s outcome is realized, an insurer’s belief that a property is indeed high 
value given that a reported high value and default are observed on the loan is: 
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),,ˆ(),ˆ|( ηη
η
−+== LH
H
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p
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His belief that a property has low value given that it is reported to be high value and 
event of default has occurred is:  
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His belief that a property has high value given that it is reported to be high value and the 
loan has paid off is:  
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And lastly, his belief that a property has low value given that it is reported to be high 
value and the loan has paid off is: 
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Given the insurer’s belief, his expected payoff if he chooses to review a defaulted loan is 
the expected payoff from reviewing a fraudulent loan and reviewing an honest loan: 
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If he chooses not to review the defaulted loan, his expected payoff is simply:  
VgVreviewE
H
−⋅= ∧|^)(π        (44) 
 
Compare the expected payoffs of review and not review we obtain that 
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Therefore, an insurer’s best response following lender’s pooling strategy on Hˆ depends 
on the sign of C
pp
Vp
LH
L −−+
−
)1(
)1(
ηη
η , i.e., the relative size of review cost and average loss 
from default in the market. If 0
)1(
)1( >−−+
− C
pp
Vp
LH
L
ηη
η  or default loss is greater than the 
cost of review, then an insurer’s best response to a pooling strategy on Hˆ  is to review 
with probability one, i.e. . Low value and high value lenders’ expected payoffs 
under pooling on 
1=q
Hˆ  are VpgTV L
H
⋅−− ∧ )(  and )( ∧−
H
gTV  respectively. An insurer 
earns 
)1(
)())(1(|)( ηη
ηηπ −+
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LH
HHHL
pp
VCgVpCgVpreviewE , greater than his 
payoff when he does not review.  
 
To determine whether both types of lenders are willing to pool on Hˆ , we need to specify 
how the insurer would react to . If the credit insurer’s best response to both  and 
default  is not to review, then a high value lender’s payoff regardless of the outcome of 
the loan remains at  if he reports 
Lˆ Lˆ
D
)( ∧−
H
gTV Hˆ , which always exceeds his expected 
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 payoff  regardless of the loan’s outcome if he chooses to report . Under the 
same best response of not to review if  and  are observed, a low value lender’s 
payoff from truthfully reporting the property value is 
)( ∧−
L
gTV Lˆ
Lˆ D
)( ∧−
L
gTV  regardless of loan’s 
outcome. If the credit insurer’s best response to 
∧
H  and  is to always review, the 
mortgage lender’s expected payoff from misreporting the property value to be 
D
∧
H  is then 
. Comparing the two expected payoffs, if a low value lender’s payoff 
from reporting  exceeds his expected payoff from reporting 
VpgTV L
H
⋅−− ∧ )(
Lˆ Hˆ , i.e., 
 then no pooling equilibrium on )()( ∧∧ −<⋅−−
L
L
H
gTVVpgTV Hˆ  where both types of 
lenders pool on Hˆ  and the credit insurer reviews all defaulted loans with certainty shall 
exist when insurer’s best response to  and  is not to review. Only if 
and 
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η  does such pooling equilibrium on Hˆ  
exist when insurer’s best response to  and  is not to review.  Lˆ D
 
It remains to consider the insurer’s belief at the information set corresponding to  and 
 as well as the optimality of his choice given this belief.  The insurer’s belief that a 
loan has low value when observing  and  is:  
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His belief that a loan has high value when observing  and  is: Lˆ D
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His expected payoffs under review and no review conditional on observing  and  are Lˆ D
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Since review always yields fewer payoffs than no review when  and  are observed, 
the insurer’s optimal strategy to  and  will always be not to review.  Therefore, a 
pooling equilibrium on 
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Hˆ  exists under the conditions that 0>−− ∧∧ L
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review if he sees Hˆ  and , not to review if he sees  and . Low value and high value 
lenders each earns 
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− C
pp
Vp
LH
L
ηη
η  or review cost is greater than the loss from default, an 
insurer’s best response to a pooling strategy on Hˆ  is not to review with certainty, i.e., 
. Low value and high value lenders’ expected payoffs under pooling on 0=q Hˆ  are both 
. An insurer earns )( ∧−
H
gTV VgVreviewE
H
−⋅= ∧|^)(π . Since an insurer’s best 
response toward  and  is also not to review, both types of lenders earn Lˆ D )( ∧−
H
gTV  
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 regardless of default outcome when they report Hˆ , which always exceed their payoffs 
when reporting . Therefore, pooling equilibrium on )( ∧−
L
gTV Lˆ Hˆ  also exists when 
0
)1(
)1( <−−+
− C
pp
Vp
LH
L
ηη
η . The credit insurer’s best response is not to review any 
defaulted loans. Both types of lenders earn )( ∧−
H
gTV , the insurer earns 
VgVreviewE
H
−⋅= ∧|^)(π . 
 
In summary, the existence of pooling equilibrium where both types of lenders report the 
property values as high regardless of its true value depends on parameters. Under the 
conditions that  and 0>−− ∧∧ L
HL
pgg 0
)1(
)1( >−−+
− C
pp
Vp
LH
L
ηη
η , the credit risk insurer’s 
best response to lenders pooling on 
∧
H  is to review any defaulted loans with high 
reported values and not to review any defaulted loans with low reported values. There 
also exists another pooling equilibrium where both types of lenders pool on 
∧
H . Under 
the conditions that  and 0>−− ∧∧ L
HL
pgg 0
)1(
)1( <−−+
− C
pp
Vp
LH
L
ηη
η , the credit risk 
insurer’s best response to lenders pooling on 
∧
H  is always not to review any defaulted 
loans. Those parameters and equilibria constructed correspond to the optimal hybrid 
equilibrium  and established previously. For example, when , it is 
concluded that the optimal review probability for a hybrid equilibrium to exist is greater 
than one, i.e. . Therefore,  and lender will always cheat. When 
*e *q L
HL
pgg >− ∧∧
1* >q *qq <
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 0
)1(
)1( <−−+
− C
pp
Vp
LH
L
ηη
η , the optimal cheating probability for a hybrid equilibrium to 
exist is greater than one, i.e., . Therefore, , and the credit risk insurer will 
always choose not to review.  
1* >e *ee <
 
2.4.5.2 Separating Equilibrium Where H Reports 
∧
H  and  Reports  L
∧
L
Now let’s take a look at the feasible separating equilibrium where both types of lenders 
honestly report the property value, i.e. 0=e . Under this scenario, the credit insurer’s 
beliefs on the true value of a property when he sees 
∧
H  and  must be 
∧
L
1
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1
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The credit risk insurer’s beliefs on the property’s true value H  or  after observing the 
lender’s signal 
L
∧
H or , and the loan’s outcome  or  are: 
∧
L D ND
The probability that a property has high value given that it is reported to be high value 
and the loan has defaulted is 1
),ˆ(
),,ˆ(),ˆ|( ==
DHP
HDHPDHHP ; the probability that a 
property has low value given that it is reported to be high value and the loan has 
defaulted is 0
),ˆ(
),,ˆ(),ˆ|( ==
DHP
LDHPDHLP ; the probability that a property is high value 
given that it is reported as high value and the loan has paid off is 
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 1
),ˆ(
),,ˆ(),ˆ|( ==
NDHP
HNDHPNDHHP ; the probability that a property has low value given 
that it is reported as high value and the loan has paid off is 
0
),ˆ(
),,ˆ(),ˆ|( ==
NDHP
LNDHPNDHLP . 
 
His expected payoff from reviewing the defaulted loan given his beliefs is  
VCgVVCgVCgVreviewE
HHH
−−⋅=−−⋅⋅+−⋅⋅= ∧∧∧ )(1)(0|)(π      
His expected payoff from not to review is VgVreviewE
H
−⋅= ∧|^)(π . An insurer will 
always chooses not to review when both types of lenders honestly report the property 
value as long as review cost . Low value lender and high value lender each earns 
 and  respectively. It remains to check if the lender’s strategy is 
optimal given the insurer’s strategy. If the low value lender deviates by reporting 
0>C
)( ∧−
L
gTV )( ∧−
H
gTV
Hˆ , the 
lender earns  under the no review strategy by the credit risk insure. This 
payoff exceeds the low value lender’s payoff of 
)( ∧−
H
gTV
)( ∧−
L
gTV  from reporting honestly. Thus 
no separating Bayesian equilibrium exists when the review cost . When the review 
cost , the insurer will always choose to review any defaulted loans. The low value 
lender and the high value lender’s expected payoffs are still 
0>C
0=C
)( ∧−
L
gTV  and )( ∧−
H
gTV  
respectively. If the low value lender deviates, his expected payoff will be 
. Deviation makes sense only if VpgTV L
H
⋅−− ∧ )( 0>−− ∧∧ L
HL
pgg .  Therefore, a 
separating equilibrium exists when 1) review is costless, i.e. 0=C  and 2) the low value 
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 property’s default probability is greater than the difference between the two guarantee 
fees, , i.e., the cost of cheating outweighs the benefit from cheating. 0<−− ∧∧ L
HL
pgg
 
In summary, the existence of a separating equilibrium where both types of lenders 
honestly report the property value also depends on the parameters. It exists only when the 
review is costless and 0<−− ∧∧ L
HL
pgg . 
 
Under the situation where guarantee fees are exogenously determined, the existence of 
Bayesian equilibria in this game depends on parameters. There are cases where review 
cost is so high, compared with the default loss, that the credit risk insurer chooses not to 
review defaulted loans and incurs the credit loss generated by low value lender’s 
fraudulent behaviors. There are also cases where the probability of default for low value 
properties’ is low enough, compared with the difference in guarantee fees, that low value 
lenders are encouraged to cheat. Hybrid equilibrium where lenders randomize between 
cheating and not cheating and insurers randomize between review and not review also 
exists under certain parameters conditions.  
 
2.5 Conclusion  
This paper analyzes a phenomenon in mortgage market induced by the information 
asymmetric structure between mortgage lenders and credit risk insurers. This 
phenomenon is referred to as appraisal bias, where mortgage lenders under information 
asymmetry, have incentive to behave in ways that maximize their utilities at the expense 
of credit risk insurers, in particular GSE’s.  
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The game played between mortgage lenders and mortgage insurers can be viewed as a 
cheap talk, for the signals sent by lenders are costless, non binding, and non-verifiable. 
Consequently, a babbling equilibrium where all signals are uninformative exists.  
However, by changing the non-verifiably information to be semi-verifiable, this paper 
establishes how semi-verifiability in a cheap talk game structure helps construct a non-
babbling perfect Bayesian equilibrium in an asymmetric information environment.  
 
This paper assumes that the guarantee fee, which determines the profit of credit risk 
insurers are exogenous. In reality, this fee ought to be determined endogenously. In 
subsequent studies, I shall look at cases where mortgage insurers endogenously determine 
the guarantee fees based on expected default rate.  
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 Chapter 3: An Empirical Analysis of Mortgage Termination With Appraisal 
Bias – Maximum Likelihood Estimation of A Proportional Hazard 
Competing Risks Model With Grouped Duration Data 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Residential mortgage market has received a great deal of attention in the past decades due 
to its importance to the economy. First of all, residential mortgage market stimulates the 
economy by generating jobs, wages and tax revenue through construction of new homes. 
According to National Association of Home Builders, the construction of 1,000 single-
family homes can generate on average 2,448 full-time jobs in construction and 
construction related industries; it can also generate $79.4 million in wages and  $42.5 
million in combined federal, state and local revenues and fees (National Association of 
Home Builders – Economic and Housing Data). Secondly, residential mortgage market 
strengthens social stability by increasing and expanding homeownerships across the 
nation. United States’ social stability is partially reflected by having the highest 
homeownership of any major economy in the world. Currently, U.S. homeownership has 
topped 69.0 percent as of 2004Q3 (U.S. Census Bureau – Housing Vacancy Survey Third 
Quarter 2004). Lastly, residential mortgage market is crucial to the prosperity of U.S. 
economy. Residential fixed investment and housing services attributed to 14 percent of 
U.S. total GDP in 2003 (Bureau of Economic Analysis: Latest NIPA Table for GDP). In 
dollar terms, residential mortgage debt outstanding (MDO) in the U. S. totaled $7.8 
trillion as of year-end 2003, higher than United States government total debt outstanding 
today. This amount was more than double the amount of residential mortgage debt 
outstanding 10 years ago, or $3.4 trillion as of year-end 1993. By 2013, mortgage debt is 
estimated to total $17.2 trillion with an 8.25 percent annual increase (Federal Reserves 
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 Bulletin, Freddie Mac Special Commentary, Fannie Mae Annual Report). The growing 
size of residential mortgage market and its importance in maintaining a stable society 
generates great interest in understanding the economics of mortgages. 
 
Understanding residential mortgage market requires the knowledge of borrower’s default 
and prepayment actions. Default is defined as “failure to make required debt payments on 
a timely basis or to comply with other conditions of an obligation or agreement.” 
Prepayment is defined as “payment of all or part of a debt prior to its due date” 
(Merriam-Webster). In mortgage terminology, default is realized when borrowers fail to 
make a certain number of mortgage payments consecutively. It results in the “transfer of 
the legal ownership of the property from the borrower to the lender either through the 
execution of foreclosure proceedings or the acceptance of a deed in lieu of foreclosure” 
(Giliberto and Houston 1989). Prepayment is realized when borrowers payoff the current 
mortgage obligation either through sale of the property or refinancing the current 
mortgage with a new mortgage. Prepayment stops scheduled cash flow of principal and 
interest payments from the borrowers to the mortgage lenders.  Mortgage market 
considers default and prepayment as two options available to borrowers to terminate 
mortgage contracts before the amortization date.  
 
Evaluating the value of these two options is crucial to the pricing decisions of mortgage 
contracts. Pricing of mortgage contracts requires thorough understanding of borrowers’ 
default and prepayment behaviors to take the termination risks into consideration. Pricing 
mortgage contracts is also complicated because default and prepayment options are 
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 distinct yet interdependent. For example, once a borrower decides to default or prepay on 
a mortgage, he or she can no longer exercise default or prepayment options in the future. 
Furthermore, differences in risk preferences and other idiosyncrasy across borrowers may 
influence borrowers behaviors differently. All of the above imply that adequate pricing of 
mortgages calls for a thorough understanding of the mortgage borrower behavior and 
requires appropriate models of default and prepayment risks. 
 
It is well established that the contingent claims model developed by Black and Scholes 
(1973), Merton (1973), Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1985) provides a coherent and useful 
framework for analyzing mortgage borrowers’ behaviors. In their framework, 
prepayment is viewed as a call option and default as a put option. Well-informed 
borrowers in a perfect competitive market are assumed to exercise either of these two 
options whenever they can to increase their wealth. Borrowers in the absence of 
transaction cost can increase their wealth by defaulting on a mortgage contract, purchase 
the same property with a lower monthly payment for the same remaining term when the 
market value of the mortgage exceeds the value of the house. They can increase their 
wealth by prepaying and refinancing the mortgage for the same remaining term at a 
mortgage rate less than the coupon rate when the market value of the mortgage exceeds 
par value (Kau and Keenan 1995). Alternatively, one can think of borrowers take on 
prepayment or default actions to minimize the cost.  
 
Although researchers quickly recognize the applicability of contingent claims option 
models on mortgage termination, virtually all the early studies that applied option models 
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 to mortgage termination focus on either default or prepayment option, but not both. It is 
not until recent time that joint estimation of the prepayment and default options in 
mortgage studies becomes well known (Deng, Quigley and Van Order 2000). Because a 
homeowner who exercises a default option today gives up not only the option to default 
tomorrow, but also the option to prepay tomorrow, the two options are interdependent 
and need to be jointly estimated (See Kau, et al., 1995 for a theoretical outline of the 
relationship between the two options).  
 
As explained above, the joint estimation of the two options calls for competing risks 
models. Since default and prepayment can be viewed as hazards, duration models provide 
a convenient analytical tool to analyze the two terminations. Duration models are well 
established in biometrics and labor economics with seminal works by Cox (1972), 
Prentice and Gloeckler (1978), Lancaster (1979), Kennan (1985), Katz (1986), Kiefer 
(1988), etc. It was first applied to borrower behavior in the mortgage market in 1986 
(Green and Shoven, 1986) and has received extended attention following recent works by 
Deng, Quigley and Van Order (2000).  
 
Deng, Quigley and Van Order (2000) contribute to the literature by making competing 
risks duration models useful in analyzing an overlooked aspect of mortgage market, 
namely the unobserved heterogeneity of borrowers. The unobserved heterogeneity of 
study subjects is well recognized in duration model approaches to biometric research 
(Kalbfleisch and Prentice, 1980). For example, research in survival time after medical 
treatment discovers that those patients who are least physically fit are more likely to exit 
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 the sample of subjects than those who are fit (Kalbfleisch and Prentice, 1980). Heckman 
and Singer (1985) also recognize the same issue when applying duration models to study 
unemployment spells in labor markets.    
 
The analogy in mortgage termination studies lies in the well-observed different 
prepayment rate among borrowers. Borrowers who are most financially astute are more 
likely to exercise prepayment options to terminate mortgage contracts, and those who are 
left in the sample are more likely to be financially uninformed. This implies that any 
sample of surviving mortgage borrowers is successively more likely to include 
disproportionate fractions of those less financially astute. In addition, financially astute 
borrowers, had they remained in the sample, are also less likely to default than the 
average population that remains in the sample. Therefore, without accounting for 
unobserved heterogeneity, one is likely to draw inaccurate inferences on the significance 
of explanatory variables. 
  
However, there are still critical aspects of residential mortgage markets that previous 
researchers fail to capture. Specifically, previous studies on residential mortgage suffer 
from lack of data to account for origination appraisal bias. Origination appraisal bias 
arises due to the information asymmetry between mortgage investors and mortgage 
originators. Mortgage originators, who do not share the same objective as mortgage 
investors, have incentive to over appraise the value of the collateral in order to profit at 
the expense of the investors. Theoretical proof on the existence of appraisal bias is 
presented in the previous chapter. There has not been any study that investigates the 
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 effect of origination bias on default and prepayment in residential mortgage market due 
to data limitation9. Origination bias needs to be controlled in the estimation of mortgage 
terminations. Without correcting for appraisal bias, one is likely to reach less accurate 
conclusions on default or prepayment hazards. 
 
This paper attempts to achieve the following goals: 
• Jointly estimate default and prepayment outcomes as competing risk proportional 
hazard models with grouped data  
• Use the exact likelihood function instead of the approximated likelihood function 
upon which previous researchers relied  
• Examine to what extent the option pricing theory can explain default and 
prepayment behavior with single-family residential mortgages and test if variables 
related to characteristics of the borrower, mortgage and underlying property are 
predictive to mortgage terminations 
• Model the unobserved borrower heterogeneity jointly with competing-risks in 
Heckman-Singer semiparametric approach and compare the results with one that 
does not control for unobserved heterogeneity.  
• Explicitly correct for origination appraisal bias at loan level by using a unique 
dataset that contains repeated transactions property values and compare the results 
with those that do not control for appraisal bias 
 
                                                 
9 Ciochetti et al. (2003) analyzed a different aggregated originator bias in commercial mortgages. Their 
research is based on 2043 commercial loans originated by a single lender who may have loose underwriting 
standards or stringent underwriting standards. They refer to this sampling bias as originator bias. To reduce 
it, they weight each observation in their sample based on how representative that observation type is 
relative to its population equivalent. 
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 The model improves on early studies by using an exact likelihood function instead of the 
approximated quasi likelihood function that is commonly used. The estimation results 
suggest that measures of appraisal bias are significant in determining default 
probabilities; a high bias leads to a big hazard of default. They are, however, not 
significant in explaining prepayment. The results confirm previous researchers’ findings 
that the call and put options are interdependent. They provide empirical support for the 
option pricing approach to explain default and prepayment behaviors of the borrowers. 
The results also confirm previous findings that non-option related variables, which 
measure characteristics of the borrower, mortgage and underlying collateral and regional 
economic conditions are also predictive in default and prepayment. Joint estimation of 
the default and prepayment risks allows the flexibility of the two risks to be 
interdependent. Unobserved borrower heterogeneity proves to be an important factor in 
accounting borrower behaviors. Ignoring the heterogeneity can lead to less optimal model 
fitness. Unlike previous studies, the two-by-two mass point heterogeneity distribution 
applied in this paper allows for independence between default heterogeneity and 
prepayment heterogeneity10. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized into the following sections. Section 2 reviews 
previous literature on mortgage terminations. It in itself can be broken down into early 
literature review, economic theory, option theory review, and reviews on econometric 
methodology on proportional hazard models. Section 3 discusses the dataset utilized in 
                                                 
10 Previous works, including Deng et. Al (2000), Huang and Ondrich (2002), restrict the heterogeneity 
between the two risks to be monotonic dependent. Although easy to implement, this assumption is counter 
intuitive to what mortgage studies have found: people who are more likely to prepay are less likely to 
default than those who is less likely to prepay.    
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 this paper and provides summary statistics on important variables. Section 4 presents the 
exact specification of the econometric model and estimation procedure. Section 5 
presents the results of the estimations and a final section summarizes the main 
conclusions and provides suggestions for future research.   
 
3.2 Literature Review on Mortgage Termination 
   
3.2.1 Early Literature Review 
Early literature on mortgage termination contributes to the line of research by suggesting 
and testing variables that are important in explaining borrower behaviors on default and 
prepayment. The variables tested range from loan characteristics, borrower 
characteristics, property characteristics and economic conditions. Without sufficient 
economic theory and econometric models, early studies treat default and prepayment 
behaviors separately and investigate them individually.  
 
Beginning with works by Jung (1962), Page (1964), and Von Furstenberg (1969, 1970a, 
1970b), early studies on mortgage terminations attempt to explain default outcome by 
mortgage characteristics at origination using aggregate data. Their choices of explanatory 
variables include origination loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, origination interest rate, 
mortgage term and origination home equity. Jung (1962), despite lack of formal 
economic theory, is the first to identify positive correlation between LTV ratios and 
default risk using aggregate data from 31 savings and loans institutions. Page (1964) and 
Von Furstenberg (1969) are among the first to use the regression approach and provide 
empirical evidence on the importance of origination LTV ratio, mortgage term, and home 
equity at the time of origination to predict default. For example, Von Furstenberg (1969, 
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 1970a, 1970b) finds that home equity at origination is the most important predictor of 
default risk, with default rates increasing by seven times if LTV ratios are raised from 90 
to 97 percent. He also found that mortgage default risk increases with the age of the loan 
up to the loan’s third or fourth year of age, after which it declines.  
 
In addition to mortgage characteristics, early studies on mortgage termination in the form 
of default also investigate the importance of borrower and property characteristics. The 
impact of borrower and property attributes receive fewer consensuses than mortgage 
characteristics however. Characteristics that show consistent effect on mortgage default 
include self-employment identification, indicators for occupation stability and variables 
that reflect the fluctuation of household income (Herzog and Earley, 1970; Von 
Furstenberg 1969). Characteristics on which researchers have not arrived at consensuses 
include household income, borrower age, marital status, number of dependents and debt-
to-income ratio at origination (Von Furstenberg 1969; Herzog and Earley, 1970; Morton 
1975; Sandor and Sosin 1975; William, Beranek and Kenkel 1974).    
 
Some of the disagreement on the effect of borrower and property characteristics on 
default is as follows. Von Furstenberg (1969)’s result shows that household income 
negatively and significantly impacts default risk. He attributes this effect to the 
correlation between income and LTV ratio and concludes that household income by itself 
is not deterministic of default. Herzog and Earley (1970) test borrower age, marital status, 
number of dependents and debt-to-income ratio at origination and conclude that none of 
the above has any significant effect on default. Although confirmed by Morton (1975) 
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 and Sandor and Sosin (1975) separately, a different conclusion was reached if debt-to-
income ratio was measured categorically (William, Beranek and Kenkel, 1974). Unlike 
Herzog and Earley (1970), Willam et.al find that all else equal, a borrower with debt-to-
income ratio higher than 30 percent is more likely to default than other borrowers.  
 
Property characteristics including local real estate markets, property conditions, and local 
unemployment rates are also among the variables that have been tested. Von Furstenberg 
and Green discover that mortgages in suburban areas are less risky to default than those 
in central cities (Von Furstenberg and Green 1976). Similarly, high default risk is also 
found to be associated with bad property conditions and neighborhoods with high crime 
rate (Williams Beranek and Kenkel 1974).  
 
Compared to studies on default, there is less early research that focuses on prepayment 
behavior. Early studies on prepayment include works by Dunn and McConnell (1981), 
Buser and Hendershott (1984), and Titmand and Torous (1989) etc. Research on 
prepayment flourishes when option theory is introduced to the analysis of mortgage 
terminations.   
 
In summary, early literature on mortgage termination separately analyzes variables 
influencing default or prepayment in lieu of formal theory. Variables analyzed include 
origination loan characteristic, property characteristics, borrower characteristics, and 
economic conditions. Researchers made no attempts to provide a theoretical basis for 
borrower behavior at the time of mortgage termination. However, they still made 
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 significant contribution to the line of research by suggesting and testing variables that are 
candidates to determine mortgage termination.  
  
3.2.2 Economic Theory and Option Theory Review 
The first connection between economic theory and mortgage borrower behaviors are 
established in studies conducted in 1980s. Studies on mortgage terminations in 1980s 
utilize economic theory of utility maximization and test previous research results based 
on the assumption that borrowers rationally decide whether to carry out the mortgage 
contract or not in the course of maximizing their utility over time (Jackson and 
Kasserman 1980; Campbell and Dietrich 1983; Vandell and Thibodeau 1985; Zorn and 
Lea 1989; Cunningham and Capone 1990).   
 
Based on McFadden’s consumer choice model, most studies assume that mortgage 
borrowers have multiple choices in their choice set at each payment period during the life 
of the mortgage. A borrower can choose to continue payment as scheduled, stop payment 
and default, or prepay the mortgage. A borrower at each decision-making period chooses 
one of three choices that maximize her utility over time. In summary, a borrower is 
assumed to maximize a utility function defined over a vector of mutually exclusive 
qualitative choices, , and a vector of exogenous state variables, S X . Each of the utility 
maximizing choices can be represented as a conditional probability, all of which sum to 
one, conditioned on X .  McFadden’s random utility model was applied to derive each 
conditional probability and multinomial logit estimation was used to estimate covariates 
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 that impact termination outcome (Vandell and Thibodeau 1985; Zorn and Lea 1989; 
Cunningham and Capone 1990)11.  
 
In addition to connecting mortgage borrower behavior with economic theory, studies 
applying the optimization model of consumer choice also contribute to the literature by 
introducing contemporaneous measures on mortgage characteristics to explain 
termination. Campbell and Dietrich (1983) find that both origination and 
contemporaneous LTV ratios have significant positive effects on default decision. Their 
results provide evidence of the importance of time varying covariates on mortgage 
termination. Borrower characteristics such as income variability are also found to have a 
significant positive effect on multi-period model for mortgage termination (Campbell and 
Dietrich 1983).  
 
The second yet breakthrough connection between mortgage borrower behavior and 
theory is also made in this time period. In 1973, Black and Scholes (1973) developed a 
                                                 
11 For example, Vandell and Thibodeau (1985) apply the following model to analyze default. The choice set 
in their model includes only two choices: continue to pay or default. The payoff function if borrowers 
choose to default can be expressed as follows: 
)1()1)(( iirD rWrQRYW +++−−=  
The payoff function if borrowers choose to continue payment can be expressed as: 
)1()()1)(( 0 iTTC rWLVrQRYW ++−++−−=  
Where  
DW  is payoff function if borrower defaults,  is payoff function if borrower continues payment, CW
Y  is real annual after-tax household income, R  is required real non-discretionary expenditures (other than 
housing),  is required real rent on new unit (gross rent plus utilities, etc.)  is expected real return on 
non housing investment, W  is current real non-housing wealth,  is required real after tax payment on 
mortgage (plus taxes, insurance, and other ownership costs)  is expected opportunity cost of borrowing 
or return on lending ,  is expected real market value of current home, and  is expected real 
outstanding loan balance on current mortgage. 
rQ ir
Q
0r
TV TL
Borrowers are expected to default instead of continue to pay their mortgage if  is greater than . DW CW
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 contingent claims model and obtained an actual closed-form solution to the problem of 
valuing a call option on an underlying asset for short-run scenarios in which the interest 
rate is regarded as constant. Their results imply that investors can arrive at the value of a 
put or call option on a certain stock provided a few parameters such as current price and 
volatility of the stock are known. Their results have significant implications to mortgage 
studies because they provide motivations for default and prepayment behaviors, quantify 
the value of each behavior and predict under what circumstance shall default and 
prepayment occur. 
 
The put and call options are defined financially as follows. A put option is an agreement 
that gives an investor the right, but not the obligation, to sell a stock, bond, commodity or 
other financial instrument at a specified price (also called strike price or exercise price) 
within a specific time period. The put option is usually purchased to protect against a fall 
in price. A call option, on the other hand, is an agreement that gives the holder the right 
but not the obligation to purchase an asset for a pre-determined price (also called strike 
price or exercise price) at or before the expiration date of the option. A call option is 
bought with the expectation of a rise in prices (http://www.cftc.gov). 
 
In order to appreciate Black and Scholes results, one needs to realize that an option is a 
derivative asset whereas the stock itself is the fundamental asset. All market forces that 
govern prices, i.e., demand and supply reflected by individual preferences and firm 
technologies, have directly set the value of the stock, and the value of the option follows 
that of the stock. Since the payoff obtained from an option can also be obtained by 
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 continuous costless adjustment of a portfolio consisting of the same underlying stock and 
some risk free bonds, the value of the option must equal the value of the sum of stock and 
the risk free bonds in order to prevent arbitrage. Because the value of the sum of stock 
and the risk free bonds are known, so is the value of the option. Thus Black and Scholes 
conclude that the value of an option can be calculated without any reference to individual 
risk attitudes or to the mean value of the stock price movement that govern the option’s 
risk (Black and Scholes 1973). Volatility of the stock does matter in determining the 
value of an option to the extent that it determines the range of likely stock movements 
(Black and Scholes 1973).  
 
Turning to studies on mortgage termination, the analogy between a mortgage on a house 
and an option on a stock is quite close. Both can be considered investment tools and both 
have underlying asset that back the value of the investment. In addition, similar to 
uncertainties in an option on a stock, there are also uncertainties in mortgages on real 
estate properties. The two fundamental sources of uncertainties in mortgages are interest 
rate risk and house price risk. If one views the house as a traded asset, then default 
portion of a mortgage can be viewed as a put option whereas prepayment can be viewed 
as a call option. By exercising default option, a borrower turns over possession of the 
house in exchange for abandoning payments; by exercising prepayment option, a 
borrower gains the right to the house by paying off the loan. Between the two 
uncertainties, house price risk is more associated with default option whereas interest risk 
is more associated with prepayment option.  
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 Based on results from option-based model, the conditions driving default and prepayment 
behaviors are (1) conditions in the capital market – namely current and expected future 
interest rates that represent the opportunity cost of funds, and (2) the current and expected 
future price of the property. The two conditions are specified as stochastic processes 
representing expectations about the future pattern and volatility of these measures 
(Cunningham and Hendershott 1984; Hendershott and Van Order 1987; Kau, Keenan, 
Muller and Epperson 1987; Buser and Hendershott 1984; Brennan and Schwartz 1985; 
Kau, Keenan, Muller, and Epperson 1992, 1995; Kau and Keenan 1996; Titman and 
Torous 1989; etc.). 
 
Take Kau, Keenan, Muller, and Epperson (1992, 1995) for example, a standard mean-
reverting process is applied to interest rates and a standard lognormal process is applied 
to the property value trends. A borrower’s prepayment decision is determined by whether 
the value of the mortgage under contract interest rate (also called coupon rate) is less than 
that of a new mortgage under the market interest rate. A default decision is determined by 
whether the value of the mortgage under the market interest rate is greater than the 
current value of the property (details in Kau et al. 1992). At each decision point, a 
borrower decides which options to choose by comparing the market value of her 
mortgage with the par value and the market value of her property. Property value is 
assumed to be observable to borrowers. Solution to a partial differential equation solved 
backward is the current value of the mortgage12.   
                                                 
12 Following Kau et al. (1992), the value of a mortgage  depends on the coupon rate , 
a vector of relevant interest rates 
),,,,( kBHrcM c
r , the property value H , the outstanding balance B , the age of the loan 
, and other parameters. For simplicity, they assume there is only one interest rate that determines the 
yield curve. Also assume a continuous house price change with an instantaneous mean and a standard 
k
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Note that a mortgage borrower does not need to solve for the differential equation in 
order to know when to exercise either option (Kau et a. 1995). All she needs to know is 
whether or not she can refinance the remaining mortgage for the same term at a mortgage 
rate lower than her current interest rate. If the answer is yes, prepayment option shall be 
exercised immediately. If the borrowers knows that she can obtain a new mortgage on the 
same property for the same remaining term yet with a lower than current payment, 
default option shall be exercised immediately. Hence the option-based model predicts 
                                                                                                                                                 
Hdeviation σ . The interest rate denoted by r  and the value of the house denoted by H  are assumed to 
follow a stochastic process: 
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where θ  is the mean value of the interest rate r , γ  is the rate of convergence for the interest rate, d  is 
the imputed rent payout rate (dividend), rσ  is the volatility of the interest rate, rrσ
H
 is the 
instantaneous standard deviation of the term structure, σ  is the instantaneous standard deviation of the 
house price,  and  are standard Brownian motion with rdz Hdz 0)( =dzE dtdzE =)( 2 and , and ρ  is 
the correlation between the disturbance to the term structure and the disturbance to the house price (Kau et 
al. 1992). 
 
Kau et al. (1995) shows that under the perfect capital market assumption and the Local Expectations 
Hypothesis, the value of the mortgage M  satisfies: 
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a second order partial differential equation such that the value of the mortgage equals the risk-adjusted 
expected present value of its net cash flows. This follows from Black and Scholes (1973). The value of 
and the optimal default and prepayment strategy are determined simultaneously. ⋅M
*
 
is determined by choosing r  and *H )(⋅M that minimize  given the above equation. The optimal level 
of r  and H are functions of parameters underlying the stochastic process of interest rate and house value 
as well as (Kau et. al. 1995). The decision rules are such that borrower choose to exercise 
default option when the house value falls to 
kBHrc ,,,,
*H , and prepay when the current interest rate falls to *r .  
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 that prepayment or default option will be immediately exercised once either option is “in 
the money”.    
 
Many recent studies have applied the above option-based model to mortgage market by 
modeling default as a put option and prepayment as a call option. They calculate the 
value of the put and call options and tested whether default and prepayment occur as 
option theory predicts. Hendershott and Van Order (1987) and Kau and Keenan (1995) 
provide survey to literature that relates to option-based mortgage pricing. 
 
Early applications fail to recognize the interdependence between default and prepayment 
and tend to focus on either of them however. There are many studies that use option 
theory to model default. For example, Foster and Van Order (1984) apply the option 
theory to mortgage default using FHA data from 1960 through 1978. They estimate an 
equity position as measured by contemporaneous LTV ratios over time and create a 
number of variables that represent the percentage of loans with negative equity for each 
year in the sample. Their estimates on the current and lagged equity variables explain 
over 90 percent of the variance. Cunningham and Hendershott (1984) and Epperson, Kau, 
Keenan, and Muller (1985) apply option models to price default risk by modeling default 
as a put option. Foster and Van Order (1984) and Quigley and Van Order (1995) estimate 
default model empirically in an option-based framework using fixed rate residential 
mortgages. Buser, Hendershott and Sanders (1985), Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1980), 
Findlay and Capozza (1977), Kau et al. (1985, 1990, 1993) and Schwartz and Torous 
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 (1991) analyze residential adjustable rate mortgages in option-based models. . Quercia 
and Stegman (1992) and Vandell (1993) give reviews on empirical default models13.   
 
Just like studies that focus on default, there are also many studies that rely on option 
theory to analyze prepayment behavior. For instance, Dunn and McConnell (1981), Buser 
and Hendershott (1984) analyze prepayment option of adjustable-rate (ARM) and fixed-
rate mortgages (FRM). Titmand and Torous (1989) analyze special case of commercial 
mortgages where prepayment is prohibited through yield maintenance features and 
prepayment penalties. Green and Shoven (1986), Hendershott and Van Order (1987), 
Schwartz and Torous (1989), Stanton (1994), Caplin Freeman and Tracy (1997), to name 
a few, analyze mortgage termination by prepayment using aggregate data. Findley and 
Capozza (1997) analyzed the prepayment options of adjustable-rate mortgages (ARM) 
and fixed rate mortgages (FRM). Archer, Ling and McGill (1996) use American Housing 
Survey data from 1985 to 1987 to examine the influence of post-origination income and 
collateral constraints on prepayment behavior, after controlling for the value of the call 
option. 
 
In summary, the connection between option theory and mortgage termination behaviors 
provides a theoretical tool to analyze default and prepayment incentives and outcomes. 
Researchers in mortgage studies calculate the extent to which the put and call options are 
in the money, based on which they predict when default and prepayment occur. 
                                                 
13 Research emphasizing financial variables that directly bear on a mortgage asset also include those by 
Cunningham and Capone (1990) and Jackson and Kaserman (1980). Empirical studies employing the 
option-theoretic approach include those of Archer and Ling (1993); Foster and Van Order (1984, 1985); 
and Quigley and Van Order (1991, 1992).  Please see Quercia and Stegman (1992) for a comprehensive 
review of the empirical literature. 
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A straightforward application of Black and Scholes (1973)’s results on mortgage 
terminations provides us with a “frictionless” model in the sense that there is no 
transaction cost associated with either default or prepayment. The “frictionless” model 
assumes that borrowers can pays off the outstanding mortgage balance without penalty. It 
also assumes that borrowers can purchase a new property with equal value as the 
defaulted one and enter into a new loan agreement after immediately exercise the default 
option with no transaction or reputation cost. Following its assumption, the model 
predicts that borrowers will immediately exercise either option whenever default or 
prepayment option is “in the money”, and hence the name “ruthless” termination 
behavior is used to refer to it.  
 
However, there exists empirical evidence that shows mortgage borrowers do not exercise 
their default or prepayment options in the same manner as investors exercise financial 
options (Vandell 1995; Green and LaCour-Little 1999). In particular, mortgage borrowers 
do not ruthlessly exercise either option as the frictionless model implies (Foster and Van 
Order 1984, 1985).   
 
For instance, Foster and Van Order (1984, 1985) find that only 4.2 percent of residential 
mortgages with contemporaneous LTV ratios in excess of 110 percent default, compared 
to a predicted 100 percent default outcome based on the ruthless model. The authors 
attribute this friction to transaction costs that can vary across borrowes. Transaction cost 
can be measured in the forms of loss of equity, search costs, and opportunity costs facing 
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 different borrowers. For instance, a borrower who defaults today might lose her 
creditworthiness and face a limited access to credit in the future (Foster and Van Order 
1985).  
 
Other researchers also provide evidence of default non-ruthlessness. Vandell and 
Thibodeau (1985) use a set of disaggregate loan histories from a saving and loan 
association to evaluate the influences of both the equity and cash flow on default as well 
as the influence of non-financial trigger events such as divorce and unemployment. They 
conclude that an expected negative net equity of 10 percent is to cause less than a 5 
percent likelihood of default on average. Their results also show that other than equity, 
measures of put option value, source of income, length of employment, level of wealth 
endowment and the condition of the neighborhood also affect the likelihood of default. 
Furthermore, some of these effects appear to have greater influences on default than the 
equity effect does. Their results suggest that solvency and trigger event such as loss of 
income due to social disruptions plays an important role in default. Deng, Quigley and 
Van Order (1996) also provide findings supporting the importance of trigger events such 
as unemployment and divorce in mortgage terminations. Vandell (1990, 1992) find 
similar evidence of “hesitated” default behavior among commercial mortgage borrowers 
using data from the American Council of Life Insurance. These types of models are 
referred to as “non-ruthless” models. 
 
Evidence of non-ruthless exercise of the prepayment option is also present. For example, 
Archer, Ling and McGill (1996) analyze prepayment behavior and conclude that higher 
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 annual debt-to-income and LTV ratios are negatively related to prepayments after 
controlling for call option values.  Caplin, Freeman and Tracy (1997) find that regional 
recessions reduce prepayment rates by as much as 50 percent in states with declining 
property markets. Peristiani, et al. (1997)’s results suggest that poor consumer credit 
history as well as high contemporaneous LTV significantly reduce the probability of 
prepayment. These empirical findings are intuitive because if the property value decline 
below the loan balance, additional funds will be required to prepay the current mortgage. 
Similarly, a borrower whose income or financial position deteriorates may be unable to 
prepay due to constraints on credit quality or debt-to-income ratios. 
 
Evidence on the existence of the non-ruthless option exercise behaviors as well as the 
importance and the impact of non-option related variables on mortgage terminations 
make testing both option and non-option variables a necessity. Most studies include both 
option and non-option related variables and conclude that they are both important in 
affecting mortgage default and prepayment. Most studies conclude that the probability of 
prepayment is an increasing function of the market price of the mortgage; it is a negative 
function of the contemporaneous LTV, the probability of negative equity, the local 
unemployment rate, minority status, borrower income and low credit score indicator 
(Clapp and Deng 2002). On the other hand, the probability of default is an increasing 
function of the market value of the mortgage, the contemporaneous LTV, the probability 
of negative equity, the local unemployment rate, and the debt-to-income ratio. It is a 
decreasing function of borrower’s credit history. 
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 One issue related with mortgage termination that is rarely analyzed is the existence of the 
unobserved heterogeneity among borrowers. Although no investigation has been done 
until recently, unobserved heterogeneity can selectively censor the observations and 
disproportionately impact the survival sample. If borrowers differ in their astuteness 
toward interest rate, then those who are financially savvy are more likely to exercise 
prepayment option and those who are financially unsophisticated are more likely to 
remain in the at risk population for default. Heterogeneity can also be caused by different 
opportunities such as unmeasured changes in property values and perceptions or abilities 
among borrowers. One example given in Vandell (1995) is that if borrowers who reside 
in the low end of the distribution of property values also tend to have high cost to default, 
the default option will be underestimated due to under exercise of the default option. 
Unobserved heterogeneity remains to be an important factor influence mortgage 
terminations and one needs to correctly account of it. Deng Quigley and Van Order 
(2000) is the first to control for unobserved heterogeneity in mortgage terminations to 
explain why some borrowers are less likely to exercise either option than other borrowers 
in a semiparametric framework. 
   
Finally, virtually all early research based on option models tend to focus on one, not both 
termination outcomes. The most common approaches used in the literature rule out the 
possibility of default when valuing the right to prepay, and rule out the possibility to 
prepay when considering default14. Only until a series of papers by Kau et al. (1992, 
                                                 
14For instance, Schwartz and Torous (1989) analyzed Ginnie Mae mortgage prepayment experience by 
assuming the mortgages were free of default risk. Green and Shoven (1986) and Quigley and van Order 
(1990) made analogous assumptions in the analysis of prepayment behavior. Cunningham and Hendershott 
(1984) analyze mortgage default using a single hazard model. 
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 1995); Kau and Keenan (1995); and Titman and Torous (1989) did the interdependent 
relationship between default and prepayment becomes theoretically established. A 
borrower who exercises default option today forfeits the option to default in the future as 
well as the option to prepay today or in the future and vice versa. It is important to realize 
that one can never ascertain whether default is optimal by considering only the value of 
the default option; one must look at the entire termination option set to decide whether 
termination is called for and what form it should take (Kau and Keenan 1995).   
 
Recent studies recognize the importance of the competing risk nature and jointly estimate 
the two termination outcomes. Cunningham and Capone (1990) use multinomial logit 
estimation on a pool of Federal Housing Association (FHA) insured loans to analyze the 
concurrent loan termination (default and prepayment) experience at each payment period 
of FRM and ARM residential mortgage borrowers. Zorn and Lea (1989) undertake a 
similar analysis on a sample of Canadian ARM borrowers. Foster and Van order (1985) 
estimate simultaneous models of default and prepayment using pool data of FHA loans. 
Schwartz and Torous (1993) estimate joint hazard using Poisson regression on aggregate 
data. Deng, Quigley and Van Order (1996), Deng (1997) and Deng Quigley and Van 
Order (2000) jointly analyze residential mortgage default and prepayment behavior using 
disaggregated loan level data. Deng et al. (2000) further extend their studies by 
accounting for borrower heterogeneity to explain why some borrowers are less likely to 
exercise either option than other borrowers in a semiparametric framework. Huang and 
Ondrich (2002) apply a competing risk proportional hazard model on FHA insured 
multifamily mortgages and employ a bivariate Heckman-Singer nonparametric random 
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 effect distribution to control for unobserved heterogeneity. They conclude that failure to 
control for it leads to severe downward biases in the coefficient estimates.  
 
In summary, it is well established that option-based contingent claims model provides 
connection between formal economic and financial theory and mortgage borrower 
behavior. Although challenged, option related variables, specifically variables measuring 
the market value of the mortgages remain to be explanatory in determining mortgage 
terminations. Along with variables reflecting transaction costs and trigger events, option 
related variables continue to draw attention from researchers and are included in 
estimations of mortgage terminations. Competing risks models are called for when 
estimating mortgage terminations because it is well known by now that default and 
prepayment are interdependent and need to be jointly estimated. Borrower heterogeneity, 
if exists, should be accounted for if one needs to correctly draw inference on the effect of 
explanatory variables on either option.   
 
3.2.3 Reviews of Econometric Methodology   
Many estimation methodologies are proposed to study mortgage terminations. Until 
recently, the most commonly used models have been bivariate logit under a single risk 
assumption and multinomial logit model (MNL) under multiple risk assumptions (See 
Campbell and Dietrich (1983); Cunningham and Capone (1990); Arch, Ling and McGill 
(1996); Clapp, Goldberg, Harding and LaCour-Little (2001); Calhoun and Deng (2002)).  
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 Bivariate logit model automatically rules out the risk of default when analyzing 
prepayment and rules out the risk of prepayment when analyzing default. It treats default 
as a censored observation when analyzing prepayment and treats prepayment as a 
censored observation when analyzing default. By construction, it does not allow for 
competing risks among different termination outcomes.  
 
Unlike bivariate logit model, multinomial logit model allows for direct competition 
among different risks.  By requiring all risks sum to unity, MNL ensures that an increase 
in one termination probability must be offset by a decrease in probability for one or more 
of the alternatives and hence guarantees competition among risks. However, MNL does 
not allow correlations among different risks because by construction it assumes 
independence across different risks. This assumption violates the empirical findings that 
risks are interdependent in mortgage terminations.  
 
Multinomial logit also implies independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). IIA says that 
the odds ratio for any pairs of choices is independent of any third alternative and 
eliminating one of the choices should not change the ratios of probabilities for the 
remaining ones. Thus IIA implication limits the role of multinomial logit model in 
mortgage termination analysis when two choices are close.  
 
An example illustrating the point above can be found in Clapp and Deng (2002)’s model 
on mortgage terminations where the authors attempt to model three termination outcomes 
including default, prepayment by refinance, and prepayment by sale of property. 
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 Prepayment by refinance and prepayment by sale of property are considered closer risks 
than that of default. Not surprisingly, their results show that MNL models generate small 
and insignificant coefficients for the risk of prepayment by sale of property than all other 
risks.  
 
One additional pitfall of using discrete choice models other than their inflexibility to 
accommodate critical assumptions on mortgage terminations is their inadequacy to 
analyze duration data. Discrete choice models such as logit are easy to employ, yet 
suboptimal to analyze continuous durations of mortgage life. Unlike discrete consumer 
choice problems, mortgage termination is a duration problem with underlying 
deterministic hazard functions. Discrete choice models lack the capability to analyze the 
shape of these hazards. Similar duration nature arises in other fields such as survival 
analysis in biostatistics, and unemployment spell studies in labor economics. The 
duration nature of mortgage calls for sophisticated econometric estimation techniques.   
 
The estimation technique that is suitable to handle duration analysis is developed based 
on Cox’s seminal work on proportional hazard model (Cox 1972). Cox (1972)’s 
proportional hazard model provides a flexible tool to analyze censored survival data. It 
allows for time varying and time invariant covariates and combines the advantages of 
both parametric and nonparametric estimation approaches for model building.  
 
The Cox proportional hazard model is built on the basis of defining hazard function and 
survivor function. Assuming the probability density function of the duration of the event, 
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 in this case, from loan origination to termination (default or prepayment), at t  is ; 
the cumulative probability distribution is . The hazard function is defined as the 
probability density of termination between time  and 
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The Cox proportional hazard model assumes that  is a product of a baseline hazard 
common to all individuals at each time period  and a component that depends on the 
covariates : 
)(th
)(0 th
)(tzi
 
})'(exp{)()( 0 βtzthth ii = , 
 
)(0 th is the unknown baseline hazard at time ;  is the vector of covariates that 
influences the termination decision for observation i  at time t ;  can contain 
covariates that are time varying or time invariant; and 
t )(tzi
)(tzi
β  is the parameter vector to be 
estimated. The convenient exponential specification ensures that the hazard rate under 
different values of covariates is always positive. Theoretically, the hazard function is 
continuous and can take any nonnegative value. This flexibility, however, makes the 
empirical identification and estimation of the model a nontrivial exercise.  
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 Several approaches have been proposed to estimate the hazard function. The simplest one 
is through parametric assumption on the distribution of the baseline hazard, most 
commonly Exponential, Logistic, Lognormal or Weibull, followed by estimation on the 
rest unknown functional parameters. However, studies in labor economics especially in 
unemployment duration have shown empirical evidence on inconsistencies between the 
assumed distribution and the actual hazard (Kiefer, 1988; Han and Housman 1990; Katz 
and Meyer 1990; McCall 1993, 1994, 1995)15. This is because the shape of the baseline 
hazard is often irregular and hence a simple parametric form is unlikely to well 
approximate it. The functional form assumption inevitably exerts constraints on the shape 
of the underlying hazard, forbidding the estimated hazard to reflect the real hazard. 
Meyer (1995) points out that the baseline hazard is often central to tests of economic 
hypotheses and imposing a shape for the baseline hazard may lead to incorrect 
conclusions about economic hypotheses.  
 
In order to relax the assumption on the baseline hazard, Cox proposes Partial Likelihood 
specification (CPL) (Cox 1975; Cox and Oakes 1984). CPL estimation technique only 
requires the existence of a common stationary baseline hazard function  for all 
subjects with no specified functional forms. The likelihood function under this scenario is 
decomposed into two separate parts; one contains the unknowns in the baseline hazard 
function, the other contains unknowns of the partial likelihood of the proportional 
)(0 th
                                                 
15 For example, Katz and Meyer (1990) find irregular spikes in the hazard for unemployment spell at 26-27 
weeks and 52-53 weeks due to termination of unemployment insurance. Similar spikes have been 
documented by independent studies. 
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 changes (Cox 1975). Therefore, β  can be identified without parametric restrictions on 
the baseline function because the baseline hazard can be factored out16.  
 
This estimation methodology is called partial likelihood because CPL uses likelihoods 
contributed from observed terminations instead of all the individuals in the sample. It is 
also a semiparametric approach in the sense that one applies nonparametric estimation in 
the baseline hazard functions and parametric in the specifications of the proportional 
change (Cox 1975; Cox and Oakes 1984; Gill 1984).  
 
Since researchers are also interested in the shapes of baseline hazard, remedies are 
proposed to CPL to estimate the baseline function. They include a two-step procedure 
                                                 
16Following Cox (1972), Miller et al. (1980), Andersen (1982) and Kalbfleisch and Prentice (1980), let 
 be independent continuously distributed positive random variables representing the times 
of termination of  individuals, each of whom can only be observed on a fixed time interval [0, ] for 
certain censoring times  . Suppose each individual  has hazard rate specified above: 
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Cox then proposed that the statistical inference on β  could be carried out by considering 
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ββ  as a likelihood function for β , to which standard large sample 
maximum likelihood theory applies. Each term in the above product is the probability that at time  of an 
observed termination, it is precisely individual  who is observed to terminate. After the likelihood is 
decomposed to two parts, common maximum likelihood estimation approaches shall be applied to estimate 
iT
i
β .  Also see Lancaster (1990), chapter 8.2.5 and Amemiya (1985), chapter 11.2.7.  
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 where regression coefficients β  are first identified through CPL. These estimates are 
then employed in the full likelihood estimation to obtain the necessary parameters for a 
flexible specified baseline hazard function, either fully unspecified (Meyer 1990) or some 
high-order polynomial function of time (See Fu, LaCour-Little and Vandell (2000) for an 
application).  
 
Although extremely flexible and powerful, CPL still faces pitfalls when applied to 
economic data, specifically in cases where surviving data is grouped with many ties in 
failure time (i.e., numerous individuals are with the same reported duration).  
 
Grouped data with ties in failure time are common in economic duration data. For 
example, length of unemployment spells is measured in weeks; mortgage terminations 
are reported in months or quarters. The grouping data naturally makes ties a frequent 
phenomenon. However, CPL assumes that duration data are continuous and is not 
capable to handle grouped data with ties. As illustrated in Prentice and Gloeckler (1978), 
CPL technique suffers from computational inconvenience in the event of grouped data 
with ties. CPL is a product of terms, one from each distinct failure time. If  failure 
times are tied at time  and  individuals are at risk prior to t , the partial likelihood 
contribution involves a summation over all possible subsets of size m  from the  at 
risk17. With many failures occurring at the same time, the likelihood becomes intractable 
and is theoretically and computationally infeasible to obtain.  
m
t n
n
                                                 
17The CPL partial likelihood contains a term for every subset of the risk set at time t , which contains 
exactly  elements, where  is the number of failures occurring at time  when ties occur. Denote td td t tℜ  
as the risk set (those alive and uncensored just prior to ) at t , then the number of such terms is t
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A series of papers by Prentice and Gloeckler (1978), Meyer (1986, 1990), Han and 
Hausman (1990) have proposed grouped data version of the proportional hazard model to 
fill the gap. The grouped data proportional hazard model, also referred to as “flexible” 
proportional hazard method, is able to obtain computationally feasible estimates for 
β and the corresponding survival function in the presence of ties.  
 
The “flexible” proportional hazard model assumes that failure times are grouped into 
intervals and regression vector is allowed to be time-dependent, but fixed within a 
specific time interval. As in CPL, the hazard function for individual i  at time t  is still in 
the form of })'(exp{)()( 0 βtzthth ii = , where is the unknown baseline hazard at 
time t ;  is the vector of covariates. 
)(0 th
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Following Prentice and Gloeckler (1978)’s specification, failure times are grouped into 
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− . Even without ties, a full parametric likelihood function with continuously changing 
baseline hazard rates is computationally difficult to converge (Meyer 1995). 
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 where  is the conditional survival probability in  for an 
individual with ;  is the baseline hazard. The probability of surviving to 
the beginning of  is .  
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Let ),,( ztk δ  represent the survival time, censoring indicator ( 0=δ  if censored, 1=δ  if 
failure) and regression vector for a study subject. Prentice and Gloeckler (1978) show 
that the contribution to the likelihood from this subject is . The 
likelihood function of the sample is the product of the above term over all individuals in 
the sample.  
∏−
=
−
1
1
}exp{}exp{ }1{
k
j
z
j
z
k
βδβ αα
 
With specified grouping intervals the discrete model above includes a finite number of 
parameters ),...,( 11 −rαα  and β . Those estimators are computationally feasible to obtain. 
 
Meyer (1986) compares estimates obtained from Prentice and Gloeckler (1987) method 
and those obtained from parametric estimations. His results show that the semiparametric 
estimators yield more plausible and consistent coefficients than those from Weibull 
models if the baseline hazard shape assumption is incorrect. After several distribution 
simulations, Meyer (1986) concludes that the Prentice and Gloeckler (1987) method 
allows for consistent estimation of β  when the form of the baseline hazard is unknown. 
The conventional parametric assumption on the baseline hazard, on the other hand, 
results in inconsistent estimates of β  when the assumed baseline is incorrect.  
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After the development of the flexible proportional hazard model, researchers are armed 
with a necessary tool to confront grouped economic data. However other economic issues 
remain to be solved. One of such issues is how to treat unobserved heterogeneity 
presented in the population.  
 
Economists who work on hazard models have been emphasizing the importance to 
control for unobserved individual characteristics or heterogeneity in the estimation of the 
hazards (Lancaster 1979; Lancaster and Nickell 1980; Heckman and Singer 1982, 1984, 
1986; Han and Hausman 1990; McCall 1996; Meyer 1990, 1995; Kiefer 1988). As one 
expects, characteristics of individuals that cause a lower hazard would be more present 
among the surviving individuals. Unobserved individual heterogeneity has been shown to 
affect failure time in labor economics, specifically in the studies of unemployment spells 
(Lancaster 1979; Lancaster and Nickell 1980). For example, researchers discover that 
individuals who remain in the survival sample in unemployment spell studies tend to be 
disproportionately high benefit, non-white and aged.  
 
If incorporated in CPL model, the unobserved heterogeneity will generate multiple 
integrals of the same order as the number of individuals in the risk set, which makes 
estimation difficult, if not impossible (Meyer 1986). Fortunately, the grouped data 
proportional hazard specification can easily accommodate the individual heterogeneity. 
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 There are two ways to specify the heterogeneity: parametric and nonparametric 
heterogeneity. Examples of the former include distribution assumptions on the 
heterogeneity in the population. For example Lancaster (1979), Han and Hausman 
(1990), and Meyer (1990) have assumed Gamma distribution on the heterogeneity; others 
have assumed lognormal distribution or discrete distributions (Meyer 1986). Examples of 
the latter begin with works by Heckman and Singer (1982). Heckman and Singer (1982, 
1984, 1986) propose a nonparametric technique for the estimation of the heterogeneity 
distribution, which generates a discrete distribution on the heterogeneity with a finite 
number of mass points. They argue that estimates of structural parameters obtained from 
ad hoc choices of the heterogeneity parametric distributions are very sensitive to the 
choice of mixing distributions. Instead, they develop a consistent nonparametric 
maximum likelihood estimator for the distribution of unobservable and a computational 
strategy for implementing it.  Heckman-Singer heterogeneity distribution is a discrete 
distribution with  points, each with associated probability  that sums to one. Their 
research suggests that parametric estimation on the heterogeneity is very unstable and 
nonparametric estimation should be employed (Heckman and Singer 1982). Meyer 
(1986), McCall (1996, 1997), Deng, Quigley and Van Order (2000), Ciochetti, Deng, 
Gao and Yao (2002), Huang and Ondrich (2002) adopt this method and assume 
nonparametric heterogeneity in estimating hazards.  
J jp
 
A natural extension of single-risk duration analysis with grouped data (Prentice and 
Gloeckler 1978; Kiefer, 1988) is how to modify it to apply to the competing risks 
framework with more than one risk. Competing risks models are named such because the 
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 shortest realized risk-specific duration makes the durations of other risks right censored. 
As illustrated in previous paragraphs, competing risks models are appropriate when 
multiple risks are interdependent and hence should be estimated jointly. For example, 
studies on unemployment spells terminated by full time employment or part time 
employment, and mortgage terminations by default or prepayment are cases where 
competing risks models are called for. In the case of mortgage terminations, the two 
termination outcomes are correlated. If good quality mortgagors exercise prepay option 
ruthlessly in early age of the mortgage whereas bad quality mortgagors cannot exercise 
prepayment option due to institutional constraints, then the at risk population will be 
adversely selected as time goes on. Therefore, one shall correct for the sample selection 
problem by modeling termination hazard model in a competing risks framework. 
 
Previous studies deal with competing risk in a very restricted manner. Many assume 
restricted parametric form on the risks such as bivariate lognormal distribution (Diamond 
and Hausman 1984). Others assume independence between the risks on the ground that 
unrestricted interdependent risks model is unidentifiable (Kalbfleisch and Prentice 1980; 
Katz 1986).  
 
Han and Hausman (1988) provide proofs for identification of the bivariate competing 
risks proportional hazard model under certain regularity conditions and clear the way to 
estimate competing risk model with unrestricted correlation. Based on their results, Han 
and Hausman (1990), Sueyoshi (1992), and McCall (1996) suggest a maximum 
likelihood estimation approach to expand the single risk flexible proportional hazard into 
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 an unrestricted competing risk framework. Their approach estimates the competing risks 
simultaneously in a proportional hazard specification, allows for unrestricted correlation 
among different risks, and accounts for presence of individual unobserved heterogeneity. 
Time varying covariates are also allowed in their approach. The difference among them is 
that Han and Hausman (1990) adopt piece-wise linear integrated baseline hazards in the 
estimation and assume parametric form on the heterogeneity whereas Sueyoshi (1992) 
and McCall (1996) assume the integrated baseline hazard takes the form of a fifth order 
polynomial specification and adopt Heckman and Singer (1982)’s approach to non-
parametrically estimate the heterogeneity jointly with the baseline hazard and the 
coefficients on the covariates.     
 
Following McCall (1996), let  be risk  and risk ,  be the duration of a 
subject until it is terminated by risk a  and risk b  respectively. The joint survivor 
function conditional on 
ba TT , a b ba tt ,
baz θθ ,, , ),| babbaabab ztTtTztS ,,|,Pr(),,( at θθθθ >>= , is 
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Here  is time varying or time invariant covariate, z ba θθ ,  are parameters for unobserved 
heterogeneity, and )(),( tt ba αα  are the log of integrated baseline hazard rate for risk type 
 and b  between  and , i.e., .  is the underlying a 1−t t ))(log()(
1 0∫−= tt ss duuhtα )(0 uh s
 98
 continuous time baseline hazard function, bas ,= . McCall assumes )(tα  is in the form of 
a fifth order polynomial in t . 
 
The competing risk nature makes only the first realized termination observable, that is 
. Define ),min( ba ttt = ),|(k baaF θθ  as the probability of termination by risk  in period 
, 
a
k ),|( bab kF θθ  as the probability of termination by risk  in period , and b k
),|( bac kF θθ  as the probability that the surviving spell last more than  period.  k
 
Following McCall (1996), the above probabilities can be expressed as 
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McCall uses the term 
)},,|,1(),}1,(),|1,1(),|,({5.0 babababa kkSkkSkkSkkS θθθθθθθθ +−+−+++  as an 
adjustment because durations are measured in discrete time rather than continuously. 
 
The unconditional probability is then given by  
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unobserved types of people and  defines the relative frequency that these types of 
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The log likelihood function of the fully specified competing risk proportional hazard 
model with unobserved heterogeneity is given by 
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with  being the total number of subjects,  being the indicators that equals one 
if the i th subject is terminated by risk , risk , or censoring respectively and zero 
otherwise.  
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McCall’s method is widely adopted by recent studies on mortgage termination (Deng, 
Quigley and Van Order 2000; Deng and Quigley 2000; Ambrose and LaCourLitle 2001; 
Ciochetti, Deng, Gao and Yao 2002; Huang and Ondrich 2002) despite that the likelihood 
function with the adjustment term he proposed is an ad hoc approximation of the sample 
likelihood function.  
 
A recent paper by An (2004) shows that competing risks proportional hazard model with 
grouped duration data is unidentifiable if the baseline hazard is assumed to be non-
parametric; functional form assumptions on the baseline hazard are needed for any 
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 consistent estimation and meaningful inference. The non-identification for the competing 
risks model is purely due to data grouping and is irrelevant to the existence of 
heterogeneity. Unlike in single risk proportional hazard model with grouped data where 
the likelihood function depends on the baseline hazard only through the discrete values of 
the integrated hazard function evaluated at limited numbers of points, in competing risks 
model the likelihood function depends on the values of all risks’ baseline hazards at each 
time between each grouped intervals. Provided sample size is always smaller than 
infinite, functional form assumptions on the baseline hazard are required in grouped data 
proportional hazard competing risks model.  
 
An (2004) also shows that under certain parametric assumption such as piecewise 
constant baseline hazards, the sample likelihood function has an explicit analytical form 
and there is no need for approximation once one makes the assumption that the baseline 
hazards are piecewise constant. The piecewise constant baseline assumption ensures that 
the integrated baseline are in the form of piecewise linear and the likelihood function 
depends on the baseline hazards only through fixed number of discrete values of the 
integrated baseline hazards. Provided the number of groups in the sample is smaller than 
sample size, the parameters are identifiable.     
 
Recent studies by Deng, Quigley and Van Order (2000), Deng and Quigley (2000), 
Ambrose and LaCourLitle (2001), Ciochetti, Deng, Gao and Yao (2002) adopted 
McCall’s approximation formula of the likelihood function, which is inconsistent with 
their piecewise constant assumption of the baseline hazard. In addition, specific to 
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 mortgage termination models is the fact that default is an extremely rare event, with a 
hazard rate of less than one percent of that of the prepayment hazard rate. Therefore, 
McCall’s one half one half split between the two risks, although might be suitable in 
unemployment spell studies, is inappropriate to apply to mortgage studies. More work is 
needed where an explicit analytical form of the likelihood function is available in 
mortgage studies. In addition, Deng et al. (2000a, 2000b) and Huang and Ondrich (2002) 
attempt to control for unobserved heterogeneity by Heckman-Singer’s mass point 
nonparametric approach. Their specification limits the heterogeneity in a restrictive form 
and hence forces the results to be in contrast to empirical evidence. I attempt to apply a 
different Heckman-Singer heterogeneity approach to relax the restrictions. 
 
In summary, the econometric estimation technique on mortgage terminations advances 
from discrete choice model to proportional hazard model to semiparametric flexible 
proportional hazard model to competing risk proportional hazard model with grouped 
data with heterogeneity. As the technique sophisticates, so are the issues addressed. Up to 
now, researchers on mortgage terminations are able to address unrestricted form of 
correlation between competing risks along with unrestricted form of individual 
heterogeneity. They can also investigate the shapes of the hazards to further understand 
termination behaviors.  
 
The above section gives a comprehensive review of the literature review, including 
review on early studies, economic theory, option theory and review on econometric 
methodology. In the following section, I attempt to apply the option theory to test the 
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 non-ruthless model specification while controlling for the unobserved heterogeneity. I 
attempt to improve the literature by introduction an unmeasured, yet important factor that 
significantly influence mortgage default. In addition, I apply Heckman-Singer’s 
unobserved heterogeneity to allow for a more flexible correlation between heterogeneities 
on default and prepayment than the specification in Deng, Quigley and Van Order 
(2000). Lastly, I will adopt a latest result by An (2004) on the identification of the sample 
likelihood function in the estimation of competing-risk models under the proportional 
hazards assumption with grouped duration data and introduce the exact likelihood 
function to replace the commonly used approximation formula.   
 
3.3 Data 
3.3.1 Dataset   
In this section, I shall provide a brief explanation of the dataset that I employed in the 
paper. The empirical analysis is based on individual mortgage history data maintained by 
a large mortgage institution. The database contains 508,219 observations on single-family 
mortgage loans originated from 1992 to 2000. All loans are one unit and owner occupied 
properties with 30 or 15 years of fixed-rate mortgage terms. All loans are observed from 
their origination dates till December 2003 or till their termination dates. The maximum 
length a loan can be observed in the sample is 48 quarters. 
 
For each mortgage loan, the available information includes the origination and 
termination time, termination reason (prepayment, default, or censoring), the original 
loan amount, the initial loan-to-value ratio, the mortgage contract interest rate (coupon 
rate), the monthly housing expense including principal, interest and insurance payment, 
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 state, region and the zip code in which the property is located. Borrower information such 
as credit score, income, and debt-to-income ratio are also presented in the dataset. Since 
all loans mortgage term are either 15 or 30 years, and the observation window is 12 years, 
no loan exits the sample as a matured loan. Therefore, the analysis is confined to loans 
that were either terminated or censored at the end of 2003. The duration is measured in 
quarters.  
 
This database is unique in the sense that the observations in it are paired in the following 
way: each property has appeared chronologically twice in the dataset. The first time the 
property enters the database is through a purchase transaction where a borrower obtains a 
mortgage from purchasing the property. The second time the same property enters the 
database is in the form of either a refinance or another purchase transaction, which occurs 
later in time than the first purchase transaction. Hence there are two pairs of transactions 
in the database: purchase to refinance and purchase to purchase. Purchase to purchase 
pair is obtained when the title of the property exchanges hands and the owner of the 
property changes after the transaction. Purchase to refinance pair is realized when the 
property owner refinances her current mortgage and obtain a new mortgage on the same 
property; no ownership changes are involved18.  
 
The first purchase transaction provides the property’s market value that is agreed upon 
between a buyer and a seller. It serves as the base property value from which the property 
appreciates. Since the housing market competitively decides the purchase price of the 
                                                 
18 The appraisal bias measure is obtained through the purchase to refinance transactions.  
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 property, we assume no systematic bias exists on the value of the purchase transaction 
property. By the same reason, the purchase-to-purchase transaction is assumed to exhibit 
mean zero value bias. The property value of the refinanced transaction, however, is not 
determined in the same manner. Because there is no demand for the property, the value of 
the property is not determined by the market. It is rather what a lender designated 
appraiser appraises at.  Due to the information asymmetric structure described in the 
previous chapter, lenders and appraisers have an incentive to inflate the property value. 
Therefore, there is potential appraisal bias in the property value of the refinanced 
transaction.  
 
3.3.2 Appraisal Bias   
The structure of the secondary mortgage market creates asymmetric information between 
mortgage lenders and mortgage buyers. A profit maximizing lender would manipulate the 
application, e.g., overvalue the collateral, in order to achieve favorable outcome without 
being subjected to penalties. Fraud on loans delivered to Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac is 
directly undetectable because these two government-sponsored enterprises are limited to 
participate in the secondary market only by Charter rules set up by Congress. Therefore, 
an objective third party is required to verify the truth of the collateral values. This job is 
done entirely by the real estate appraisal industry. 
 
The real estate appraisal industry certifies the value of collaterals for mortgage 
transactions and provides an estimate of the property value through an appraisal process. 
Their estimate helps mortgage lenders and borrowers determine if their investment is 
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 worthy. In theory, real estate appraisers should maintain independence of mortgage 
borrowers and lenders in order to present objective and unbiased opinion on the value of 
the property. The system is set up to protect mortgage lenders and ensure that they can 
recoup their investments if forced to foreclose on a property, it also protects borrowers 
from paying more than what their homes are worth. However, recent changes in 
mortgage market structures and intensive competition among appraisers prevent real 
estate appraisers to fulfill their duty objectively.  
 
In the past when the residential mortgage market was dominated by low loan to value 
(LTV) purchase money loans to high quality borrowers directly from lenders, the 
appraiser was considered a fact checker for a newspaper or magazine. His job boiled 
down to making sure the contracted-for purchase price was reasonable.  Very 
occasionally, appraisers were asked to determine if the borrower would have enough 
equity in the transaction so that the lender would be protected in case of default or if the 
lender should require private mortgage insurance (MI). Most lenders simply counted on 
rising housing prices, making such decisions irrelevant.  
 
The independent third-party fact-checking function of appraisers has been compromised 
due to a drastic change in the mortgage market environment. Today, every aspect of that 
worry-free environment that existed throughout most of the 1970s and 1980s is gone. For 
example, in 1990s, refinancing and home equity loans had come to dominate the 
residential mortgage market, making purchase money mortgage less than one quarter of 
mortgage transactions. Currently, high LTV loans account for 25 percent of mortgage 
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 productions, and mortgage brokers who do not hold mortgages in their portfolios 
originate more than half of all loans in the primary market. In addition, consumer 
delinquencies are on the rise and create a growing pool of sub-prime borrowers.  
 
Appraisers are tempted to follow these market trends to secure their future businesses. In 
the worst-case scenarios, they achieve the goal by inflating stated property values. Instead 
of knowing the purchase price in a sale transaction, the appraiser finds out the size of the 
underlying mortgage that the homeowner wants to refinance or how big a credit line he 
wants to establish. Often appraisers are given this information by the homeowner or the 
mortgage originator/lender. Or, with matrix pricing by LTV becoming more and more 
popular in the sub-prime market, the appraiser finds out what interest rate the homeowner 
wants to qualify for and report the property value accordingly. In other cases, appraisers 
inflate property value in order not to be responsible for imposing the cost of private 
mortgage insurance on a homeowner, a percentage of the unpaid principal balance, which 
could be as high as half of the mortgage payment. Competition has accentuated this trend. 
Even in the peak refinancing year of 1994, there were only an average of 100 transactions 
per appraiser generating an average income of $25,000 to $30,000. Their average 
incomes declined by more than one third over the next two years. Given that most 
defaults do not happen in the first year of loan origination and a steady house price 
appreciation, appraisers have incentive to inflate property prices to attract business 
without getting penalized.  
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 Pressure from mortgage lenders is another reason for appraisers to inflate property 
appraisal values. “The people who certify what homes are worth when they are sold or 
refinanced say they are being pressured to inflate their numbers to ensure that the lending 
deals go through”, sited from the Denver Post (The Denver Post, July 20, 2003).  
 
The property valuation bias created could lead to substantial losses for the economy. For 
example, it was inflated appraisals and rampant property flipping that were among the 
many factors that led to the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s, which led to the ultimate 
failure of a large number of US’s thrifts while significantly weakening many lending 
institutions.  Many of the thrifts subsequently had to be closed or bailed out by the federal 
government, which seized and then resold thousands of overvalued properties.  
 
Since then, the real estate appraisal industry has received severe criticism. On September 
23, 1986, U. S. House of Representatives Committee on Government Operations 
approved and adopted a report, titled “Impact of Appraisal Problems on Real Estate 
Lending, Mortgage Insurance, and Investment in the Secondary Market”. The so-called 
“1986 Barnard Report,” named after then chairman, Congressman Douglas Barnard, Jr., 
concluded that more than 800 federally insured savings and loan associations have 
“significant appraisal deficiencies” and on top of that, more than 300 were declared 
insolvent or placed in “problem status” by federal regulators. The Committee also 
reported that 10-15% of the $1.3 billion in losses suffered by private mortgage insurers in 
1984-1985 could be attributed to inaccurate and fraudulent appraisals, and that 10-40% of 
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 the $420 million in loan losses at the Veterans Administration in 1987 was caused by 
inaccurate or dishonest appraisals or other appraisal-related deficiencies.  
 
The findings and conclusions of this report stated that a wide range of corrective 
measures would have to be developed and instituted by federal regulatory authorities, the 
appraisal industry, and the real estate finance and investment interests. Following the 
report, a series of mandated reforms and regulatory requirements in the appraisal 
profession were introduced. They include the emergence of the Appraisal Foundation in 
1987; Title XI of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recover, and Enforcement Act of 
1989 (know as FIRREA); Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice; state 
licensing; quality control measures; and appraisal review guidelines.  
 
Despite a series of appraisal regulations, updates, mandates, procedural guidelines, and 
advisory opinions, faulty and fraudulent appraisals still remain a national problem. The 
FBI recently reported that 10 to 15 percent of all loan applications contains material 
misrepresentations, such as inflated property valuations (The Denver Post July 20, 2003). 
Many times these fraudulent loans end up in foreclosure, resulting in financial losses to 
mortgage buyers. Their estimates showed the total price of mortgage fraud could be as 
high as $120 billion, with the Mortgage Banker Association (MBA) estimating over $60 
billion from its reporting membership. The Washington Post’s recent article on mortgage 
fraud quotes an FBI official that “mortgage fraud has the potential to become a ‘national 
epidemic’ that could expose lenders to hundreds of millions of dollars in losses.”  (The 
Washington Post, September 18, 2004; Page E01). “Appraisal bias, spreading like a 
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 cancer, is eating away at the industry’s moral foundation” (NAIFA – AppraiserE-Gram, 
2001). 
 
OFHEO (the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight), the federal oversight 
agency for Fannie and Freddie, has also identified appraisal bias as an issue in 
determining how much capital they should set aside for any market downturns (risk based 
capital requirements)19. The Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight is directed 
by the Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act of 1992 to 
develop a risk-based capital regulation for Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae (collectively, the 
Enterprises). The regulation specifies the risk-based capital stress test that will determine 
the amount of capital an Enterprise is required to hold to maintain positive capital 
throughout a ten-year period of economic stress. The results of the risk-based capital 
stress test will be used to determine each Enterprise's risk-based capital requirements and, 
along with the minimum capital requirement, to determine each Enterprise's capital 
classification for purposes of possible supervisory action.  
 
Appraisal bias, defined by OFHEO, can result from “the perceived tendency of 
appraisers, as agents of primary mortgage lenders, to impart an upward bias to a home 
value to insure that a home sale is made”20. OFHEO recognizes that appraisal bias could 
affect the rates generated by the stress test if the method of computing the house price 
index were changed in some way to account for appraisal bias or if appraisal bias were 
found to be significantly different in more recent data than in the historical data used to 
                                                 
19 Federal Register: April 13, 1999 (Volume 64, Number 70), Page 18083-18132. 
20 Federal Register: April 13, 1999 (Volume 64, Number 70), Page 18125. 
 110
 estimate the models21. As of September 30, 2004, Fannie Mae’s risk-based capital 
requirement was $18.342 billion. Fannie Mae’s total capital of $38.762 billion on that 
date exceeded the risk-based capital requirement by $20.420 billion (OFHEO News 
Release Thursday, December 21, 2004). As of September 30, 2004, Freddie Mac’s risk-
based capital requirement was $5.749 billion. Freddie Mac’s total capital of $34.397 
billion on that date exceeded the requirement amount by $28.648 billion (OFHEO News 
Release Thursday, December 30, 2004). OFHEO continues to conduct analysis on 
appraisal bias and its effect on risk-based capital requirement for the GSEs; no conclusive 
findings on how the risk-based capital shall be impacted are available at this moment. 
Nevertheless, OFHEO’s awareness of appraisal bias and its willingness to investigate the 
impact of appraisal bias on risk-based capital requirement for the GSEs suggests that 
appraisal bias is an economically significant phenomenon. 
 
The following figures help quantify the importance of appraisal bias. As of January 2005, 
16 percent of outstanding subprime market refinance loans are reported to have exactly 
80 percent origination LTV ratio, translating into $35.57 billion in unpaid principal 
balance22. This LTV ratio allows the borrowers to pay the minimum required down 
payment while avoiding primary mortgage insurance payments. According to the 
estimation data used in this paper, the mean ratio of reported property value to predicted 
property value for refinance loans with 80 percent LTV is 1.05; the standard deviation is 
0.12. Therefore, 97.72 percent of those loans should have predicted LTV less or equal to 
                                                 
21 Federal Register: April 13, 1999 (Volume 64, Number 70), Page 18125. 
22 The total outstanding balance for refinance loans in the subprime market is $219.0 billion as of January 
2005. 
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 103 percent23. 50 percent of those loans should have predicted LTV greater than 84 
percent, which would require primary mortgage insurance coverage between 12 to 35 
percent of the unpaid principal balance; the exact coverage also depends on other loan 
characteristics24. For simplicity, let’s assume these loans would require on average 15 
percent mortgage insurance coverage. Multiplying their unpaid principal balance amount, 
the coverage will translate into $5.3 billion of loss cushion for default. This amount of 
money is what mortgage buyers are able to recoup from primary mortgage insurers 
should the loans default during the lifetime of a loan. The loss within a shorter period of 
time depends on the default rate within shorter period. If we assume that the cumulative 
default rate within 3 years is 1 percent, then the loss generated by defaults in 3 years 
would be $0.35 billion, out of which $53 million shall be recovered. However, these 
loans are not required to purchase mortgage insurance since they are reported to have 
exactly 80 percent LTV ratio, making the would have been there loss cushion not 
recoupable. Since default risk is strongly determined by LTV as literature establishes, the 
underreported LTV due to appraisal bias will generate unmeasured default risk and 
subsequently un-recoupable loss to mortgage buyers.     
 
Because most lenders only use their in house appraisers, I assume the appraisers and the 
lenders are one entity and share the same interest. Appraisal bias in this paper refers to 
the actions taken by lenders and appraisers that intentionally overvalue the collateral 
value to facilitate the successful completion of a mortgage transaction. Origination 
                                                 
23 Two standard deviation away from the population mean on a normal distribution. 
24 The standard mortgage insurance coverage is 12, 25, 30 and 35 percent for loans with LTV 85 percent 
and under, 85.01 to 90 percent, 90.01 to 95 percent, 95.01 to 100 percent respectively for 30 year, standard 
coverage, primary residence, purchase or rate term refinance, A rating credit loans. Source: 
www.radian.biz/rates. 
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 appraisal bias arises due to the information asymmetry between mortgage investors and 
mortgage originators25. Mortgage originators, whose compensation is contingent upon 
business volume, have an incentive to influence appraisers to provide favorable 
valuations to the mortgage investors. Mortgage investors and secondary mortgage market 
agents do not have access to the individual collateral values independently and lack the 
capability to verify the lender reported property value. This structure creates incentive for 
lenders to behave in ways that contract to the best interest of the mortgage investors.   
 
For example, holding everything else constant, a higher property value lowers the interest 
rate for mortgage borrowers, and mortgage borrowers are more inclined to accept an offer 
with a lower interest rate. Therefore, mortgage lenders are willing to report a higher than 
actual property value to mortgage buyers in the secondary market in returns for 
increasing business provided the inflated value is not detectable. The higher than actual 
property value is realized through lender ordered appraisals where the appraisers 
intentionally over appraise the underlying collateral value. This systematic fraudulent 
action is referred to as origination appraisal bias. 
 
The existence of appraisal bias is solely due to the structure between primary mortgage 
market and secondary mortgage market. Due to the investment nature of mortgages and 
the popularity of mortgage derivatives, i.e., mortgaged backed securities (MBS), 
mortgage lenders typically do not hold mortgages in their portfolios. Instead, they sell 
them to secondary mortgage market in return for MBS, which can be traded frequently in 
the capital market. MBSs, depending on who the issuers are, carry guaranties on the 
                                                 
25 Please refer to chapter 2 on the theoretical derivation of appraisal bias.  
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 credit risk of the underlying mortgages. Investors on the capital market are free of default 
risk if they purchase MBSs issued by certain institutions, e.g., Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac and Ginnie Mae. Those institutions guarantee the timely payment of mortgage 
principals and interest. In this scenario, it is the MBS issuers, not the mortgage lenders 
who bare the credit risk of the mortgages. This gives mortgage lenders incentive to 
behave in ways that maximize their profit at the expense of MBS issuers.  
 
Because appraisals are used to estimate borrower’s equity in the absence of a transaction 
price and equity influence default, over-valuation of collaterals results in underestimation 
of the default risk. By passing the inflated default risk to secondary mortgage market 
agents, mortgage lenders have strong motivations to maintain a system of appraisal 
incentives.  
 
Empirical and experimental/behavioral research has documented the existence of 
appraisal bias. Empirical wise, Cho and Megbolugbe (1996) and Chinloy, Cho and 
Megbolugbe (1997) find out that over 95 percent of the appraised values on a sample of 
600, 000 residential mortgages purchased by Fannie Mae exceed that of the property 
pending sale price. Noordewier, Harrion, and Ramagopal (2001) study 1,428 residential 
mortgages and conclude that mortgages whose collateral values are over-valued, 
compared to their comparable value, exhibit higher default risk than those whose 
collaterals do not have overvaluation.  
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 Experimental/behavior research conducted through survey and experimental design 
present findings that reinstate the existence of appraisal bias. Survey and experiment 
conducted by Kinnard, Lenk and Worzala (1997) reveal that appraisers acknowledge they 
are under pervasive client pressure and have a tendency to succumb to it when exerted by 
important clients. Another study finds that unsophisticated pressures from lenders are 
applied to appraisers in the forms of threat of withholding fee payments or reduction in 
future assignments (Levy and Schuck 1999). Another experiment shows an asymmetric 
response to transaction price feedback among appraisers (Hansz and Diaz 2001). 
Appraisers do not adjust downward their estimates when told their previous estimate on 
an unrelated property is too high. However, when told that their value estimates on a 
previous appraisal was too low regardless if it is so, appraisers respond by adjusting 
upward their next valuation on an unrelated assignment. Hansz and Diaz interpret this 
asymmetry as a routine response to pervasive appraiser-lender concerns.   
 
Theoretical derivation on appraisal bias can be found in chapter 2. Chapter 2 concludes 
that under certain conditions, it is an equilibrium strategy for lenders to randomize 
between truthfully reports the property value and intentionally inflates the property value. 
It is also an equilibrium strategy for mortgage buyers to randomize between takes the 
reported value as such and costly investigate the soundness of the reported property 
value. 
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 There has not been any study on mortgage termination that explicitly corrects for 
origination appraisal bias when calculating the put and call option at loan level26.  
Ignoring origination appraisal bias leads to mis-measurement of equity related variables 
and biased estimators. In order to correct for appraisal bias, one needs to know the true 
market value of the property instead of relying on lender reported value. Unfortunately, 
limited data on property value prevents previous studies to address this concern.  
 
Fortunately, this study utilizes a unique set of dataset where all sample observations have 
an earlier purchase transaction. As mentioned earlier, one can match each refinance loan 
record with an earlier purchase transaction where the purchase price of the property at 
that time is available. In addition, we have access to a quarterly weighted repeated sales 
house price index separately for 100,000 zip code levels provided by the same institution 
that also provides the estimation dataset. This index provides an estimate of the course of 
house prices in each zip code area and each quarter since loan originations. Combining 
the purchase price with the zip code level quarterly weighted repeated sales house price 
index one can derive the calculated property value at the second transaction’s origination 
time. The difference between the calculated and the lender reported property value at 
second loan’s origination time reflects the appraisal bias. The appraisal bias for purchase 
transactions is eliminated because the purchase price is assumed to be determined 
competitively by demand and supply in the market. 
 
                                                 
26 Ciochetti et al. (2002) studies lender level aggregated originator bias in commercial mortgage.  They 
define originator bias as the non-representative underwriting behavior (too loose or too stringent) by each 
lender. They correct it by weighing each sample observation based on how representative that observation 
type is relative to its population equivalent. 
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 The methodology that creates the house price index (HPI) is based on the weighted 
repeated sales (WRS) 3-stage estimation procedure proposed by Bailey, Muth and Nourse 
(1963) and implemented by Case and Shiller (1987; 1989) 27. To validate the 
appropriateness of their methodology, I compute predicted property value using Case and 
Shiller’s WRS index on purchase loans and refinance loans. Then I compare the predicted 
property value with the actual purchase transaction price and the lender-reported 
refinance property price. My comparison suggests that the WRS model over predicts the 
purchase price by 0.5 percent and under predicts the refinance property value by 2 
percent on average28. This indicates that Case and Shiller’s methodology does well in 
predicting actual purchase transaction prices. The under prediction of the refinance 
property values suggests that there exists appraisal bias in the refinance transactions.   
 
The above measure is still at most a proxy for appraisal bias because researchers do not 
observe the actual market value of the property. However, it at least eases the concern of 
appraisal bias at the mean level. I limit the observation to loans that have prior purchase 
transactions records only because in theory the purchase price should bare no bias in any 
direction. On the other hand, a prior refinance transaction might have been subjected to 
appraisal bias and hence the estimated current property value based on an inflated prior 
property value may lead to underestimated appraisal bias.  
 
                                                 
 
27 Please refer to Appendix B for the documentation on weighted repeat sale house price index. 
28 The average actual purchase price is $179,580.51 with a standard deviation of 72,138.96, and the average 
refinance price is $173,317.81 with a standard deviation of 71,940.72. 
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 3.3.3 Explanatory Variables   
As explained earlier, the borrower treats prepayment option (call option) as an option to 
pay off the unpaid balance prior to maturity, where she “buys” the mortgage from the 
mortgage lender for the amount of the remaining balance. In the interpretation of default 
option (put option), the borrower “sells” the property back to the mortgage lender at the 
property market value at the time of default.  
 
Following literature on option pricing model, the variable influencing the exercise of the 
call option is the gap between the market value of the mortgage and the face value of the 
mortgage. This variable can be computed by the ratio of the present discounted value of 
the unpaid mortgage balance at the current market rate relative to the value discounted at 
the contract interest rate (coupon rate)29.  
 
The variable influencing the exercise of the put option is the amount of negative equity 
associated with the property at the time of default. It can be measured by the equity ratio 
between contemporaneous property value and market value of the mortgage. 
Unfortunately, we do not observe the exact market property value for each individual 
house. Once again, we rely on the zip code level house price index to measure the house 
price appreciation in each quarter. Applying the estimates of the zip code level house 
price index to the origination house value gives us the quarterly market house value. The 
                                                 
29 The current quarterly market interest rate used here is the average interest rate charged by lenders 
reported by Freddie Mac’s quarterly market survey (http://www.freddiemac.com. This rate varies by 
quarter across five major US regions. 
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 ratio between the market house value and the mortgage market value gives us proxy for 
put option value30.  
 
This measure is by far an approximation for the put option value that a borrower endows 
in each period. An apparent improvement is one that considers the tax benefit that the 
interest payment on a mortgage brings to the borrower. The interest payment on a 
mortgage is tax deductible and hence reduces the put option value to the borrower. 
However, lack on information on the household size prevents me to locate the county, 
state and federal specific marginal tax bracket that should be applied to each borrower. 
One the other hand, one also needs to subtract property tax from the interest payment tax 
benefit. The property tax is based on county level property tax rate that I do not obtain. 
Arbitrary assumptions on the amount of the tax benefit and tax payment does not make 
the put option measurement more accurate than what it is. Therefore, I assume the tax 
benefit and tax payment cancel out each other and hence the exclusion of both does not 
impose a threat to the estimation. The put option value measures the probability that the 
equity value falls below market value and should be considered a probability measure.    
 
The econometric model presented in the next section uses variables that can be 
categorized as mortgage and property characteristics, borrower characteristics, and 
economic conditions as covariates to explain default and prepayment behavior. Based on 
those variables, I construct the put and call option value, the transaction cost, and the 
trigger events that determine default and prepayment behavior. 
 
                                                 
30 Please refer to Appendix A for construction of the call and put option variable. 
 119
 Mortgage and property characteristics:  
Mortgage Size – Mortgage size is included to control for differences in the fixed-cost 
component of transaction costs associated with default and prepayment. In practice, the 
fixed-cost component of the transaction costs is proportionately smaller for large 
mortgages than for small mortgages. Therefore, we expect to see borrowers with large 
mortgages are more likely to invoke the default or prepayment options. On the other 
hand, the size of the mortgage also indicates the financial affordability of the borrowers. 
The fact that a borrower chooses to borrow a large size mortgage demonstrates her 
financial confidence and stability, which also reflects a low default probability. And we 
should expect borrowers who are less financially stable, as represented by a small loan 
amount, are more likely to default. The value of the natural logarithm of mortgage size at 
origination is used in the estimation31.  
 
Put and Call Option Value – The put and call option values are constructed using loan 
age, monthly principal and interest payment, mortgage note rate, current local market 
interest rate, mortgage term, property value at origination and market value of the 
property. One expects the borrowers with high put option values are more likely to 
default and borrowers with high call option values are more likely to prepay. Since the 
two are correlated, we are also interested in how the put and call variables influence the 
other option.    
 
                                                 
31 is used in the duration model as one of the covariates, where m  is the mortgage amount at 
origination. 
)log(m
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 Borrower Credit Score at Origination – Borrower credit score serves as measures for 
borrower’s capability to manage debt. A historically capable borrower is better positioned 
to manage her credit risk and to avoid default than an incapable one.  
 
Borrower Debt-to-Income Ratio – Debt-to-income ratio is negatively correlated with 
prepayment and positively correlated with default. It is hard for borrowers with high 
debt-to-income ratio to find lenders who are willing to refinance their current mortgage 
due to their financial constraints. For the same reason, borrowers with high debt-to-
income ratio are likely to exercise default option for there is little financial cushion.  
 
Economic conditions: 
State Level Quarterly Unemployment Rate – Unemployment rate serves as proxy for 
trigger event. One expects that properties in high unemployment regions are more likely 
to default than those that are in low unemployment regions. Previous studies also suggest 
that high unemployment rates lower the prepayment hazard, indicating that liquidity 
constraints make prepayment difficult for unemployed borrowers (Deng, Quigley and 
Van Order 1996).  
 
3.3.4 Summary Statistics of Explanatory Variables   
Table I presents the means and standard deviations of the time invariant variables by 
termination reasons. The summary statistics shows that origination LTV, borrower credit 
score, borrower monthly income and debt to income ratio all move in the direction that 
literature suggested. Defaulted loans have high origination LTV, low credit scores, low 
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 monthly income, and high debt to income ratios at origination. In comparison, loans that 
have prepaid during the 48 quarters observation window tend to have high loan amount, 
high credit score, high monthly income and low debt-to-income ratio. In addition, 
defaulted loans also have higher appraisal bias than active loans or prepaid loans as of 
December 2003. Whether or not these variables possess significant explanatory power to 
loan terminations remain to be tested.     
 
Table I. Descriptive Statistics of Time Invariant Variables by Loan Termination Type 
Total
Variables Active Prepayed Defaulted
Original Loan Amount ($) 124,034.63 108,123.95 127,629.48 118,181.00
(47,777.49) (44,287.54) (47,805.67) (46,718.68)
Original Loan to Value Ratio 0.74 0.71 0.75 0.84
(0.14) (0.15) (0.14) (0.90)
Original Note Rate 0.0715 0.0687 0.0722 0.0750
(0.0057) (0.0050) (0.0057) (0.0065)
Borrower FICO 718.95 720.47 718.91 660.78
(50.67) (53.57) (49.80) (54.40)
Monthly Income ($) 5,933.56 5,568.67 6,020.13 4,992.14
(3,571.54) (3,401.16) (3,606.31) (2,796.04)
Monthly Debt ($) 1,680.44 1,511.47 1,718.39 1,663.18
(842.03) (800.72) (846.37) (846.91)
Debt to Income Ratio 0.3073 0.2967 0.3094 0.3515
(0.1190) (0.1228) (0.1180) (0.1166)
Appraisal Bias (Predicted LTV - Reported LTV) 0.0231 0.0152 0.0247 0.0911
(0.0992) (0.1031) (0.0976) (0.1588)
Appraisal Bias (Reported Value - Predicted Value)/Predicted Value 0.0341 0.0240 0.0362 0.1175
(0.1589) (0.1633) (0.1573) (0.2074)
Notes: Standard deviations are in parenthesis. All loans originated from 1992 to 2000. Values are reported as of the
time of loan origination. An active loan is one that had not yet terminated by 12/31/2003.
Based on 508,219 observations.
As of 2003/12
 
 
The following two tables present summary statistics of the time variant variables, one by 
loan age, the other by calendar time.  
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 Table II presents means and standard deviation of time variant variables by duration/loan 
age. The data shows that the put option monotonically decreases as the loans age, with 
the biggest decrease occurring from origination to the end of first year.  The decreasing 
trend then flattens to approach zero from 3rd to 5th year, and returns to its original speed 
from 5th to 7th year and slows down again to stay relatively flat after a loan reaches 7 
years of age. This indicates that default is more likely to occur after a loan reaches its 5 
years of age. The call option fluctuates as loan ages, indicating that its value is less 
correlated with the age of the loan. This result is not surprising because call option is 
defined by a loan’s origination interest rate and what is being offered in the market 
quarterly. The decreasing trend observed in house price reflects the fact that the surviving 
pool consists more low value property loans than high value property loans.  
 
Table II. Descriptive Statistics for Time Variant Variables By Loan Duration 
Variables At Origination 1Yr 3Yr 5Yr 7Yr 9Yr
House Price 172,066.69 171,102.72 169,558.04 161,033.89 155,580.68 158,383.18
(72,740.74) (72,298.20) (71,872.93) (69,661.33) (70,729.64) (72,897.68)
Call Option 0.0089 -0.0265 0.0063 0.0603 0.0081 0.0259
(0.0423) (0.0802) (0.0602) (0.0880) (0.0878) (0.0796)
Put Option 0.1075 0.0615 0.0297 0.0218 0.0072 0.0024
(0.1346) (0.1063) (0.0682) (0.0556) (0.0309) (0.0144)
Squared Term of Call Option 0.0019 0.0071 0.0037 0.0114 0.0078 0.0070
(0.0030) (0.0072) (0.0109) (0.0154) (0.0163) (0.0087)
Squared Term of Put Option 0.0297 0.0151 0.0055 0.0036 0.0010 0.0002
(0.0618) (0.0467) (0.0277) (0.0179) (0.0102) (0.0036)
State Unemployment Rate 4.6106 4.3506 5.0027 5.4610 4.7471 5.7703
(1.1795) (1.0266) (1.0603) (1.2222) (1.2329) (0.9222)
Notes: Standard deviations are in parenthesis. All loans originated from 1992 to 2000. Values are reported by loan age.
Based on 508,219 loan observations
 
 
Table III presents summary statistics of time variant variables by calendar time. It shows 
that the call option value is increasing over the year except for a dip in 1999Q4, 
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 indicating that prepayment activities shall be clustered before and after 1999Q4. The 
value of call option is the lowest in 1999Q4, indicating that the prepayment option is lest 
likely to be exercised. State level quarterly unemployment rate decreases from 1992Q4 to 
19999Q4 and reaches its lowest level in 1999Q4, after which it then starts to climb back 
up again. Values of put options fluctuate by calendar time, its absolute value is less 
informative since it is reflecting a mixture of loans of different ages. The house price 
reflects the general market appreciation trend occurred by calendar time. Once again, the 
dip in 2003Q4 is resulting from the low property loans left in the surviving pool.  
 
Table III. Descriptive Statistics for Time Variant Variables By Calendar Time 
Variables 1993Q4 1995Q4 1997Q4 1999Q4 2001Q4 2003Q4
House Price 158,727.60 157,125.43 160,424.41 170,899.53 172,997.26 158,304.79
(73,639.30) (70,645.67) (68,139.59) (71,713.89) (73,289.79) (70,550.63)
Call Option 0.0269 0.0084 0.0304 -0.0595 0.0352 0.0453
(0.0532) (0.0556) (0.0576) (0.0383) (0.0608) (0.0917)
Put Option 0.0546 0.0626 0.0880 0.0343 0.0384 0.0193
(0.1103) (0.1308) (0.1370) (0.0672) (0.0843) (0.0559)
Squared Term of Call Option 0.0036 0.0032 0.0042 0.0050 0.0049 0.0105
(0.0054) (0.0052) (0.0059) (0.0040) (0.0080) (0.0123)
Squared Term of Put Option 0.0151 0.0210 0.0265 0.0057 0.0086 0.0035
(0.0506) (0.0696) (0.0673) (0.0223) (0.0363) (0.0210)
State Unemployment Rate 6.4108 5.3717 4.5971 4.0484 5.5298 5.9265
(1.4127) (1.2180) (0.9873) (0.7753) (0.8311) (0.9790)
Notes: Standard deviations are in parenthesis. All loans originated from 1992 to 2000. Values are reported by loan age.
Based on 508,219 loan observations
 
 
3.4 Model 
In this section, I present the derivation and specification of the competing risk 
proportional hazard model with unobserved heterogeneity. 
Let  be the latent variables representing the duration of a mortgage until it is 
terminated in the form of default or prepayment respectively. Denote  as 
pd TT ,
),min( pd TTT =
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 the observable duration, where only the risk that occurs earlier will be observed. 
Therefore, it is known that an observation’s default duration is longer than its prepayment 
duration if a prepayment is observed. Likewise, an observation’s prepayment duration is 
longer than its default duration if a default is observed. If an observation remains active 
by the end of the 48th quarter, we conclude that both its default and prepayment duration 
exceed the length of the maximum observation window.  
 
Let denote a vector of time invariant covariates and  denote a vector of time varying 
covariates that is fixed between 
z tx
),1[ tt − , but can vary from period to period. Both 
variables influence the termination decision for the borrower at each period. Furthermore 
let ),( pd θθθ = be the two unobserved heterogeneity factors associated with default and 
prepayment risks respectively.  
 
Competing risk model under proportional hazard specifications has the following 
assumptions (Han and Hausman 1990; Sueyoshi 1992; McCall 1996; An 2004; 
Wooldridge): 
 
Assumption 1 (Conditional Independence) Conditional on the observed and unobserved 
heterogeneity ),,( θzxt , the two risk-specific durations  are independent.  pd TT ,
 
Assumption 2 (Proportional Hazards) Conditional on ),,,...,( 1 θzxx t , the hazard function 
for s pd TT ,  i pdjzxthzxxth ijjijitjiiitji ,),exp()(),,,...,|( 01 =++= θγβθ  respectively. 
The hazard at time  only depends on the covariates at time t . t
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McCall (1994) specifies the heterogeneity as multiplicative to the proportional hazards, 
specifically in the form of θβθ ))(exp()()],,0[),(|( 0 tzthtsszth =∈ . McCall’s 
specification and the one in assumption 2 are equivalent where his heterogeneity equals 
the exponential of what is specified in assumption 2. The advantage of the latter is that by 
putting the heterogeneity parameter inside the exponential function, we are guaranteed a 
positive value.  
 
For each observation , researchers can observe two covariate vectors , and an 
interval  such that , where  is either 
i iit zx ,
iA ii AT ∈ iA ),1[ kk −  or ),1[ ∞−k , ∞= ,...,1k . 
Researchers also observe two censoring indicator, dipi δδ , . The value of piδ  equals one 
for prepayment and zero for default; the value of diδ  equals one for default and zero for 
prepayment for observation .  i
 
Combining assumption 1, 2 and utilizing the relationship between probability density 
function, survivor function and hazard function, i.e., 
(.)
(.)(.)
S
fh = , the joint density 
function of  conditional on ),( pd TT ),,( θzxt  can be expressed as: 
 
∫ ∫
= =
−−⋅⋅=
⋅=
u
s
v
s
iiispiiisdiiitpiiitd
iiitpiiitdiiit
dszxshdszxshzxvhzxuh
zxvfzxufzxvuf
0 0
}),,|(),,|(exp{),,|(),,|(
),,|(),,|(),,|,(
θθθθ
θθθ
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 The joint survivor function is  
 
}})exp()()exp()({exp{
)},|,{Pr(),|,(
0 0
00∫ ∫
= =
Θ
Θ
++⋅−++⋅−=
≥≥=
u
s
v
s
pipipispdididisd
iitpdiit
dszxshdszxshE
zxvTuTEzxvuS
θγβθγβ  
where denotes the expectation operator with respect to the distribution of the 
heterogeneity, which is assumed to be independent from   
ΘE
zxt , .
 
Denote the risk specific integrated baseline hazard and time varying covariate 
 as ∫
=
⋅
u
s
jisj dsxsh
0
0 )exp()( β pdjuji ,),( =Λ  and the time invariant covariate 
)exp( jijiz θγ +  as pdjji ,, =φ . After simplification, the joint survivor function can be 
written as 
 
}})()({exp{),|,( pipididiiit vuEzxvuS φφ ⋅Λ−⋅Λ−= Θ  
 
An observation can be classified in the following three types: 
Type I. A default subject is observed with ),1[ kkTi −∈  for Kk ≤≤0 and 1=diδ , 
Type II. A prepayment subject is observed with ),1[ kkTi −∈  for  and Kk ≤≤0 1=piδ , 
Type III. A subject is observed with ),1[ ∞−∈ kTi  for Kk ≤≤0  and 0,0 == pidi δδ . 
 
A Type III observation contributes to the sample likelihood function in the following 
form: 
 127
 (1) 
],|1,1([)],|1[Pr(),|0,0,1Pr( iitiitiiitpidii zxkkSEzxkTEzxkT −−=−≥===−≥ ΘΘδδ  
Because this observation has survived the end of the observation window, its contribution 
to the likelihood is its joint survivor function at 1−k . 
  
The contribution to the sample likelihood of a Type I observation is: 
(2)  
}})()(exp{)({
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1
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The above expression is the probability of an observation surviving up to period 1−k , 
multiplied by its default hazard rate between period 1−k  and . It represents the area 
size where default occurs between 
k
1−k  and , and prepayment risk occurs after default.  k
 
To gain intuition, the above integral can be thought of as  
∫
−=
⋅
k
kt
pd dttStf
1
)()( , where  measures the density that default occurs at time  and  
 represents the likelihood that prepayment occurs after period t . Because 
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The contribution to the sample likelihood of a Type II observation is: 
(3)  
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This is simply the probability of an observation surviving up to period , multiplied 
by its prepayment hazard rate between period 
1−k
1−k  and . It represents the area size 
where prepayment occurs between 
k
1−k  and , and default occurs after prepayment.  k
 
Notice that unlike in the single risk grouped data model, where the likelihood depends on 
the baseline hazard only through the discrete values of integrated hazard function 
evaluated at limited number of grouping points, the above integrals depend on the values 
of  and  for all t  between the interval )(0 th d )(0 th p 1−k  and . This is because in single 
risk model, the likelihood of an un-censored observation is reduced to  
k
dttth
k
kt
iii }))(exp()({
1
∫
−=
⋅Λ−⋅ φ . 
 
Since ,  )()1()1()()()1Pr(
1
kSkSkFkFdttfkTk
k
kt
−−=−−==<≤− ∫
−=
the above integral can also be expressed as )()1( kSkS −− . 
 
In the absence of time varying covariates, the proportional contribution to the hazard 
function can be taken out of the integral and the integrant is then left with only the 
baseline hazard. Therefore, the functional form of the baseline is irrelevant; its integrated 
value at discrete number of grouping points is what needs to be estimated. Provided the 
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 number of grouping points is less than the sample size, consistent estimates can be 
achieved.  
 
In the competing risk framework with grouped data one needs parameterization of the 
baseline hazard to solve the exact solution of the integrals even without the presence of 
time varying covariates. The integral can be thought of as . 
One cannot solve for it without the knowledge of  and . An (2004) provides 
proof of the unidentifiable problem for competing risks model under proportional hazard 
specification with grouped duration data.   
∫
−=
−−
k
ks
dsxGxFxf
1
))()(exp()(
)(xf )(xg
 
However, exact solution can be achieved under certain assumptions on the baseline 
hazard function. Following Han and Hausman (1990) and An (2004), a piece-wise 
constant assumption is made on the baseline hazard. 
 
Assumption 3 (Piece-wise Constant Baseline Hazard) the baseline hazard function is 
piece-wise constant: 
pdj
kkt
th kjj
,
),,1[
,)( ,0
=
−∈
= α
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 Under assumption 3, the two integrated baseline hazard functions  are 
piece-wise linear with interval-specific slopes 
pdjdssh
t
j ,,)(0 0 =∫
jkα . With this assumption, the integrals in 
(2) and (3) have analytical expression and become 
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(3)’ 
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Since the probably of the duration ends in interval ),1[ kk −  given θ,, zxt  is the sum of 
the probability of termination by default and probability of termination by prepayment, 
i.e.,  
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It is clear that one needs to assign weights ω  and ω−1  to default and prepayment risks 
respectively when calculating the contribution to the likelihood function. McCall (1996) 
arbitrarily assigns 5.0=ω  rather than estimating ω  and studies by Deng et al (2000), 
Ciochetti et al (2001), Amborse and LaCour-Little (2001), and Huang and Ondrich 
(2002) all adopt his formula in contrast to their piecewise constant baseline hazard 
assumptions. As illustrated, the exact solution of the likelihood is achievable once the 
baseline hazards are assumed to be piecewise constant, hence one should not approximate 
ω ; one should rather estimate it using the data. 
 
The unobserved heterogeneity is accounted for by the Heckman-Singer nonparametric 
approach. Heckman-Singer heterogeneity distribution is a discrete distribution with M  
points (Heckman and Singer 1984). The joint distribution of ),( pd θθ  is modeled by 
assuming that there are  unobserved types of individuals that occur in the 
population with relative frequency  (an individual in group  is characterized by the 
doublet of location parameters 
Mm ,...1=
mp m
),( pmdm θθ . Here, I assume a two-by-two discrete support 
for the heterogeneity in the model. 
 
Specifically, I assume there are two types of individuals for each risk; their joint 
distribution and associated probabilities are presented in the following table.  
 
dp θθ &        Marginal Probability of 1dθ 2dθ dθ  
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 1
pθ         11p 12p 1211 pp +  
2
pθ         21p 22p 2221 pp +  
Marginal Probability of dθ  2111 pp +  2212 pp +  1 
 
Two sets of conditions must be satisfied on the eight parameters for the heterogeneity. 
1. The probabilities must sum to unity: 
∑∑ =
i j
ijp 1 
 
2. The heterogeneity is mean 1 and distributed independently of . Due to the additive 
heterogeneity specification in this model, the mean 1 normalization is approximated by 
the following condition:  
zxt ,
pdjE j ,,0][ ==θ  
 
Condition 1 and the fact that all probabilities must range between 0 and 1 are met through 
the following transformation: 
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 Condition 2 requires that  
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Therefore, only five out of the eight heterogeneity parameters are free to be estimated. 
They are 
),,,,( 11211211 pd θθρρρ  
 
Deng el al. (2000a, 2000b) and Huang and Ondrich (2002) also adopt the Heckman-
Singer mass point heterogeneity but in a very restrictive form. Both of their specifications 
assume the same probability for default and prepayment heterogeneity. Specifically, they 
assume three types of individuals:  with probability ,  with 
probability  and  with , where 
),( 11 pd θθ 1p ),( 22 pd θθ
2p ),(
33
pd θθ 3p 1321 =++ ppp . Hence their methods 
restrict pd θθ ,  to be dependent and positively correlated. Translated to mortgage terms, 
their specifications restrict that high prepayment heterogeneity must be associated with 
high default heterogeneity, which contradicts to empirical evidence. Empirical studies 
show that a borrower who is more risky to prepay is less prone to default and they have 
smaller default probability had they not prepaid compare to the average at risk 
population. My specification relaxes the dependence between default and prepayment 
heterogeneity and allows them to move freely. 
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 After specifying the heterogeneity, one can define the unconditional probability 
contribution to the likelihood function corresponding to the three types of observations as 
)(),(),( klklkl pdc . They are respectively: 
(4) 
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The log likelihood function of the competing risks model over all observations is  
∑
=
−−++=
N
i
icpidiippiiddi klklkll
1
)(log)1()(log)(loglog δδδδ  
 
3.5 Estimation Results 
3.5.1 Non-Ruthless Specifications 
In this section, I present the estimation results of the non-ruthless model specification 
with controls for appraisal bias. For comparison, I also provide estimation results for the 
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 ruthless model with controls for appraisal bias, and ruthless and non-ruthless models 
without controls for appraisal bias in appendix C. 
 
All covariates in the estimations are between zero and unity or normalized to be within 
that range. Variables that have gone through normalization include credit score (divided 
by 1000), LTV (divided by 100), and logarithm of the origination loan value (divided by 
10). For estimation purpose, the baseline hazard functions are assumed to be exponentials 
of the piecewise constant, specifically,  
 
pdj
kkt
th kjj
,
),,1[
),exp()( ,0
=
−∈
= α
 
This specification allows the baseline hazard parameters to move inside the proportional 
changes; the only change stemming from it is the interpretation of jkα . Specifically, jkα  
now represents the natural logarithm of the baseline hazards. In addition, moving jkα  
inside the proportional portion of the hazard function allows me to estimate an intercept 
within the proportional portion while getting rid of one degree of freedom from the 
baseline portion. 
 
As indicated previously, the difference between ruthless and non-ruthless model 
assumptions is that the former assumes frictionless exercise of mortgage termination 
options where borrowers immediately exercise the default or prepayment option as soon 
as it is “in the money”. The latter one assumes that in addition to option values, there 
exist other deterministic factors that either trigger or hinder the exercise of mortgage 
terminations.  
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In order to test the two assumptions, I set up a ruthless and a non-ruthless model 
specification, where the former includes only the measures of financial incentives 
represented by the put and call options and the latter includes variables that measure 
borrower characteriscs, property characteristics and trigger events in addition to the 
financial option variables in the ruthless specification. Both specifications include 
measures for appraisal bias.  
 
The likelihood ratio test between the ruthless model and the non-ruthless model with 
appraisal bias returns a chi-square value of 6354.0 with degree of freedom 10, which 
favors the non-ruthless model specification. Table IV presents the maximum likelihood 
estimation of the competing risks proportional hazard model with grouped duration data 
for the non-ruthless model specification with controls for appraisal bias. For comparison 
purposes, estimation results of the ruthless model with controls for appraisal bias, ruthless 
and non-ruthless model without controls for appraisal bias are presented in Appendix C32.  
 
Table IV. Maximum Likelihood Estimation of Competing Risks Proportional Hazard 
Model – Model 1: Non-Ruthless Model With Controls for Appraisal Bias 
                                                 
The parameters remain stable in different runs where I change the starting value of the maximum 
likelihood estimations. The parameters in all models are similar in their magnitudes and carry the same 
sign as those obtained from the conditional default and prepayment models employed by multinomial 
logit estimations. 
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 Prepayment Default
baseline hazard parameters
2 years of age -0.7982 -4.1952
(0.2360) (0.1899)
3 years of age -0.6360 -3.6671
(0.2347) (0.2186)
4 years of age -0.4914 -3.5411
(0.2352) (0.2502)
5 years of age -0.1022 -3.3920
(0.2355) (0.2798)
6 years of age -0.1413 -3.5903
 (0.2523) (0.3494)
>6 years of age -0.2464 -2.9831
(0.2514) (0.3467)
Intercept -8.7107 4.1920
(1.0062) (2.5321)
Credit Score 0.3750 -11.5939
(0.5596) (1.6428)
Debt to Income Ratio 0.0996 1.9804
(0.2321) (0.5609)
Loan to Value Ratio -0.1459 4.9514
(0.2699) (0.8703)
Loan Amount 4.8957 -6.2484
(0.7943) (2.0413)
Appraisal Bias -0.4257 8.8821
(0.5069) (1.3146)
Squared Term of Appraisal Bias 0.9237 -8.6355
(1.3914) (2.4953)
Put Option -1.2851 9.2795
(0.6489) (1.5912)
Call Option 8.2279 -1.9420
(0.7078) (1.2151)
Squared Term of Put Option 2.4291 -8.5282
(1.6010) (2.6957)
Squared Term of Call Option -5.0647 2.3761
(3.0011) (5.0914)
State Unemployment Rate 0.0589 0.2513
(0.0305) (0.0675)
Logliklihood
Note: Standard errors reported in parentheses. 
Risks are estimated jointly with maximum likelihood approach.
-478,297.05
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 The parameters for the first year’s baseline hazards are fixed so that two intercepts, one 
for prepayment and one for default, can be freely estimated inside the proportional 
hazards.  
 
The baseline hazards for prepayment and default exhibit the following trend. The 
prepayment baseline hazard increases as loan ages and reaches its highest rate around a 
loan’s fifth year of age then starts decreasing afterwards. The default baseline hazard 
reaches its first peak around the fifth year of a loan’s age and then makes a sharp dip 
before it reaches its highest value after a loan has survived for at least seven years.  
 
The put and call option variables move in the direction as the theory predicts. Instead of 
evaluating the signs of the parameters for the put and call options, 48 partial derivatives 
of the hazard functions with respect to put and call options at period 1 to period 48 
evaluated at the sample mean value of each option at period 1 to period 48 are computed 
due to the existence of the squared option terms. The results show that across all periods, 
a higher put option value leads to a higher default hazard and similarly, a higher call 
option value causes the prepayment risk to increase. Setting the partial derivatives with 
respect to each option variable to zero solves for the turning point value, exceeding which 
the effect of each option on termination outcomes becomes negative. None of the call 
option value exceeds the turning point threshold, and only less than half of one percent of 
put option value exceeds the turning point threshold.     
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 The estimation results also indicate that high probability of negative equity reduces the 
prepayment hazard across all periods, whereas the impact of call option on default hazard 
is insignificant. This indicates that a borrowers with high negative equity are less likely to 
prepay, either because mortgage lenders are less likely to extend credit to those deemed 
high risk of default or because their own financial unawareness. In a favorable interest 
rate market where market rate reduces significantly, such as in 1999-2000 and 2001-2002 
periods, and call options across all types of mortgages increases substantially, one fails to 
find a significant impact of call options on default decision. This might explain that the 
default population has less financial awareness than the prepayment population. Both the 
squared terms of the put and call option impact their respective default and prepayment 
hazards significantly and negatively, indicating that the default and prepayment hazards 
increase with put and call option value in a decreasing way. 
 
The put option value, which measures the probability of negative equity in each period is 
calculated based on LTVs and house values reported by lender at origination33. These 
values might be subjected to appraisal bias. The measures of appraisal bias attempt to 
control for it and shed light on the effect of appraisal bias on mortgage terminations.  
 
Appraisal bias arises when the appraiser/lender intentionally inflates the property’s value 
to influence the result of the mortgage application evaluated by automated underwriting 
systems from large secondary mortgage market participants who decide if and how to 
extend credit lines to borrowers. The influenced results can be represented in several 
ways: an approval of the mortgage application switched from a prior rejection, a lowered 
                                                 
33 Details of how to compute probability of negative equity are provided in Appendix A.  
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 interest rate for the borrower from a prior high interest rate, or a higher cash out amount 
than what would have been given under the unbiased collateral value. Borrowers who are 
perceived to be “safe” for a certain level of pricing decisions are in fact “risky” and their 
true default risk is not captured due to manipulation of the origination collateral value.  
 
Measures of appraisal bias can serve as indicators on how desperate and incapable a 
borrower is financially. If she needs a high valuation bias in order to qualify an already 
stretched thin mortgage burden, her default risk is undoubtedly higher than those who 
would qualify for the same mortgage without inflating the collateral value. Therefore, one 
should expect measures of appraisal bias are predictive to default probabilities and the 
higher the appraisal bias, the higher the default risk.  
 
The appraisal bias used in the model measures the difference between lender-reported 
LTV at loan origination and the mark-to-market house price based predicted LTV at 
origination. The squared term of appraisal bias is also included in the model to capture 
potential non-linear effect on mortgage terminations34.    
 
Model 1 shows that coefficients on appraisal bias and its squared term are both 
significant in determining default probability. However, neither of them is significant in 
determining prepayment probability. This indicates that property valuation bias at loan 
origination does not influence prepayment behavior. Both prepayment by selling the 
house and prepayment by refinance require another appraisal of the current property 
                                                 
34 The likelihood ratio test between the non-ruthless model with (Model 1) and without controls for 
appraisal bias (Model 1’’ in Appendix C) returns a chi-square value of 355.79 with degree of freedom of 4, 
which favors the non-ruthless model with controls for appraisal bias.  
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 value. Prepayment by selling the house involves agreement on the current property price 
from the seller and the buyer, which can be assumed to be independent from the 
origination appraisal process. Prepayment by refinance is more influenced by the second 
appraisal at refinance rather than the first appraisal at origination. For example, a higher 
appraisal value at refinance might lead to a better refinance offer and a higher chance of 
approval from mortgage lenders. This value is more influenced by current housing 
market conditions than prior appraisal value at the first mortgage’s origination. 
Therefore, it is sensible that the origination property valuation bias is found to be 
insignificant in determining prepayment behaviors. Nevertheless, one should expect that 
the second appraisal at refinance would impact this new loan’s default probability in the 
future, just as the above model exhibits.  
 
The coefficients on appraisal bias and its squared term show that default probability is 
significantly influenced by origination appraisal bias. The partial derivative of the default 
hazard function with respect to appraisal bias evaluated at its minimum, 25th percentile, 
mean level, median, 75th percentile and 99th percentile are all positive, indicating a higher 
origination appraisal bias leads to a higher likelihood of default. The parameter on the 
squared term of the appraisal bias indicates that this effect is increasing in a decreasing 
fashion. The turning point for the effect to become negative is when appraisal bias 
exceeds 54 percent; only less than half of one percent of loans in the entire dataset has 
bias exceeding this value.  
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 The importance of appraisal bias on default requires it be controlled in the default 
estimation. The mis-measured negative equity based on lender reported house value by 
itself is insufficient to explain the likelihood of default. Buyers on the secondary 
mortgage market are gamed if they rely solely on lender reported property value to 
determine default probabilities and provide pricing schedules. This result calls for 
reevaluation of the magnitude of equity related variables’ impact on default probability 
and stringent rules on appraisal practice. Default risk will remain underestimated, which 
results in uncompensated extra default losses born by creditors. This in turn will lead to 
reduction in consumer credit extension if such appraisal behavior is allowed to continue. 
Effect of appraisal bias on default risk must be carefully evaluated before one begins 
investigating the impact of equity on default probability.  
 
Model 1 also addresses asymmetric information by including borrower characteristics, 
property characteristics and trigger event variables. In addition to the financial option 
variables and measures for appraisal bias, it also includes consumer credit score provided 
by Fair Isaac Corp. (e.g. FICO score) at the time of loan origination, borrower’s debt to 
income ratio at loan origination, origination LTV ratio, origination loan amount and 
quarterly state level unemployment rate where the borrower resides. It attempts to test the 
trigger event hypothesis that borrower’s willingness to exercise financial options may be 
triggered or hindered by variables other than the put and call options. The trigger event 
hypothesis states that unexpected loss of job, divorce or death in the family might induce 
the borrower to take a termination action that otherwise would not be considered utility 
maximizing.  
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For example, borrowers with weak financial conditions are more prone to unexpected 
financial disturbance than those with sound financial conditions. Borrowers’ with less 
creditworthiness, by definition, are less financially trustworthy and responsible; a small 
amount of financial chaos will likely to incur big changes in their financial behaviors. 
These borrower characteristics can be approximately reflected by consumer credit score 
at the time of the loan origination, and their debt to income ratio at loan originations. The 
macro economic conditions can be approximated by quarterly state level unemployment 
rate.     
 
There also exists asymmetric information between mortgage borrowers and lenders that 
is not captured in the financial option variables. For example, borrowers might know 
more about the volatility of their financial constraints than lenders do and hence choose 
mortgage contracts accordingly. Such asymmetry might be reflected by origination loan-
to-value (LTV) ratio, where borrowers who anticipate fluctuations in incomes might put 
in few down payments and elect mortgage contracts with high LTV ratio. Similarly, 
borrowers who are more financially constrained might select a small mortgage with a less 
value property, reflected by the size of the loan amount and LTV ratios. On the contrary, 
borrowers with no concerns on either the volatility or the soundness of their financial 
affordability might apply for big mortgages and/or large down payments and properties 
with high value and reside in areas with fast house price appreciation. Other asymmetric 
information might include whether the borrower expects to move out sooner than 
average, or if the lender charges higher rate for risky borrowers. Information asymmetry 
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 can result in biased estimates of the put and call option variables if they are not controlled 
for.  
 
Results in Model 1 shows that borrower characteristics, loan characteristics and economic 
conditions are all significant in determining one or both of the termination outcomes.  
 
The result shows that default hazard monotonically increases as origination credit rating 
deteriorates. Credit score at origination summarizes the borrower’s historical attitude 
toward credit. Not surprisingly, a borrower with a habit of delinquency and default on his 
other credit lines also has a tendency to default on his mortgage. It does not have 
deterministic power in prepayment hazard.  
 
Debt-to-income ratio is found to be positively and significantly impacting default risk; 
the higher the debt-to-income ratio at origination, the higher the default risk is. Debt-to-
income ratio at origination measures the borrower’s financial conditions. The higher the 
ratio is, the less reserves there is should the borrower be forced to readjust his financial 
plans. Once the reserves runs out, the borrower might resort to defaulting on his mortgage 
payments to reduce financial burdens. Borrowers with sound financial conditions do not 
have to exercise default option if faced with the same level of financial disturbance. 
Therefore, one should expect a positive relationship between debt-to-income ratio and 
default probability, which is confirmed by the model results. Debt-to-income ratio does 
not appear to influence prepayment option.     
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 Origination loan to value (LTV) ratio shows significant and positive impact on default 
probability. Default probability monotonically increases with origination LTV. As 
explained earlier, loan to value ratio at origination measures aspects of individual 
asymmetry that is not captured by financial option variables. Borrowers choose the 
optimal mortgage contracts to maximize their utilities. High LTV mortgage can be 
viewed as good options for borrowers who have less liquid assets for the down payment 
or who want to save for expect big fluctuations in future income flow. Both of the two 
populations of borrower are less financially stable and are more likely to exercise default 
option if disturbance occurs than people who are financially stable. Therefore, one should 
expect high original LTV ratio would lead to high probability of default. The model 
results suggest that information between borrowers and lender at origination is 
asymmetric and that there exists positive relationship between LTV ratios and default 
probability.  
 
Origination loan amount is found to be positively influencing prepayment risk and 
negatively influencing default risk. This finding once again indicates that information 
asymmetry exists between borrowers and lenders. Borrowers with big loan amount must 
have high collateral values, controlling for LTV ratio. And properties with high value are 
more likely to be offered refinance opportunities because they are less likely to default 
and incur costs on lenders. This explains why origination loan amount and prepayment 
probability are positively connected. Mortgages with small loan amount, given LTV ratio 
are those that are based on low collateral values and hence are deemed more risky to 
default. In addition, low loan amount also might reflect a borrower’s financial soundness 
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 and credit worthiness, which impact a borrower’s default risk. Therefore, one should not 
be surprised to see a high loan amount leads to high probability of prepayment and low 
probability of default.  
 
Lastly, parameters on state level quarterly unemployment rate suggest that 
unemployment rate significantly increases default probability. When economic 
conditions worsen, reflected by an increase in the state level unemployment rate, the 
mortgage default probability also increases. This indicates that controlling the put option 
value, a high unemployment rate triggers the borrower to exercise the default option that 
would not have been exercised in a low unemployment rate environment. All of the 
above results suggest that borrower characteriscs, mortgage characteristics, property 
characteristics and economic conditions provide explanatory power to default and 
prepayment behaviors. Option related variables alone are not sufficient to answer 
mortgage termination behaviors even if termination behaviors are considered financial 
options35.  
 
In summary, the model result suggests that option related variables are significant in 
determining mortgage termination outcomes. However, a non-ruthless model 
specification where borrower characteristics, property characteristics and economic 
conditions are included in addition to option variables provides a better model fit. In 
                                                 
35 Results from ruthless model specifications are similar to non-ruthless specifications, with likelihood ratio 
test favoring the non-ruthless model with appraisal bias specification. Please refer to Appendix C for details 
on estimation results for other specifications.  
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 addition, appraisal bias is found to be significantly impacting default decision, indicating 
the importance to control for it in mortgage termination studies36.   
  
3.5.2 Unobserved Heterogeneity  
This section presents estimation results where borrower heterogeneity is introduced to the 
specification.  
 
Unobserved heterogeneity arises when there are unobserved individual characteristics 
that affects the outcome of the interest. It is an important factor because heterogeneity is 
correlated with the error term and will result in biased estimates for the variables of 
interest if not controlled for. In the mortgage termination analysis, unobserved 
heterogeneity may reflect the financial astuteness of borrowers and help explain why we 
observe different prepayment speeds across borrowers. If borrowers differ in their 
astuteness toward interest rate, then those who are financially savvy are more likely to 
exercise prepayment option and those who are financially unsophisticated are more likely 
to remain in the at risk population for default. For example, Deng et al. point out in their 
paper that there appears to be three types of people in their dataset: one with the highest 
likelihood of exercising the prepayment option, the other the lowest, and another group in 
the middle. Their results suggest that given the same market and economic environment, 
the high-risk group is about three times riskier than the intermediate group, and about 
                                                 
36 Several versions of different starting values are tested in all the model specifications and the parameters 
estimated remain to be very close, indicating stable estimates. In addition, similar results have also been 
obtained in multinomial discrete choice model specifications where default and prepayment are jointly 
estimated in a conditional probability framework. The multinomial results confirm what have been 
established in the competing risk proportional hazard models with similar parameters estimates and same 
conclusions. 
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 twenty times riskier than the low risk group in terms of prepayment. They didn’t find 
heterogeneity in terms of exercising the default option (Deng, Quigley and Van Order 
2000). Huang and Ondrich (2002) adopt Deng’s approach and conclude that failing to 
control for unobserved heterogeneity can lead to severe biases in the coefficient estimates 
of key covariates. The claim that borrowers’ difference in financial awareness is picked 
up by the unobserved heterogeneity is one of the plausible interpretations; there exists 
other interpretations such as the heterogeneity may be attributed to unmeasured house-
specific factors, e.g., unexpected depreciation or appreciation of property values, as well 
as borrower tastes or abilities. I will use the difference in borrowers’ attitude 
interpretation throughout the paper.  
 
As illustrated in the previous section, the approach taken here is different from what 
Deng et al. employed because theirs restricts the heterogeneity between prepayment and 
default to be monotonically correlated. Because they assign the same probability to 
default and prepayment heterogeneity, the two heterogeneities move in the same 
direction. The approach taken here is a different implementation of the Heckman-Singer 
mass point distribution where I allow default and prepayment to move independently and 
have independent probabilities.  
 
Specifically, I assume a 2x2 discrete support for the distribution of default and 
prepayment heterogeneity. I assume there are two types of individuals for each risk; their 
joint distribution and associated probabilities are presented in the following table.  
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 dp θθ /         Marginal Probability of 1dθ 2dθ pθ  
1
pθ         11p 12p 1211 pp +  
2
pθ         21p 22p 2221 pp +  
Marginal Probability of dθ  2111 pp +  2212 pp +  1 
 
This setup does not restrict default and prepayment heterogeneity location parameters to 
move in the same direction with the same probability. One freely estimates five of the 
eight parameters with restrictions that all probabilities sum to one, the heterogeneity is 
distributed mean one (in the exponential specification, it can be approximated by mean 
zero) and all probabilities must range between zero and one.  
 
The above restrictions can be translated into the following expressions:  
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The five free parameters to be estimated are 
),,,,( 11211211 pd θθρρρ  
 
Likelihood ratio tests suggest that models that controlled for unobserved heterogeneity 
generate better fit than its counterparts that do not control for heterogeneity. The 
likelihood ratio test before and after controlling for heterogeneity returns a chi-square 
value of 2152.42 with 5 degrees of freedom for the non-ruthless model with controls for 
appraisal bias, favoring the specification with heterogeneity37.  
 
Between the two models that controlled for unobserved heterogeneity, the likelihood ratio 
test suggests that the best model fitness is generated by the non-ruthless model with bias 
measures, followed by the non-ruthless model without appraisal bias. The chi-square 
values generated by the likelihood ratio tests between the non-ruthless model with bias 
measures and its respective restricted versions are 432.57 with 4 degrees of freedom.  
 
                                                 
37 The likelihood ratio test for the non-ruthless model without controls for appraisal bias before and after 
controlling for heterogeneity returns a chi-square value of 2075.64 with 5 degree of freedom, favoring the 
heterogeneity specification. 
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 The following Model 2 presents the non-ruthless model specification with appraisal bias 
where unobserved heterogeneity is controlled38.   
 
 
Table V. Maximum Likelihood Estimation of Competing Risks Proportional Hazard 
Model – Model 2: Non-Ruthless Model With Unobserved Heterogeneity and Controls for 
Appraisal Bias 
                                                 
38 Model 2’ in Appendix C presents the non-ruthless model specification with unobserved heterogeneity 
without controls for appraisal bias.  
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 Prepayment Default
baseline hazard parameters
2 years of age -0.8324 -4.0908
(0.2367) (0.1926)
3 years of age -0.6595 -3.6619
(0.2369) (0.2343)
4 years of age -0.4662 -3.5446
(0.2382) (0.2712)
5 years of age -0.0957 -3.4131
(0.2420) (0.3066)
6 years of age -0.0779 -3.6288
 (0.2644) (0.3906)
>6 years of age 0.0429 -2.6978
(0.2584) (0.3650)
Intercept -8.6928 -2.3670
(1.1772) (3.2246)
Credit Score 0.1393 -12.1071
(0.6868) (1.7988)
Debt to Income Ratio 0.2545 1.9957
(0.2818) (0.6033)
Loan to Value Ratio 0.0333 4.3569
(0.3173) (0.9048)
Loan Amount 4.5712 -1.9428
(0.9486) (2.1787)
Appraisal Bias -0.7063 8.7681
(0.6470) (1.4168)
Squared Term of Appraisal Bias 1.6886 -8.6199
(1.4938) (2.7429)
Put Option -1.6059 8.5607
(0.6486) (1.6587)
Call Option 8.1473 0.0379
(0.7608) (1.2597)
Squared Term of Put Option 2.9953 -7.5961
(1.8601) (2.8785)
Squared Term of Call Option 1.2369 3.2613
(3.7953) (6.3509)
State Unemployment Rate 0.0670 0.2390
(0.0351) (0.0741)
vd1
vp1
rho11
rho12
rho21
Logliklihood
Note: Standard errors reported in parentheses. 
Risks are estimated jointly with maximum likelihood approach.
2.6229
-6.8112
(8.1958)
(2.0265)
-6.9287
(0.8083)
(0.9536)
-477,220.84
-0.9404
(0.8640)
1.9208
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 The inclusion of the unobserved heterogeneity does not change the fundamental 
relationship between financial variables and prepayment and default hazards. Prepayment 
hazard remains to be positively influenced by call option and negatively influenced by 
put option and default hazard remains to be positively influenced by put option. And 
appraisal bias continues to positively impact default risk.  
 
The non-ruthless model with controls for appraisal bias suggests that there exist groups of 
people whose attitudes toward prepayment are different, but their attitudes toward default 
are the same.  
 
dp θθ /     0  0  Marginal Probability of pθ  
-6.929    0.102  0.102  0.204 
1.771    0.695  0.102  0.797 
Marginal Probability of dθ  0.797  0.204  1 
 
The above matrix shows the prepayment and default heterogeneity locations and its 
respective marginal probability and joint density. The result indicates that there exist two 
groups of borrowers who possess different trends of prepayment risks: one high and one 
low. According to the heterogeneity parameters, 79.7 percent of people have a high 
tendency toward prepayment risk, whereas 20.4 percent of the people have low astuteness 
toward prepayment. There does not appear to be any heterogeneity in the default space39.  
                                                 
39 I further expand the prepayment heterogeneity into 3, 4 and 5 mass points and reduce the default 
heterogeneity into none. The log likelihood functions are unchanged but several mass points become 
insignificant. The coefficients of other parameters remain unchanged. 
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Literature on mortgage terminations establishes that majority of mortgage borrowers are 
financially savvy toward prepayment opportunities and resistant toward default behaviors 
(Huang and Ondrich 2002). Their findings are based on analyses without measures for 
appraisal bias. Hence I estimate the non-ruthless specification without controls for 
appraisal bias to compare with their results. The result confirms previous findings that 
majority of people have a high tendency toward prepayment and low tendency toward 
default. In addition, prepayment heterogeneity and default heterogeneity are negatively 
correlated: people who are more likely to prepay are also very unlikely to default and 
vice versa40.    
 
As Model 2 exhibits, the heterogeneity in default space disappears after controlling for 
appraisal bias. A plausible explanation for the disappearance of default heterogeneity is 
that the heterogeneity in default may be captured by appraisal bias and hence become 
insignificant in the full model. There still exist different types of people whose attitude 
toward prepayment is different and their differences are significant in explaining 
prepayment behavior. The difference in default is fully captured in the full specification 
model, whereas there is less difference in prepayment that are yet to be captured. 
The heterogeneity results confirm that there exist different trends of prepayment or 
default behaviors among borrowers when we fail to incorporate all variables that 
governing mortgage terminations into the models. In this case, heterogeneity needs to be 
controlled in order to obtain correct estimates of the variables of interest.  
 
                                                 
40 Please refer to Model 2’ in Appendix C. 
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 The approach employed here is a general implementation of Heckman-Singer’s mass 
point heterogeneity distribution. The mass point distribution is utilized to reduce 
unnecessary and incorrect assumptions on the distribution in order to achieve optimal 
estimation results. Specifically, the specification applied here assumes there exists a 2X2 
distribution of default and prepayment heterogeneities. Default and prepayment 
heterogeneities can move freely with no restrictions on the directions and relative 
magnitude.  
 
The specification further eliminates the correlation imposed on prepayment and default 
heterogeneities. It does not suffer from the limited applications that previous researchers 
relied. Namely, the specification designed in this paper relaxes the dependency and 
monotonic relationship that previous studies imposed on the default and prepayment 
heterogeneity. The results, unlike Huang and Ondrich (2002) which shows prepayment 
and default awareness move in the same direction, suggest that the majority people who 
exhibit a high probability of prepayment also have a low probability of default. This 
result is confirmed by many empirical studies. 
 
For completeness, Model 3 in Appendix C presents the single risk proportional hazard 
model with non-ruthless specification to compare with the competing risk specification. 
Due to the flexible single risk specification, variables that are not predictive to 
prepayment risk are removed from the prepayment model. A comparison of the 
coefficient estimates across the single risk and the competing risk without heterogeneity 
model suggests that the results of them are virtually identical. For this data set, explicitly 
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 controlling for the possibility that default and prepayment occur in the same quarter 
makes almost no difference in the coefficient estimates. This result should not be 
surprising given the relative infrequency of the default events. However, in the model 
that controls for unobserved heterogeneity, the magnitudes of several coefficient 
estimates changed. For example, the coefficient of put option has decreased from 9.21 to 
8.56; the coefficient of loan amount has decreased from –6.1 to insignificant. These 
results suggest that failing to control for unobserved heterogeneity may lead to severe 
biases in the coefficient estimates of key covariates.     
 
In order to demonstrate that McCall’s ½ - ½ weight assumption is inappropriate for 
mortgage termination studies, I present the estimation results based on McCall’s 
assumption in Model 4 in Appendix C. Comparing the estimation results from Model 1 
and Model 4, one concludes that allowing the data to freely estimate the weight not only 
provides a better model fit than the ½ - ½ arbitrary assumption as represented by the 
likelihood ratio test, but also provides meaningful estimates of the covariates. It turns out 
that under the arbitrary weight assumption, most of the covariates become insignificant, 
contrary to theory predictions. The ½ - ½ assumption on the last period hazard rate on 
competing risks with grouped duration data may be appropriate in part-time vs. full-time 
unemployment studies because the two risks are very alike. It is inappropriate for 
mortgage termination studies because default risk and prepayment risk are drastically 
different. While prepayments occur with more than 50% likelihood, defaults are only a 
fraction of a percent. As demonstrated by the model results, one needs to estimate the 
weight jointly with the model covariates in order to achieve meaning outcome.      
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3.5.3 Predicted Hazards  
This section provides graphical comparison between empirical hazards and model 
predicted hazards for prepayment and default. It also presents the relationship between 
prepayment hazard by calendar time and market interest rate. 
 
Figure 2 compares the Kaplan-Meier empirical termination hazards for prepayment 
(Panel A) and default (Panel B) with the average predicted hazards from the non-ruthless 
model with heterogeneity (Model 2).  The prediction does a good job tracking the 
empirical data for prepayment hazard for 25 or less quarter durations. Although still 
tracking the movement of the actual prepayment, the prediction does not capture the rapid 
up rise after 36 quarters. This is primarily due to small sample size. Only less than 5 
percent of the loan observations were originated prior to 1995, making potential at risk 
loans with 36 or more quarter durations very few. The actual default hazard presents 
larger volatility than actual prepayment hazard. Default is a rare event, with the highest 
observed per quarter hazard less than 0.04 percent. According to the empirical hazards, 
prepayment hazard can be as high as 1000 times greater than default hazard. Coupled 
with the significant reduction in surviving sample due to termination by prepay after 20 
quarter of durations, default becomes hard to track by the prediction. Nevertheless, the 
predicted default hazard tracks the general trend of actual default with less accuracy than 
its counterpart for prepayment.        
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 Figure 2. Actual vs. Predicted Hazards 
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 Figure 3 presents the relationship between predicted prepayment hazard by calendar time 
 
 
and market interest rate. Because call option moves in the opposite direction to interest 
rate, one should expect that calendar specific prepayment hazard is negatively correlated
with market interest rate. The market interest rate is obtained from Freddie Mac’s 30-year
fixed rate mortgage interest rate survey (www.freddiemac.com). Predicted prepayment 
hazard is negatively correlated with market interest rate; the local highest prepayment 
usually corresponds to the local lowest interest rate and vise versa. The correlation 
coefficient and its statistical significance are included in Figure 3. It indicates that 
prepayment hazard by calendar time closely tracks the movement of market interes
and they are negatively correlated.   
t rate 
Figure 3. Prepayment Hazard and Market Interest Rate 
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 3.6 Conclusion 
This paper analyzes mortgage terminations in a competing risk proportional hazard with 
grouped duration data framework. It treats default and prepayment as interdependent 
risks and jointly estimates both termination outcomes in maximum likelihood estimation.  
 
The paper verifies the importance of financial option variables in mortgage terminations. 
It suggests that the financial value of the call option is strongly associated with the 
prepayment action and the probability of negative equity is strongly associated with the 
default option. The results also provide support for the interdependence between 
prepayment and default behaviors. It indicates that borrowers whose put option is in the 
money, which translates to a high default hazard, also have low prepayment hazards. 
 
This paper also tests borrower characteristics, loan characteristics and trigger events such 
as economic conditions in addition to the financial option variables and concludes that 
variable that measure individual specific information provides improvement to the model 
fit. For example, borrowers with low credit score are more likely to default than those 
with high credit scores; borrowers with small financial buffers are more likely to default 
than those with big buffers. Also, borrowers tend to choose mortgage contract according 
to their preferences for risk and expected future behaviors.  Lastly the state level 
quarterly unemployment rate is predictive in default behaviors, suggesting the impact of 
trigger event exists. All the above findings indicate that financial option variables 
themselves are not sufficient to govern borrowers’ mortgage termination behaviors.  
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 This paper also controls for unobserved heterogeneity in the population and estimates the 
heterogeneity simultaneously with the parameters and the baseline hazards associated wit 
prepayment and default functions. The paper contributes to the literature by applying a 
general specification of the Heckman-Singer mass point non-parametric heterogeneity 
distribution. The result generated by this specification produces fruitful results about the 
relationship between default and prepayment, which is confirmed by many empirical 
studies. The heterogeneity results suggest that there exist differences among mortgage 
borrowers, particularly regarding prepayment. If not controlled, the unobserved 
heterogeneity will lead to biased estimation of the parameters of interest.  
 
The most important feature of this paper is the inclusion of the measures for origination 
appraisal bias.  
 
Appraisal bias is the natural product of the secondary mortgage market structure where 
mortgage buyers and mortgage lenders face information asymmetry. Mortgage lenders 
know more about the quality of the mortgage than mortgage buyers do and it is relatively 
costly for mortgage buyers to verify the truthfulness of the information provided by 
mortgage lenders. The asymmetric information structure creates incentives for mortgage 
lender to maximize his utility function at the expense of mortgage buyers.  
 
Appraisal bias refers to actions taken by mortgage lenders who intentionally inflate 
collateral property values to under report default risks in order to maximize their profit at 
the expense of mortgage buyers. This practice brings revenue to lenders either through 
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 expanded business or customer satisfaction or increased bonuses. This practice, on the 
other hand, affects the measure of equity variables and leads to miscalculated default risk 
of a borrower. Therefore, mortgage buyers who bear the default risk of mortgages will be 
adversely impacted and incur unnecessary credit loss imposed by the unmeasured bias. If 
the credit loss incurred by mortgage buyers keeps increasing, one would expect that 
honest lenders be penalized with a high fee or secondary mortgage market buyers start 
tightening credit extension, significantly reducing credit supplies for borrowers.  
 
Realizing all the adverse impact by appraisal bias, one concludes that it shall be 
controlled for in order to reach a correct and unbiased measure of default risk related 
variables.  
 
This paper uses a unique dataset that allows me to quantify measures of appraisal bias. 
The results suggest that appraisal bias significantly increase default hazards across all 
model specifications. The higher the appraisal bias is, the higher the default risk. In 
addition, inclusion of measures of appraisal bias appears to alleviate the unobserved 
heterogeneity existed on the default side and provides superior estimation results. This 
suggests that one needs to update his belief on the magnitude of equity related variables 
on default and infer the correct default risk and price accordingly.  
 
Future research should continue on identifying variables that can explain the prepayment 
behaviors, suggested by the heterogeneity existed on the prepayment side.  
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 In addition, researchers should continue improving the measures on appraisal bias. The 
bias measured in the paper is based on a unique dataset where a property enters the 
dataset twice with the first transaction a purchase transaction. The data reflects properties 
that had been purchased at least once within a certain time limit, which may not reflect 
the entire mortgage market in the present. In the future, researchers should try expanding 
the dataset to contain as much properties and transactions occurred across a larger 
horizon to capture the entire market condition.  
 
Another approach of controlling for appraisal bias can be realized by implicitly correct 
for appraisal bias in the put option calculation instead of explicitly entering it into the 
model. Since the put option is computed based on house value, which in turn is 
determined by appraisal bias, one can correct the appraisal bias by correcting the put 
option value directly. Therefore, the model comparisons could be one that focus on 
measurement error and based on non-nested statistical model inference.  
 
Non-nested model and hypotheses are called for where there is a need for statistical 
procedures for testing non-nested, or separate, parametric families of hypotheses. In these 
situations, one model cannot be obtained from the other by imposing appropriate 
restrictions or as a limiting suitable approximation. And the conventional model 
performance comparison tests cannot in general be used for hypotheses of the non-nested 
type. In my example, a put option variable based on lender reported house value and a put 
option variable based on appraisal bias adjusted house value create two models that are 
non-nested and one cannot conclude on the model fitness by the usual tests. These tests of 
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 separate models are specification tests that use information about a specific alternative 
and test whether the null can predict the performance of the alternative. The non-nested 
model test results can give inference on how to best correct for appraisal bias.  
 
Theoretical research can also be done on solving for an optimal game structure such that 
the incentive for appraisal bias disappears. Eliminating the incentive for appraisal bias 
can completely erase the existence of appraisal bias and avoid unnecessary losses to 
participants in the residential mortgage market.   
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 Appendix A: Specification of Call and Put Option Variables 
Appendix A and B are borrowed extensively from Deng et. al. (2000). Following directly 
from Deng, Quigley, and Van Order (1996, 2000), the variables measuring the value of 
the call and put options are defined by the initial terms of the mortgage and current 
market conditions.  
 
A fixed-rate mortgage  with an original loan amount of , a mortgage note rate of , 
and a monthly payment of  in principal and interest and mortgage term  in 
quarters. At each quarter  after origination at time 
i iO ir
iP iTM
k iτ , the local market interest rate is 
, where kj im +τ, j  indexes the local region. The call option variable is defined as the 
difference in the present value of the payment stream at the current market interest rate 
and mortgage note rate: 
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Since interest rate is always measured annually and in percentage, and the observation 
windows are in quarterly, we apply 4, the number of quarters in a year and 100, to change 
it from its normal form to a decimal value measured by quarters. 3 is the number of 
months in a quarter and we use it to compute the quarterly principal and interest 
payments.  
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 The call option value variable changes each quarter due to quarterly changes in market 
interest rate. It measured the difference between a borrower’s present value of mortgage 
payment evaluated at her contract note rate and that evaluated at the current market rate. 
A positive call option indicates prepayment option is valuable to exercise.   
 
The put option variable is defined as the probability that the ratio of contemporaneous 
equity to market value of the mortgage is negative. The contemporaneous property value 
 is constructed as mapping the origination property value to current by the quarterly 
zip code level weighted repeated sale house price index; the contemporaneous mortgage 
value is simply  listed above. The ratio of equity to market value of the mortgage 
is:  
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The put option is defined as the probability that equity is negative: 
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where  is cumulative standard normal distribution function, and  is the estimated 
variance defined in Appendix B. The more negative the put option value is, the more 
likely the default option is exercised. 
)(⋅Φ 2ω
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 Appendix B: The Weighted Repeated Sales House Price Index 
The weighted repeated sales (WRS) method was first proposed by Bailey, Muth and 
Nourse (1963) and implemented empirically in the 1980s by Case and Shiller (1987; 
1989). This method uses two consecutive property transaction prices to estimate the 
average appreciation rate for the location.  
 
Since the time between the transaction pairs can vary within the sample, this method 
suggests a three-stage estimation procedure to address it. First, time dummies are used to 
generate average value changes for cohorts of transactions. Secondly, the variance is 
assumed to be a function of time difference between two transactions and its square term. 
Hence the error term from the 1st stage is regressed on time difference and its square 
term. Lastly, a generalized least square regression is employed with the weights equal the 
fitted residuals from the 2nd stage.  
 
Following Bailey, Muth, and Nourse (1963) exactly and borrowing from Deng et. al. 
(2000), the model assumes that the natural logarithm of the price of house  at time  can 
be expressed in terms of a market price index, a Gaussian random walk and white noise, 
such that 
i t
itittit NHIP ++=  
where  is the logarithm of the market house price level,  is a Gaussian random walk 
with the following assumption: 
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 and  is white noise with the following assumption: itN
22
2
1)(
,0)(
vit
it
NE
NE
σ=
=
 
In addition,  and  are assumed to be independent. itH itN
 
This specification allows us to express the percent change in transaction prices as a 
function of an average appreciation rate over time. The Gaussian random walk describes 
how variation in individual house price appreciation rates around the rate of change in the 
market index causes house prices to vary over time. The white noise represents cross-
sectional dispersion in housing values arising from purely idiosyncratic differences in 
how the individual properties are valued at any given point in time.  
 
The model is estimated on paired sales properties. In the first stage, the log price of the 
second sale minus the log price of the first sale is regressed on a set of dummy variables, 
one for each time period in the sample except the first period. The dummy variables have 
values of 1 for the quarter of the second sale, -1 for the quarter of the first sale and zeros 
otherwise. 
 
In the second stage, the squared residuals  from each observation in the first stage are 
regressed on  and  
2ω
k 2k
22 CkBkA ++=ω  
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 where  is the interval between the first and second sale. The coefficients , k A B , and  
are estimates of , , and  respectively. 
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In the third stage, the stage one regression is re-estimated by GLS with weights 
. The estimated log price level difference  is distributed with 
mean , and variance . Denote  as the 
estimated zip code level house price index, in th quarter subsequent to purchase, 
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 Appendix C: Other Specification Estimations 
Model 1'. Maximum Likelihood Estimation Of Competing Risk Proportional Hazard Model
- Ruthless Model With Controls For Appraisal Bias 
Prepayment Default
baseline hazard parameters
2 years of age -2.8048 -6.0333
(0.2352) (0.1805)
3 years of age -2.6302 -5.3693
(0.2334) (0.1979)
4 years of age -2.4760 -5.0901
(0.2316) (0.2199)
5 years of age -2.0906 -4.9936
(0.2317) (0.2400)
6 years of age -2.1754 -5.2020
 (0.2495) (0.3064)
>6 years of age -2.2818 -4.8190
(0.2484) (0.2946)
Intercept -0.5110 -3.8511
(0.2194) (0.2265)
Appraisal Bias -0.3025 8.4178
(0.4761) (1.3021)
Squared Term of Appraisal Bias 0.2381 -7.7983
(1.4535) (2.3362)
Put Option -1.2066 14.1848
(0.6054) (1.3888)
Call Option 8.6958 0.0134
(0.7084) (1.0802)
Squared Term of Put Option 1.9046 -13.1606
(1.6105) (2.4858)
Squared Term of Call Option -5.9875 -0.6570
(3.0321) (5.0358)
Logliklihood
Note: Standard errors reported in parentheses. 
Risks are estimated jointly with maximum likelihood approach.
-481,474.04
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Model 1''. Maximum Likelihood Estimation Of Competing Risk Proportional Hazard Model
- Non-Ruthless Model Without Controls For Appraisal Bias
Prepayment Default
baseline hazard parameters
2 years of age -0.7986 -4.2309
(0.2358) (0.1878)
3 years of age -0.6352 -3.7599
(0.2345) (0.2150)
4 years of age -0.4902 -3.7299
(0.2348) (0.2439)
5 years of age -0.1009 -3.6463
(0.2349) (0.2679)
6 years of age -0.1410 -3.8413
 (0.2518) (0.3355)
>6 years of age -0.2489 -3.1738
(0.2510) (0.3257)
Intercept -8.7036 5.1007
(1.0010) (2.3413)
Credit Score 0.4315 -11.7820
(0.5507) (1.5082)
Debt to Income Ratio 0.0975 1.7068
(0.2321) (0.5142)
Loan to Value Ratio -0.1576 3.3629
(0.2675) (0.7115)
Loan Amount 4.8573 -5.3766
(0.7934) (1.9191)
Put Option -1.2428 8.2501
(0.6076) (1.5533)
Call Option 8.2040 -0.8837
(0.7043) (1.1385)
Squared Term of Put Option 2.3828 -8.0380
(1.5967) (2.7349)
Squared Term of Call Option -4.9707 1.4358
(2.9930) (4.9642)
State Unemployment Rate 0.0595 0.2686
(0.0305) (0.0654)
Logliklihood
Note: Standard errors reported in parentheses. 
Risks are estimated jointly with maximum likelihood approach.
-478,474.95
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Model 1'''. Maximum Likelihood Estimation Of Competing Risk Proportional Hazard Model
- Ruthless Model Without Controls For Appraisal Bias
Prepayment Default
baseline hazard parameters
2 years of age -2.8053 -6.0600
(0.2349) (0.1765)
3 years of age -2.6293 -5.4741
(0.2331) (0.1919)
4 years of age -2.4742 -5.2850
(0.2312) (0.2106)
5 years of age -2.0870 -5.2318
(0.2311) (0.2267)
6 years of age -2.1726 -5.4337
 (0.2490) (0.2923)
>6 years of age -2.2810 -4.9967
(0.2480) (0.2793)
Intercept -0.5173 -3.3699
(0.2184) (0.1981)
Put Option -1.1848 12.8848
(0.5929) (1.2563)
Call Option 8.6655 1.2152
(0.7036) (1.0128)
Squared Term of Put Option 1.8964 -12.7325
(1.6085) (2.3527)
Squared Term of Call Option -5.9203 -1.0794
(3.0250) (4.5281)
Logliklihood
Note: Standard errors reported in parentheses. 
Risks are estimated jointly with maximum likelihood approach.
-481,631.22
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p1
o11
o12
o21
ogliklihood
Note: Standard errors reported in parentheses. 
Risks are estimated jointly with maximum likelihood approach.
5.6134
(1.1588)
-12.4279
(0.6745)
-7.4191
(1.5515)
-2.6274
(0.3833)
-477,437.13
-2.9806
(0.2361)
Model 2'. Maximum Likelihood Estimation Of Competing Risk Proportional Hazard Model
- Non-Ruthless Model With Unobserved Heterogeneity, Without Controlls For Appraisal Bias
Prepayment Default
baseline hazard parameters
2 years of age -0.8316 -4.1484
(0.2365) (0.1778)
3 years of age -0.6566 -3.5015
(0.2366) (0.1949)
4 years of age -0.4656 -3.2590
(0.2378) (0.2266)
5 years of age -0.0954 -3.1345
(0.2414) (0.2582)
6 years of age -0.0823 -3.2867
 (0.2639) (0.3298)
>6 years of age 0.0341 -2.5222
(0.2582) (0.3067)
Intercept -8.9173 6.1348
(1.1669) (2.6388)
Credit Score 0.2340 -15.2867
(0.6705) (1.4107)
Debt to Income Ratio 0.2501 2.0708
(0.2762) (0.6425)
Loan to Value Ratio -0.0051 3.8461
(0.3126) (0.7995)
Loan Amount 4.5115 -7.0982
(0.9416) (2.1174)
Put Option -1.5115 9.0167
(0.6426) (1.5232)
Call Option 8.1190 -0.9131
(0.7564) (1.0982)
Squared Term of Put Option 2.8931 -8.0856
(1.8966) (2.4256)
Squared Term of Call Option 1.1513 10.7734
(3.8317) (5.4462)
State Unemployment Rate 0.0672 0.1887
(0.0349) (0.0621)
vd1
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 Model 3. Maximum Likelihood Estimation of Single Risk Proportional Hazard Model
- Non-Ruthless Model
Prepayment Default
baseline hazard parameters
2 years of age -0.8025 -4.1829
(0.2346) (0.1895)
3 years of age -0.6428 -3.6481
(0.2329) (0.2178)
4 years of age -0.5024 -3.5176
(0.2324) (0.2474)
5 years of age -0.1138 -3.3501
(0.2318) (0.2781)
6 years of age -0.1551 -3.5753
 (0.2486) (0.3481)
>6 years of age -0.2611 -2.9627
(0.2474) (0.3442)
Intercept -8.3100 3.9370
(0.8923) (2.5198)
Credit Score . -11.4915
. (1.6281)
Debt to Income Ratio . 1.9761
. (0.5561)
Loan to Value Ratio . 4.9386
. (0.8639)
Loan Amount 4.7154 -6.0626
(0.7500) (2.0323)
Appraisal Bias . 8.8814
. (1.3061)
Squared Term of Appraisal Bias . -8.6491
. (2.4927)
Put Option -1.4891 9.2090
(0.7972) (1.5910)
Call Option 8.1863 -1.7433
(0.6990) (1.2152)
Squared Term of Put Option 2.6667 -8.4970
(1.5168) (2.7219)
Squared Term of Call Option -4.8917 3.5119
(2.9780) (5.0555)
State Unemployment Rate 0.0622 0.2486
(0.0302) (0.0671)
Logliklihood -473,121.20 -5,240.41
Note: Standard errors reported in parentheses. 
Risks are estimated jointly with maximum likelihood approach.
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 Model 4. Maximum Likelihood Estimation Of Competing Risk Proportional Hazard Model
- Using McCall's 1/2 - 1/2 Assumption on the Weight instead of Estimating the Weight
Prepayment Default
baseline hazard parameters
2 years of age -0.8020 -9.3644
(0.2334) (0.8766)
3 years of age -0.6377 -7.8722
(0.2321) (2.1269)
4 years of age -0.4940 -8.3301
(0.2327) (0.9455)
5 years of age -0.1055 -9.3884
(0.2331) (0.5304)
6 years of age -0.1447 -6.2023
 (0.2500) (2.5338)
>6 years of age -0.2477 -5.9131
(0.2490) (2.5228)
Intercept -8.6045 -2.1034
(0.9997) (5.6193)
Credit Score 0.3077 -12.1277
(0.5566) (6.0774)
Debt to Income Ratio 0.1036 1.5661
(0.2310) (4.5524)
Loan to Value Ratio -0.1396 3.5560
(0.2690) (6.9674)
Loan Amount 4.8435 -0.7064
(0.7899) (3.3823)
Appraisal Bias -0.3993 9.0292
(0.5037) (5.4584)
Squared Term of Appraisal Bias 0.9322 -8.9700
(1.3606) (13.3389)
Put Option -1.2080 9.1640
(0.8909) (12.8536)
Call Option 8.1939 -0.8390
(0.7043) (9.5221)
Squared Term of Put Option 2.3614 -7.5192
(1.5820) (16.0577)
Squared Term of Call Option -5.0767 2.9676
(2.9858) (2.7376)
State Unemployment Rate 0.0596 -1.6188
(0.0304) (0.8341)
Logliklihood
Note: Standard errors reported in parentheses. 
Risks are estimated jointly with maximum likelihood approach.
-569,270.70
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